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analysis using microdata. However, international comparisons ( and index number theory 
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Abstract 
In this thesis, an analysis of the use of multilateral true welfare indexes in cross-country 
welfare comparisons is presented. There are two main goals of the study. The first 
aim is to present a comprehensive review of different approaches to conducting cross-
country welfare comparisons, with particular emphasis on the Revealed Preference (RP) 
approach to welfare measurement. In Chapter 1, a review of the different approaches to 
index number construction is presented. The RP approach to welfare measurement is 
reviewed, and the construction of bilateral and multilateral true welfare indexes under 
this approach is introduced. In Chapter 2, RP tests for common general preferences are 
reviewed and three approaches to constructing bilateral true welfare indexes are outlined. 
In Chapter 3, results on the existence and construction of multilateral true welfare indexes 
are presented and the Ideal Afriat Index of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) is constructed 
using 1980 and 1993 data from the International Comparison Programme (ICP). 
The second aim of the thesis is to present three extensions on the use of multilateral 
true indexes in cross-country welfare comparisons, and to apply these extensions to the 
ICP data. One of the criticism of the standard RP approach to welfare measurement 
is that it is non-stochastic in that it does not allow for the existence of measurement 
or consumer optimisation error. In Chapter 4, the RP approach is extended to enable 
approximate multilateral welfare comparisons. It is found that under moderate levels 
of consumer optimisation error, the pairwise rankings between certain countries change, 
thus suggesting that these countries should perhaps be ranked as equivalent. 
Homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique (i.e. base-country 
invariant) welfare index. However , homotheticity is very restrictive and in Chapter 5, 
results on the construction of unique marginal welfare indexes, which exist under affine 
homothetic preferences ( of which, homotheticity is a special case) and measure the utility 
gained from supernumerary consumption, are presented. A particular multilateral true 
marginal index, the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index, is proposed and it is shown that the 
Ideal Afriat Index is a special case of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 
xv 
The Ideal Afriat Marginal Index is constructed for a particular subsistence consumption 
bundle. For a given data set , an iterative procedure can be used to find the range within 
which the subsistence bundles must lie (for a homothetic data set , one of the subsistence 
bundles will be a vector of zeros). By taking a sample of possible subsistence bundles we 
can construct bounds t o the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes and bounds to the rankings 
implied by these indexes. For the ICP data, it is found that there are inconsistencies 
in the country rankings implied by the Ideal Afriat Index in that there exists another 
( equally valid) minimum subsistence bundle that results in different rankings. It is also 
shown that a comparison of the Ideal Afriat Index and the bounds to the Ideal Afriat 
Marginal Indexes can be used to identify poor and non-poor countries. 
The majority of research on cross-country comparisons of welfare are based on per capita 
expenditure on goods and services; such measures of economic welfare ignore an im-
portant commodity, leisure, which a consumer purchases implicitly by not working. In 
Chapter 6 the joint commodity demand-labour supply framework is used to extend the 
RP approach to include the value of leisure time. A leisure-inclusive multilateral true 
welfare index is defined, and it is found that for the 1993 ICP data, the inclusion of 
leisure can have a marked impact on the welfare rankings of countries . 
XVl 
Introduction 
"The ground has been trodden so often that what one makes of it might be a 
personal accident." Sidney N. Afriat (1987, p.195) on index number theory. 
There is a considerable body of research on the methods for constructing measures of real 
income for use in cross-country living standards comparisons. This research has partly 
been driven by the availability of cross-country data sets which contain comparable and 
highly disaggregated price and quantity data for countries from the entire development 
spectrum (the International Comparison Programme, ICP, is a good example of such a 
data source). Another factor contributing to continuing research on aggregation meth-
ods in the context of cross-country living standards comparisons is the demand for the 
comparative data that these methods produce. 
For example, rankings of countries in terms of GDP per capita are used as an indicator 
of comparative economic performance, and thus evidence of the success or failure of 
different policy regimes. The measurement of convergence ( or lack thereof) in countries' 
productivity and living standards is central to distinguishing between the neoclassical 
growth model and models of endogenous growth; such measurement requires as input 
consistent cross-country real income data. Cross-country rankings of living standards 
are also of direct interest to multilateral lending organisations, and are an important 
input into the determination of aid flows to developing countries. 
However, one can argue that the major reason for the enduring popularity of research 
into cross-country welfare comparisons is that it is an application of the intrinsically 
fascinating area of index number theory. Index number theory is one of the oldest fields 
in economics, and has attracted the attention of some of the brightest minds in the 
discipline ( and the rest of us). The body of research on index number theory is so large, 
that the above quote of Sidney N. Afriat seems particularly pertinent to one who is trying 
1 
2 Introduction 
to make an original contribution to the field. 
There are two main aims of this thesis. The first is to present a comprehensive review 
of different approaches to conducting cross-country welfare comparisons. This review, 
which is contained in the first three chapters, covers the major results in index number 
theory which are relevant to cross-country welfare comparisons. Further, there is an 
attempt to present some of the more mathematically challenging results in index number 
theory in a form which is accessible to a wider audience, and thus hopefully reduce the 
"start-up costs" associated with beginning research in this area. This review has been 
particularly rewarding to the author, who himself found some difficulty in understanding 
some of the source material. Indeed one could add to Afriat 's quote: "The path that 
Afriat trod is difficult to follow, and success in this might be a personal accident." 
While the material in Chapters 1-3 is essentially a review of previous work in the field, 
there are several innovative aspects of this review. In particular, a new typology which 
identifies the Revealed Preference (RP) approach to welfare measurement as an example 
of the economic approach to index number construction is presented. Under the RP ap-
proach, the existence of a representative consumer is tested for using revealed preference 
relations and true welfare indexes are constructed when the hypothesis that data are 
rationalised by a utility function cannot be rejected. The RP approach to index number 
construction has mainly been used in the context of within-country cost-of-living mea-
surement. However, the RP approach is increasingly being used in cross-country welfare 
comparisons - the Ideal Afriat Index of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) is an example. 
There has been a lot of research on the RP approach; one of the aims of the review chap-
ters is to incorporate the main results into a consistent framework which will hopefully 
be of use to other researchers working in this area. The assumptions required to con-
struct within-country cost-of-living indexes using the RP approach are different to those 
necessary for using this approach to compare welfare across countries; in this review the 
assumptions and methods used in each context are clearly stated. Further, an attempt 
has been made to precisely define the different terms which are encountered in the RP 
approach. For example, precise definitions are given to the terms: welfare index, true 
welfare index, bilateral index, multilateral index, bilateral true index, multilateral true 
index. 
Introduction 3 
The second major aim of the thesis is to present several theoretical extensions to the RP 
approach to cross-country welfare comparisons, and to apply these results to 1980 and 
1993 data from the ICP. The starting point for these extensions is the Ideal Afriat Index 
which Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) proposed as an appropriate index for multilateral 
welfare comparisons. In Chapter 4, the RP approach is extended to allow approximate 
multilateral welfare comparisons and an Ideal Afriat Index which incorporates specific 
levels of consumer optimisation error is constructed. 
The Ideal Afriat Index is a true index which exists when preferences are homothetic. 
However, homotheticity is a very restrictive assumption, and may not be appropriate in 
a cross-country context (where incomes typically vary markedly). In Chapter 5, the Ideal 
Afriat Marginal Index is proposed and constructed using the ICP data. This index is 
constructed under the less restrictive assumption of affine homotheticity, and it is shown 
that the Ideal Afriat Index is in fact a special case of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. It 
is further shown that the Ideal Afriat Index and the bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal 
\ 
Index can be used to classify countries as poor or non-poor, thus avoiding arbitrary 
decisions about where international poverty lines should be set. 
In Chapter 6, the joint commodity demand-labour supply framework is used to extend 
the RP approach to include the value of leisure time in cross-country welfare compar-
isons. The Ideal Afriat Index is adapted for use in leisure-inclusive cross-country welfare 
comparisons, and it is found that the inclusion of leisure has a marked impact on the 
welfare rankings of countries. 
A more detailed description of the chapter contents follows. 
Chapter 1 
One of the main objectives of Chapter 1 is to define the multilateral true welfare index ( of 
which, the Ideal Afriat Index is an example) which is the focus of the rest of the thesis. 
A multilateral true index is constructed under the RP approach to welfare measurement, 
which itself is an example of the economic approach to index number construction (and 
is thus based on the utility maximisation framework). 
The definition of a multilateral true index used in this thesis is that it is an index which 
has two properties. First, it is a multilateral index, and second, it is a true index. A 
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multilateral index is defined as an index which satisfies the property of circularity: the 
real income of country i relative to country j is the same whether the two are compared 
directly or via an arbitrary intermediate third country k. It can be shown that circularity 
implies base-country invariance, but the reverse is not true. Examples of multilateral 
indexes are the superlative indexes ( the EKS and CCD indexes) and also the Geary 
index. A bilateral index is defined as any index which is not a multilateral index and 
examples are the Laspeyres and Paasche quantity indexes and the Ideal Fisher Index. 
The definition of a true index is more involved. It can be shown that if the demand data 
can be rationalised by a representative consumer, then there exist money-metric welfare 
measures called the Allen welfare indexes which are constructed using the (unobservable) 
expenditure function. With general preferences, a welfare comparison between two coun-
tries can be made using either country's price vector. Hence base-country invariance does 
not hold and there is an issue of non-uniqueness - the welfare comparison can be made 
using either the base-weighted or current-weighted Allen welfare index. Additionally, 
since we do not have complete knowledge of preferences, the Allen welfare indexes are 
unobservable, that is, there is an issue of indeterminateness. 
One of the innovative aspects of Chapter 1 is that it is shown how we can construct 
observable bounds to the Allen welfare indexes, which are called the classical and fixed-
weight bounds. Since the unobservable Allen welfare indexes must be contained within 
these bounds , a true welfare index is defined as a set of numbers that satisfies these bounds 
( contingent on there existing a utility function that rationalises the data). In Chapter 
2, RP tests for common preferences are presented and three methods for constructing 
bilateral true welfare indexes are reviewed. 
If we cannot reject the hypothesis that the demand data are rationalised by a homothetic 
utility function, then the Allen welfare indexes coincide and there exists a unique welfare 
index. Thus, with homotheticity, there is no longer a problem of non-uniqueness , however 
the problem of indeterminateness remains. However, it can be shown that the unique 
welfare index must be contained within bounds provided by the Paasche and Laspeyres 
quantity indexes. This leads to the definition of the unique true welfare index, namely it 
is a set of numbers the ratios of which are contained within the Paasche-Laspeyres (P-L) 
bounds. It follows that a test for the consistency of a given data set with homotheticity 
is equivalent to the test of the existence of a unique true welfare index. 
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It is shown in Chapter 1 that a unique true welfare index will satisfy circularity, and hence 
is a multilateral true index. While the superlative and Geary indexes are multilateral 
indexes, they are not multilateral true indexes since it is possible that they will lie outside 
the P-L bounds. Tests for the existence of multilateral true welfare indexes and their 
construction are reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive review of the construction of bilateral true welfare in-
dexes is provided. First, there is a review of the tests for common general preferences 
which originated with the work of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). The 
most easily implemented of these tests is the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(GARP). For a given data set that satisfies the test of common preferences, the Allen 
welfare indexes exist, however the classical and fixed-weight bounds to these indexes tend 
to not be tight. In this chapter, three RP methods for constructing improved bounds to 
the bilateral true indexes are reviewed. The three methods for constructing bilateral true 
welfare indexes are: the GARP bounds of Varian (1982), the improved GARP bounds 
(which use expansion path information) of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998) and 
the Afriat envelope bounds of Chavas and Cox ( 1997). One of the innovations of this 
thesis is the development of a framework which can be used to assess the extent to which 
the bounds to the Allen welfare indexes are tightened by each of these methods. 
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, the tests for homothetic common preferences (Afriat (1972, 1981), (Diewert 
1973) and (Varian 1983)), the most easily implemented of which is the Homothetic Axiom 
of Revealed Preference (HARP) , are reviewed. The construction of multilateral true 
indexes is then summarised, and a distinction is made between multilateral true indexes 
which are used for bilateral comparisons ( e.g. temporal studies where prices are compared 
to a particular base year) and multilateral true indexes which are used for multilateral 
comparisons ( e.g. comparing the welfare of a particular country with that of the sample 
mean). An example of the latter is the Ideal Afriat Index of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997), 
and this index (and variants thereof) is the focus of the empirical work in the remainder 
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of the thesis. The Ideal Afriat Index is constructed using 1980 and 1993 ICP data. 
Chapter 4 
One of the criticisms of the standard RP approach to welfare measurement is that it is 
an "all or nothing" approach in that it does not allow for the existence of measurement 
or consumer optimisation error, which may lead to the failure of the test of common 
preferences. In Chapter 4, the RP approach is extended to enable approximate multilat-
eral welfare comparisons. In the first part of this chapter, the Afriat envelope approach 
reviewed in Chapter 2 is used to impute utility for countries which are found to not sat-
isfy homothetic preferences.· While this method allows for utility consistent multilateral 
comparisons across countries which do not share common homothetic preferences, it does 
not address the source of the failure of homotheticity. In the second part of Chapter 4, 
work of Afriat(l972, 1987) and Varian (1993) is extended to the construction of Ideal 
Afriat Indexes which incorporate specific levels of consumer optimisation error. 
For the 1980 ICP data, it is shown that while 42 countries satisfy HARP, if one allows 
for 4.2 percent consumer optimisation error, then the welfare of 59 countries can be 
compared using an approximate version of the Ideal Afriat Index. This approach also 
allows for the identification of countries for which their pairwise ranking changes with 
different levels of consumer optimisation error. For the 1980 data, two such pairs of 
countries are identified (Denmark and Germany, and Belgium and Luxembourg), and it 
is argued that these countries should perhaps be ranked as equivalent. For the 1993 ICP 
data, 19 of the 24 countries satisfy HARP but with 2 percent consumer optimisation 
error, all countries are found to share common (approximate) homothetic preferences. 
Further, it is found that the rankings of Australia, Italy and the U.K. change when 
optimisation error is allowed for, thus suggesting that the rankings of these countries are 
perhaps indeterminate. 
Chapter 5 
Homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a multilateral true welfare 
index. However, homotheticity implies restrictions on consumer behaviour which many 
find untenable, especially in a cross-country context. In Chapter 5, the second main 
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extension to the RP approach to cross country welfare comparisons is presented. In 
this chapter, early work by Afriat (1972, 1977, 1987) on the construction of bilateral 
marginal welfare indexes (which exist when preferences are quasi homothetic, that is , 
the expansion paths are linear) is first reviewed. It is shown that , analogously with the 
existence of the unique welfare index, a unique marginal welfare index (which measure 
the utility gained from consumption in excess of a predetermined minimum subsistence 
bundle) exists when preferences are affine homothetic. 
Affine homotheticity is a special case of quasi homotheticity where the linear expansion 
paths originate from a particular point, which can be identified as the minimum subsis-
tence consumption bundle. Thus it can be seen that since homotheticity is a special case 
of affine homotheticity (where the minimum subsistence bundle is a vector of zeros , the 
origin) the unique welfare index is in fact a special case of the unique marginal welfare 
index. While affine homotheticity is still very restrictive, it is shown that this is the 
only relaxation from homotheticity which is consistent with the existence of a unique 
(marginal) welfare index. 
Given knowledge of the minimum subsistence bundle, it is therefore possible to construct 
multilateral true marginal welfare indexes, which can be used for more general compar-
isons of welfare. A particular index, the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index is proposed for 
cross-country comparisons of marginal welfare. However, an obvious question is: how do 
we determine the minimum subsistence bundle? It is shown that for any given data set 
satisfying HARP there will exist a set of minimum subsistence bundles Q and one of the 
vectors in this set will be the homothetic subsistence bundle ( a vector of zeros). There 
is no empirical reason to base welfare comparisons on any particular bundle in Q, and 
hence the bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index are constructed using a sample of 
the subsistence bundles in Q. For a given data set satisfying HARP, a comparison of the 
Ideal Afriat Index and the bounds to Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes provides a method 
for classifying countries as rich and poor. In particular, a country i can be classified as 
rich (poor) if the element of the Ideal Afriat Index corresponding to that country is equal 
to the relevant lower (upper) bound of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes. 
These methods are applied to the ICP data and it is found that for the 1980 data , Q 
does not contain vectors of significant size and hence homotheticity is a very reasonable 
assumption. Despite this, a comparison of the (approximate) Ideal Afriat Index with 
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the bounds to the (approximate) Ideal Afriat Marginal Index reveals that the pairwise 
ranking of 5 pairs of countries is dependent on the which subsistence bundle in Q is chosen 
for the comparison, and hence these countries should perhaps be ranked as equivalent. 
It is also found that of the 59 countries for which it is possible to make (approximate) 
true welfare comparisons, 17 (or 28.8 percent) are classified as poor. 
For the 1993 ICP data, Q contains subsistence bundles of significant size. It is found that 
some of the rankings implied by the Ideal Afriat Index are contradicted by the rankings 
from the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index constructed using another minimum subsistence 
bundle. Consequently, several countries should perhaps be ranked as equivalent. It is 
also found that of the 24 countries for which we can make (approximate) true welfare 
comparisons, 5 ( or 20.8 percent) are poor relative to the other countries. 
Chapter 6 
The third major extension to the RP approach to cross-country welfare comparisons 
is presented in Chapter 6. The majority of research on cross-country comparisons of 
welfare are based on per capita expenditure on goods and services; such measures of 
economic welfare ignore an important commodity, leisure, which a consumer purchases 
implicitly by not working. In Chapter 6, the joint commodity demand-labour supply 
framework is used to extend the RP approach to welfare measurement to include the 
value of leisure time. A multilateral version of the Allen real full income index is shown 
to be the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index and this index is proposed for use 
in leisure-inclusive cross-country comparisons of welfare. 
The construction of the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index requires an esti-
mate of minimum subsistence leisure ( that is, time spent eating, sleeping and performing 
other necessary biological functions). While other authors working on leisure-inclusive 
welfare measures have needed to make an essentially arbitrary assumption about subsis-
tence leisure, the results from Chapter 5 can be used to nonparametrically estimate this 
parameter. 
For the 1993 ICP data (and using leisure data which has been adjusted for cross-country 
differences in unemployment rates), an upper-bound estimate of subsistence leisure is 
7. 7 hours/ day. The Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index constructed for this 
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index provides welfare rankings that are very different to those found in the standard 
leisure-exclusive analysis. In particular, while Luxembourg is ranked first using the Ideal 
Afriat Index, the fact that the average resident of the U.S. consumes more leisure results 
in the U.S. heading the leisure-inclusive rankings. Countries with high per capita hours 
of work slip dramatically in the welfare rankings when leisure is included in the metric: 
Japan falls from 9th to 19th, and Iceland from 7th to 16th. 

Chapter 1 
Cross-Country Welfare 
Comparisons: Theory and 
Estimation 
1.1 Introduction 
There are two principal aims of this chapter. First, a selective review of the two main 
approaches to conducting welfare comparisons is presented. 1 Under the axiomatic ap-
proach to index number construction, index numbers are chosen according to their ability 
to satisfy certain desirable properties or axioms. However, in the construction of these 
indexes there is no attempt to model the interaction between prices and quantities, and 
for this reason, indexes constructed under this approach suffer from substitution bias. 
The economic approach to index number construction, in contrast, is explicitly based on 
the utility maximising framework and hence interaction between prices and quantities is 
allowed for. 
The second goal of the chapter is to introduce the Revealed Preference (RP) approach 
to welfare measurement, which is an example of the economic approach to index number 
construction. The RP approach, and in particular, the multilateral true index which is 
constructed under this approach, is the focus of the remainder of the thesis. The RP 
approach can be used to construct both bilateral and multilateral indexes. A multilateral 
index is defined here as an index which satisfies Fisher's property of circularity - the 
real income of country i relative to country j should be the same whether the two are 
1 Note that much of the material reviewed in this chapter was originally derived in contexts other than 
international comparisons (for example, within-country cost-of-living measurement) . 
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compared directly or via an arbitrary intermediate third country. A bilateral index is 
defined as any index which is not a multilateral index. 
The RP approach to constructing bilateral indexes focuses on the estimation of bounds to 
the Allen welfare index. The Allen index is calculated as a ratio of expenditure functions 
and hence it is a money metric index of welfare. When preferences across observational 
units are common, the Allen index exists, however there is an issue of non-uniqueness -
the welfare comparison between two countries can validly be made using either country's 
price vector in the calculation. Thus, the base-weighted and current-weighted Allen 
welfare indexes do not coincide, and the Allen index therefore does not exhibit base-
country invariance. 
A further problem is that of indeterminacy - without complete information on consumer 
preferences the Allen welfare indexes are unobservable. However, one of the original 
contributions of this chapter is the development of a framework for constructing ( via RP 
methods) a complete set of bounds to the Allen welfare indexes. First, it is shown that 
it is possible to construct classical and fixed-weight bounds to the Allen indexes. The 
indeterminacy of the Allen welfare indexes implies that, conditional on preferences across 
countries being common, any set of numbers which are contained within the classical and 
fixed-weight bounds can itself be called a welfare index. This is precisely the definition 
of a true welfare index used in this thesis, namely, it is a set of numbers that satisfies the 
classical and fixed-weight bounds when preferences are common. In Chapter 2, the RP 
approach to constructing bilateral true welfare indexes is reviewed in detail. In particular, 
RP tests of common preferences are outlined and three approaches for constructing tight 
bounds to the Allen welfare indexes are reviewed. 
When preferences are common and homothetic the current-weighted and base-weighted 
Allen indexes coincide and there exists a unique welfare index. Thus , there is not a prob-
lem of non-uniqueness when preferences are homothetic, but the issue of indeterminacy 
remains. However , it can be shown that with homotheticity, the unique welfare index is 
bounded by the Paasche and Laspeyres quantity indexes. Further, any set of numbers , 
the elements of which are contained within the Paasche-Laspeyres (P-L) bounds qualifies 
as a unique welfare index. Hence, the unique true welfare index is defined as a set of 
numbers that satisfies the P-L bounds. 
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Finally, it is shown that a unique true welfare index will by construction satisfy circularity, 
and hence can be called a multilateral true index. The conditions for the existence of a 
multilateral true index, and how it may be constructed, are further reviewed in Chapter 
3, and a particular multilateral true index, the Ideal Afriat Index of Dowrick and Quiggin 
(1997) is constructed using ICP data. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1.2, the basic framework for con-
ducting cross-country comparisons of welfare is discussed. In Section 1.3, the axiomatic 
approach to index number construction is reviewed, while the economic approach is re-
viewed in Section 1.4. Three approaches to constructing multilateral indexes of welfare 
are outlined in Section 1.5. Conclusions are presented in Section 1.6. 
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1.2 Cross-Country Welfare Comparisons: Preliminaries 
In this section, the basic framework for conducting cross-country welfare comparisons is 
established, and a brief review of the approaches to index number construction used in 
international comparisons is presented. 
1.2.1 Framework for cross-country welfare comparisons 
The basic framework for making cross-country comparisons of welfare is as follows . For 
each of N countries, labeled i = 1, ... , N , it is assumed that there exist observations on 
the prices ( expressed in national currencies) and the quantities ( expressed in common 
units) of K commodities, labeled l = 1, .. . , K . Price and quantity vectors in country i 
are denoted pi and q i, with typical elements pf and qf , respectively. While each good 
is assumed to be ident ical in quality worldwide, there are barriers to arbitrage (for ex-
ample, transport cost s or imperfect competition) which prevent prices being equalised 
internationally. 
Relative prices therefore vary across countries, and for this reason, welfare indexes which 
are constructed using a particular reference price vector (where the typical candidates for 
this vector have been U.S. prices and weighted averages of prices) are not appropriate for 
cross-country welfare comparisons. In particular, such fixed-weight welfare indexes tend 
to exhibit the so-called Gerschenkron effect ( discussed further in Section 1.3.2) , namely 
that a country's relative real income tends to be higher the more the reference prices 
differ from its own prices. An alternat ive approach has been to convert national GDP 
data into a common currency using exchange rates. However, since nontraded goods are 
generally more labour intensive ( and thus relat ively cheaper in poorer, labour-abundant 
countries), exchange rate comparisons tend t o overest imate cross-country differences in 
welfare. 
Given the inherent problems in using fixed-weight welfare indexes and exchange-rate 
adjusted GDP measures, the objective of cross-country welfare comparisons is to find an 
appropriate set of multilateral index numbers (to be defined below): { Qi, i = 1, . . . , N} 
which imply the bilateral comparisons: { Qij = Qi/ Q j, Vi, j = 1, . . . , N}. 
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1.2.2 International Comparisons Programme 
The main data source used in this thesis is the International Comparisons Programme 
(ICP). The ICP provides data on prices and per capita quantities for goods and services 
that are comparable across countries. The ICP data are highly disaggregated, however 
more aggregated price and quantity data were used for this thesis. In particular, the data 
for 1980 cover 60 countries and 18 goods and services, while the data for 1993 cover 23 
0 ECD countries and 19 goods and services ( see Appendix A for more detail) . 
1.2.3 Caveats 
There are several caveats that need to be made about the approach to international 
comparisons used in this thesis. While it is important to qualify the results obtained 
within this framework in the light of these potential difficulties, one may also note that 
many of these problems apply to other expenditure-based approaches to international 
comparisons. 
Welfare is based on household expenditure 
The framework for international comparisons used here is based on consumer theory, 
and hence only household consumption data from the ICP are used in the welfare com-
parisons. 2 Note that household consumption of publicly provided health and education 
services is included in the definition of household expenditure. 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate methods for ranking countries on the basis of liv-
ing standards, and while investment and government consumption expenditure obviously 
influence living standards, a thorough investigation of the appropriate theoretical founda-
tions for making international comparisons of investment and government spending was 
considered outside the scope of the present research. 3 Further, the main aim of the thesis 
is to extend the RP approach to making cross-country welfare comparisons, and these 
extensions are valid regardless of exactly what goods are contained in the consumption 
bundle. 
2The title of the thesis is therefore somewhat a misnomer, however it is common in the international 
comparisons literature to equate household expenditure with income. 
3Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) argue that investment is a claim on future rather than present consump-
tion, and thus include investment in their cross-country welfare comparisons. 
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Even when the analysis is restricted to household expenditures, there are a number of 
issues which need to be mentioned. First, it is difficult to accurately measure the quanti-
ties and qualities of some services such as education, however the ICP project has made 
much progress in minimising such difficulties. A further problem is that differences in 
environmental conditions, for example, are not allowed for in the analysis; an implication 
of this is that expenditures on heating in cold countries will be measured as an indicator 
of the well being of the residents. Similar arguments can be made with respect to private 
expenditures on home security and expenditures addressing health problems related to 
pollution, for example. 4 A further difficulty with the approach is that the ICP data do 
not include information on household production nor externalities relating to production 
and consumption. 
The existence of a representative consumer 
The framework assumes the existence of a representative or "average" consumer at a 
national level. This assumption is at odds with intra-country microeconometric evidence 
that individual preferences do not satisfy the appropriate aggregation conditions (see, 
for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)) necessary for a representative consumer to 
capture exactly the aggregate behaviour of heterogeneous households. However, even if 
individual preferences do not satisfy the appropriate aggregation conditions, aggregate 
consumption data may still look as if it were generated by a representative consumer 
if governments redistribute income to maximise a quasi-concave social welfare function 
(Samuelson (1956, 1964) , Varian (1984)). 
While such arguments may not satisfy those who work on within-country welfare analy-
sis, the fact is that in the absence of a representative consumer construct, no normative 
significance can be attached to cross-country comparisons based on per capita expen-
ditures. So the problem of the representative consumer at the national level must be 
assumed away for the analysis to proceed. 
4 See Eisner (1988) for a discussion of similar problems in the treatment of government expenditures 
on policing and prisons. 
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1.2.4 Outline of major approaches to the study of index numbers 
An outline of the main approaches to index number construction and welfare comparisons 
is presented in Figure 1.1.5 Frisch (1936) distinguishes between two main approaches to 
index number theory. The axiomatic or test approach, following Fisher (1922), treats 
observed prices and quantities as independent entities; no attempt is made to model their 
interaction, although the indexes suggested under this approach are tested for compliance 
with certain desirable properties or axioms. While the axiomatic approach is useful 
for identifying properties that an index should possess, it has been criticised for the 
fact that inter-commodity substitution is not allowed for . The economic approach to 
index number construction, in contrast to the axiomatic approach, is directly based on 
utility maximising behaviour and thus attempts to model the interdependencies between 
prices and quantities which arise from consumer optimising behaviour. The following 
two sections review these approaches in more detail. 
5 Overviews of the vast literature on index number construction may be found in Diewert (1981, 1987) , 
for example. There are many more methods for multilateral comparisons than those reviewed in this 
chapter. See, for example, Balk (1996), Diewert (1996) and Hill (1997). 
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Approaches to Index Number Construction 
Axiomatic Economic 
Bilateral Indexes Multilateral Indexes 
Functional Approach True Indexes 
(RP Approach) 
Superlative Indexes 
(EKS,CCD) 
Unique True Indexes 
(RP Approach) 
Geary Index 
GAIA System 
Figure 1.1: A pp roaches to index number construction 
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1.3 Axiomatic Approach to Welfare Measurement 
In this section, a brief review of the axiomatic approach to welfare measurement is pro-
vided. The distinguishing feature of the axiomatic approach is that no attempt is made 
to model the interaction between prices and quantities. 
1.3.1 Some index numbers constructed under axiomatic approach 
The simplest measure comparing the welfare of country i with that of country j 1s an 
unweighted arithmetic mean of the quantity relatives: 6 
l K i 
Q ij =KL q~. 
l=l ql 
Individual quantity observations can have a large impact on the arithmetic mean, and 
thus it may be more appropriate to use either the geometric or harmonic mean of the 
quantity relatives, defined respectively: 
Qij 
Qij 
K ( i) k II ql_ 
l=l qf 
K 
K qf. 
~l=l q{ 
The obvious problem with using these simple index numbers is that all commodities are 
treated equally; it would be preferable to use weighted index numbers, with the weights 
based on the budget shares of each commodity. 
Weighted arithmetic index numbers 
The weighted arithmetic mean of the quantity relatives is: 
K . 7, 
Qij = Lwrql_, 
l=l qf 
where w[ = p[q[ /xr is the "reference" budget share for commodity l (and xr = pr.qr). 
With base country ( country j) budget shares as weights, the weighted arithmetic mean 
6 T he following summary draws from Selvanathan and Rao (1994) . 
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of the quantity relatives is the Laspeyres quantity index: 
K . . . 
i J i 
Q~- = ~ j 2l = p .q iJ D Wz . . . . 
qJ pJ .qJ l=l l 
(1.1) 
Using current country budget shares as weights does not result in any well known index 
formula, however using the hypothetical budget share resulting from the purchase of 
j i 
current country quantities at base country prices ( °'"'!1 q1 j i) as weights gives the Paasche 
l=l P1 ql 
quantity index: 
(1.2) 
K . J i 
qi Pz qz . . p_~-- K Ji 
Qij - ~ q1 ~l=l Pt ql l=l l 
pi.qi 
pi.qJ 
Other fixed-weight indexes such as the Edgeworth-Marshal and Dobrisch index numbers 
can be similarly constructed by using appropriated weights in the formula for the weighted 
arithmetic mean of quantity relatives. 
Weighted geometric index numbers 
The weighted geometric mean of the quantity relatives (also known as the Cobb-Douglas 
index) is: 
Qij = II q! K ( · ) w[ 
l=l ql 
Using wf or wf in the above formula does not lead to any recognised indexes, however 
several index numbers derived according to different specifications of w[ have been pro-
posed: 
. j 
r wi+w1 (T" . . d ) wz = 2 ornqvist In ex [ . . l 1/3 wz+wf i j 2 wlwl 
w[ = . . l 1;3 (Theil index) 
K [wi+wJ . . ~ l l wiwJ 
6 2 l l 
l=l 
wiwj 
_ l _l 
. J 
r - wI+wz (R . d ) w z - K i j ao In ex . 
~ wlwl 
6 . J 
l=l wz+wz 
1.3.2 The substitution effect and the Gerschenkron effect 
The consumer substitution effect is the tendency for a utility maximising consumer to 
shift spending away from relatively expensive goods towards relatively cheaper goods. In 
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an international comparisons context, the Gerschenkron effect is the finding that fixed-
weight indexes tend to overstate the relative real income of a country the more the 
reference prices differ from its own prices. For example, the ratio of India's real income 
to that of the U.S. will be higher when U.S. prices are used in the calculation ( compared 
to when India's prices are used) . The reason for this is that if the average Indian were 
actually facing U.S. prices, then he or she would substitute consumption to goods which 
are relatively cheaper, thus reducing measured expenditure (and hence real income, as 
defined here). The Gerschenkron effect thus arises because of the substitution effect (and 
it is also known as substitution bias). 7 
As Neary and Gleeson (1997) have argued, substitution bias is not inevitable on the-
oretical grounds. In fact, they show that the Gerschenkron effect is only a necessary 
consequence of the representative consumer maximising a homothetic utility function. 
Further, Hill (2000) notes that the producer substitution effect, which is the tendency for 
profit maximising producers to substitute production away from relatively cheaper goods 
towards relatively more expensive goods, acts in the opposite direction to the consumer 
substitution effect. However, Hill (2000) argues that in practice, at least at the level of 
GDP, the consumer substitution effect always dominates the producer substitution effect. 
The conclusion is that for a given data set , the empirical relevance of the Gerschenkron 
effect should be investigated, rather than assumed. Neary and Gleeson (1997) devised a 
method for evaluating the magnitude of the Gerschenkron effect which involves regressing 
the Laspeyres /Paasche ratio on a measure of price dispersion between the two countries 
( the sum of squared deviations between the prices of individual goods). 8 The authors 
find a positive significant coefficient in the regression for 1970 ICP data on 16 countries 
and 11 categories of consumption, and thus argue that the Gerschenkron effect is present 
in these data. As discussed further below, Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) and Hill (2000) 
have devised other methods for detecting substitution bias in international comparisons 
and provide evidence of this bias in more recent ICP data sets. 
7 Gerschenkron (1951) observed the dependence of the growth rate of Soviet machinery output between 
1927-28 and 1938, and of U.S. machinery output between 1899 and 1939, on the choice of reference price 
vector. 
8 A consequence of the Gerschenkron effect is that the Laspeyres index will exceed the Paasche index. 
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1.3.3 Substitution bias, income dispersion and convergence 
The presence of substitution bias leads to two important implications for international 
comparisons. First, fixed-weight real per capita income measures tend to underestimate 
(overestimate) the dispersion of income levels when a relatively rich (poor) country's 
prices are used to value income. Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) found for 1980 and 1990 
ICP data that the variance of log per capita GDP across OECD countries tended to 
be higher when real GDP was constructed using the prices of poorer countries such as 
Greece and Portugal, and lower when measured using Canadian and U.S. prices. 
However, they also found an inconsistency in this pattern, namely that the dispersion of 
GDP constructed using Spanish prices in 1980 was low, compared to that found using the 
prices of other poor countries. The authors reasoned that the magnitude of substitution 
bias depends on both the reference country's relative income level and on the dissimilarity 
of prices. In 1980, Spanish prices were remarkably close to average international prices, 
and this explains the above finding. 
For 1985 ICP data, Hill (2000) found a similar pattern with Gini coefficients, namely that 
they tended to be lower (higher) when calculated using the prices of rich (poor) countries. 9 
However, an inconsistency in this pattern was that the lowest Gini coefficients were 
calculated using the price vectors of the relatively poor Caribbean countries. As above, 
a possible explanation for this finding is that the prices of the Caribbean countries were 
very similar to the international average. If this is the explanation for the finding (rather 
than a data quality issue, for example), then it suggests that the Gini coefficient might 
be very sensitive to the similarity of the reference country's prices to the international 
average, compared with other measures of inequality such as variance of log per capita 
income. 
The second implication of the presence of substitution bias is that the use of fixed-
weight indexes will tend to confuse the measurement of the rate of convergence in per 
capita income over time with convergence in prices (Nuxoll (1994) and Dowrick and 
Quiggin (1997)) . Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) show this by calculating CJ convergence 
- the measured change in the variance (CJ2 ) of log per capita GDP between 1980 and 
9 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the equality of the income distribution; a Gini of zero indicates 
absolute equality, while a Gini of one indicates absolute inequality. 
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1990 - using the price vectors for each of the countries in the data sets. They found 
evidence of O' convergence ( that is, the variance of log GDP falls between 1980 and 
1990) for all price vectors except that of Luxembourg (for which there was very weak 
O' divergence). In addition, Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) found that rich country prices 
tend to give estimates of weak O' convergence, while poor country prices imply that the 
rate of convergence is much higher. 10 
The reason for this finding is related to the fact that prices tended to converge over the 
1980s. This was due to both increases in trade and also diminishing variation in the 
relative price of nontradeables ( which are primarily comprised of services) as a result of 
real wage convergence. The convergence of prices means that the level of substitution 
bias was lower in 1990, compared with 1980. Hence, it is apparent that if we use a 
rich country's prices, the variance of log GDP in both 1980 and 1990 will be biased 
downwards, but the degree of downward bias will be less in 1990 (because substitution 
bias is less). Thus, if there has been O' convergence (that is, the variance of log GDP is 
higher in 1980 compared with 1990) , we will underestimate this convergence when rich 
country prices are used in the calculation. The converse is true when poor country prices 
are used. 
1.3.4 Index numbers constructed from fixed-weight indexes 
It has been argued that index numbers constructed as functions of fixed-weight indexes 
such as the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes will be subject to less substitution bias, and 
hence can be considered an improvement. Such index numbers are termed empirical 
index numbers , and the best-known bilateral empirical index number is that suggested 
by Fisher: 
Q[; = ✓ Qr;Q[;. 
This index is known as the Ideal Fisher Index, in acknowledgment of its ability to satisfy 
a number of useful axioms, as discussed below. While an empirical index number such as 
the Ideal Fisher Index is not subject to substitution bias, the correction for the substitu-
tion effect is of a statistical nature and does not involve economic theory. This contrasts 
with the economic approach discussed below, where substitution bias is corrected for 
10 Once again , with the exception of Spain. 
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with explicit reference to utility maximising behaviour. 
1.3.5 Desirable properties of an index number 
Index numbers constructed under the axiomatic approach are constructed without spe-
cific reference to utility maximisation. The question then is how may one chose between 
the different quantity indexes constructed under this approach? Fisher (1922) suggested 
a number of tests that may be used to select an appropriate index number formula 
(hence the axiomatic approach to index number construction is also known as the test 
approach) .11 
Four axioms are of particular relevance to multilateral comparisons: 
l. Base-country invariance:12 It is desirable that in comparing the welfare of two 
countries, indexes of real income should not be sensitive to the choice of base-
country: Qij = l/Qji· 
2. Circularity: The real income of country i relative to country j should be the same 
whether the two are compared directly or via an arbitrary intermediate third coun-
try k: Qij = QikQkj- 13 
3. Characteristicity or Independence of Irrelevant Countries: The comparison between 
two countries should only depend on variables which characterise them and not on 
variables characteristic of other countries. Thus, country i's real income relative to 
that of country j should be unaffected by changes in the real income of country k. 
4. Matrix consistency: The usefulness of a set of real income indexes is enhanced if 
they can be consistently disaggregated by commodity as well as by country. 
Having established the criteria deemed desirable for cross-country welfare analysis, the 
question is: how well do the index numbers constructed above satisfy these criteria? 
11 Diewert (1992) provides a comprehensive summary of these axioms. 12 This is also known as the point reversal test. 
13Note that the Circularity test originally stated by Fisher was: QikQkJQJi = l. Circularity implies: Qii = l (this is known as the Identity test) and QiJQJi = l (base-country invariance). Further, circularity 
can be seen to be equivalent to QiJ = QikQkJ, which Fisher originally referred to as the Chain test. Thus the Chain test is equivalent to circularity, and these tests are used interchangeably in the literature. It is 
apparent that circularity is more stringent than base-country invariance and in fact implies it (replace j 
with i in the above formula). The property of circularity is sometimes referred to as transitivity (see, for 
example, Drechsler (1973)), however since this may lead to confusion with transitivity of the underlying preferences ( which is an ordinal concept), the term is not used here. 
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The fixed-weight Paasche and Laspeyres indexes do not satisfy base-country invariance 
and while the Ideal Fisher Index does satisfy this property, it fails the stricter test of 
circularity. The inability of the Fisher Index to satisfy circularity makes it of limited use 
in multilateral comparisons of welfare, and has led to multilateralisations of this index 
which do satisfy circularity (see Section 1.5.2). 
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1.4 Economic approach to Welfare Measurement 
While the test approach provides a framework for choosing between different empirical 
index numbers, ever since Frisch (1936) this approach has been subject to criticism on 
a number of grounds. 14 At a practical level, there is a problem that the tests often 
turn out to be mutually inconsistent (see Eichhorn and Voeller (1976) for details) . At a 
theoretical level, the test approach does not require indexes to have a basis in economic 
theory and hence fixed-weight indexes constructed under this approach are subject to 
substitution bias. Finally, at a conceptual level, empirical index numbers are subject to 
the criticism of Afriat (1977) that they provide "answers without questions": since there 
is no reference to economic theory, it is not clear what a real income index constructed 
under the axiomatic approach is in fact measuring. 
The economic approach to index numbers avoids these difl_iculties by explicitly starting 
from utility maximising behaviour. Thus, in the context of international comparisons, the 
data are assumed to be generated by the utility maximising behaviour of representative 
consumers in each country, each sharing identical tastes. The difference between the RP 
approach to welfare measurement and the other economic approaches to index number 
construction is that in the RP approach, this assumption of common preferences across 
countries is tested for using revealed preference relations. 
Neary (2000) has argued that there are two distinct questions which must be answered in 
using the economic approach to choosing an appropriate index for multilateral compar-
isons. First , exactly what index is to be measured? Second, given a particular choice of 
welfare index, which by nature is unobservable, how can it be best approximated? Since 
the economic approach postulates the existence of indexes of welfare, the various indexes 
constructed under this approach may be judged by how closely they approximate these 
indexes. 
1.4.1 A selective review of consumer theory 
As the economic approach to index number construction and welfare measurement is 
explicitly derived from utility maximisation framework, it is useful to first review some 
14This summary is from Neary (2000). 
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relevant results from consumer theory. 
The consumer's problem of choosing the most preferred consumption bundle given p and 
total expenditure x is the following utility maximisation problem: 
maxu(q) subject to 
q>O 
p.q < x, 
where u( q) is the utility function. The utility maximisation problem thus defines the 
M arshallian demand function, q ( x, p); this is the rule which assigns the set of optimal 
consumption vectors to each expenditure-price situation. 
The dual to the utility maximisation problem is the expenditure minimisation problem: 
IDin p.q subject to 
q>O 
u(q) > U, 
where U is a particular level of utility. This problem thus defines the expenditure-
minimising demand function , denoted h (U, p) , which is also known as the Hicksian or 
compensated demand function. 
Note that the same U and x are used in both problems: the U in the expenditure 
minimisation problem is the maximum attainable in the utility maximisation problem 
and since utility maximisation and expenditure minimisation must imply the same choice, 
the outlay in the original problem must be the expenditure minimum in the dual problem. 
Since the solutions to both problems coincide, it must be that q(x, p) == h(U, p). 
Each of these solutions can be substituted back into their respective problems to give 
the maximum attainable utility and minimum attainable expenditure, respectively. The 
maximum attainable utility given p and x is given by the indirect utility function , which 
is defined: 
'lj;(x, pi) == max[u (q ) : pi .q == x]. 
q 
The minimum expenditure associated with attaining U at prices p is given by the expen-
diture function, which is defined: 
. . 
e(U, pi) == min[pi.q: u(q) == U]. 
q 
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Thus, e(U, pi) can be thought of as the minimum cost of reaching the indifference curve 
labeled U, when prices are pi. 
Money metric utility 
Demand theory is completely ordinal in nature- there is no unique cardinal representation 
of utility. Indifference curves are unaffected by monotonic increasing transformations of 
u ( q), so that by moving to a transformation f [ u ( q)], we simply re-label the identical 
indifference curves. For example, if we know preferences are represented by the utility 
function u ( q), then the indifference curve for a particular bundle qi will be labeled 
Ui = u(qi). However, preferences may equivalently be represented by J[u(q)], and for 
this transform, the indifference curve for the bundle qi will be labeled 1-1 [Ui], where 
1-1 D is the inverse function of f O. 
The implication of the ordinality of demand is that the utility function ( even if it is 
known, which is not the case in practice) cannot be directly used for computing ratios 
of the welfare of different countries. The reason for this is that the transformations of 
the utility functions will result in different welfare ratios, and since all transforms of 
the utility function are equally valid representations of preferences, there is no reason to 
choose one over any other. 
For example, suppose preferences are represented by the following Stone-Geary utility 
function, u(q) = (q1 - 0.5) 112(q2 - 0.75) 112 and we are wanting to compare the welfare 
of two countries with the following prices and demand data (note that the demand data 
have been generated from the utility function): p 1 = {l, 1 }, q1 = {1.875, 2.125} and 
p 2 = {2, 1 }, q2 = {2.563, 4.875}. The welfare of country 1 compared with 2 can be 
1 2 (ql-Q.5)1/2(ql-Q.75)1/2 
. calculated as: U /U = 1J_n i:;u;21J_n 7-c;\l/ 2 = 1.375/2.917 = 0.471. However, 1t can 
also validly be calculated using the logarithm of the utility function U* = log[u( q)] as: 
U*1 /U*2 = log 1.375/ log 2.917 = 0.297. 
The above example illustrates how the welfare comparison between two countries is de-
pendent on which monotonic transformation of the utility function is used. However, it 
is common practice to remove this source of non-uniqueness in welfare comparisons by 
using certain cardinalisations of utility. One such cardinalisation is Samuelson's (1974) 
money metric utility function; the cost of attaining utility level U at refere;nce prices pr 
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is e(U, pr); with prices fixed, the expenditure function is a monotonic increasing function 
of U and hence can be considered a measure of utility in its own right. 15 The use of the 
money metric utility function is equivalent to "assuming away" all the possible mono-
tonic transformations of the utility function. However, as shown in the next sub section, 
money metric utility introduces another source of non-uniqueness which is related to the 
choice of the reference price vector in the welfare comparison. 
Homothetic preferences 
The final part of this review of consumer theory relates to a particular form of preferences 
which is used throughout this thesis. Formally, preferences are homothetic if and only if 
utility is a monotone increasing function of a function that is homogeneous of degree 1:16 
U = J[u(q)] ; u(0q) = 0u(q) , 
where 0 is an arbitrary positive scalar. Since consumer behaviour is invariant with 
respect to monotonic transformations of the utility function, we can choose u( q) itself as 
the representation of preferences (i.e. we can ignore JO) . 
The property of homotheticity implies that the slope of the indifference curves are con-
stant along a ray from the origin. Thus, the income expansion paths are rays from the 
origin and the budget shares are invariant to changes in income ( the income elasticities 
are constrained to one). However, it should be noted that these properties hold when util-
ity is an increasing monotonic transformation of a utility function which is homogeneous 
of any degree, and are not restricted to homotheticity. 
When u(q) is linearly homogeneous, a doubling of U will be accomplished by doubling 
q and, hence, by doubling costs. Therefore, the expenditure function will be linearly 
homogeneous in U: 
e(U, pi) = U e(l , p i) = Ub(pi) , 
where b(pi) = e(l, pi) is linearly homogeneous and concave in pi. Under homotheticity, 
15 The money metric utility function is also known as the "minimum income function", and t he "direct 
compensation function". An alternative definition used by Varian (1982) is: m(q, pr)= e(u(q), pr). This 
definition of money metric utility is used further in Chapter 2. 
16See Appendix B for a further discussion of the property of homogeneity. 
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the indirect utility function can therefore be calculated as: 
'lj;(x, pi) = e(U, pi)/b(pi) = x/b(pi) = 'lj;(pi)x, 
where 'lj;(pi) = b(pi)-1 . 
1.4.2 Three welfare indexes 
There are three indexes of welfare which have been proposed. Following Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), welfare indexes are distinguished here from quantity indexes by the 
fact that in order to calculate the former, complete knowledge of the form of preferences is 
required, while quantity indexes can be calculated with knowledge of the actual demands 
(and the prices). 17 It is important to note that while some authors refer to the following 
three welfare indexes as true welfare indexes, the adjective "true" is not used here in this 
context since it has a precise definition which is introduced later in this chapter. 
The Allen welfare index 
The Allen index comparing utility levels Ui and UJ at reference prices pr is: 
Qj,r = e(Ui' pr)/ e(Uj' pr). 
The Allen index therefore gives the fraction of the cost of attaining country j's utility 
level required to attain country i's utility level at the reference prices. If, for example, 
Qj,r = 2, then it costs twice as much at prices pr to attain i's utility level as it does to 
attain j's utility level and thus, under the money metric concept of utility, consumer i is 
said to be twice as well off as consumer j. Since by definition the expenditure function 
gives the minimum cost of attaining a given utility level when facing given prices, the 
Allen index allows for inter-commodity substitution. 
The natural candidates for pr are p.i and pi , giving base-weighted and current-weighted 
17 Similarly, the calculation of cost-of-living indexes require information on preference, while price in-
dexes again can be calculated with information only on actual quantities demanded and the prices. For 
reasons of brevity, welfare indexes defined using the indirect utility function (see, for example, Lloyd (1979)) are not reviewed here. 
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welfare indexes, which are known as the Laspeyres-Allen and Paasche-Allen welfare in-
dexes, respectively: 
QtA = e(Ui, pJ) / e(UJ, pJ) 
Q[;A = e(Ui, pi)/e(UJ, pi). 
The Koniis welfare index 
The cost-of-living index, which is due to Koniis, compares the cost of achieving a partic-
ular level of utility, ur, given different prices: 
Pif ,r = e(ur' pi) I e(Ur' pj). 
The Laspeyres-Koniis and Paasche-Koniis cost-of-living indexes are defined, respectively, 
as: 
PijK = e(Uj, pi)/ xj 
PK ii (Ui j) pij = X e , p , 
where xi = e(Ui, pi). 
It is desirable that the product of a price and welfare index equal the ratio of actual 
expenditures between the two countries ( this property is known as the weak factor reversal 
test). For the Allen welfare index, in the absence of homothetic preference, this property 
will only hold when the quantity index is base-weighted and the price index is current-
weighted (and vice-versa) i.e. , Qf;AP/jK = xi/xJ and Q½AphK = xi/xJ. 
An alternative to the Allen welfare index is the Koniis welfare index, which satisfies weak 
factor reversal by construction: 
xi 
Q J_<_,r = -. K ,r · 
iJ xJ Pij 
The Laspeyres-Koniis and Paasche-Koniis welfare indexes are defined, respectively: 
i xi X 
LK - · ·) Qij = ,...,; o[:K - e(UJ, pi 
iJ 
Q f.K _ Xi iJ - x~ .L .• 1,J 
e(Ui, pJ) 
xJ 
and it is immediately apparent that Q~-K = QfA and QfK = Q~-A iJ iJ iJ iJ . 
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The Malmquist welfare index 
The Allen and Koniis indexes are both constructed using an approach where each indif-
ference curve is in effect labeled by the expenditure required to reach it. An alternative 
approach is label indifference curves by their relative distance from the origin along some 
reference quantity bundle. The Malmquist quantity index is defined: 18 
Q}_1Q,r = d(Ur, qi) 
iJ d(Ur, qj)' 
where the distance ,function, d(Ur, qi) = max0{ 6 : u( qi/ 6) > ur}. The distance function 
therefore measures the scalar by which qi must be divided by so that u[qi / d(Ur, qi)] = 
ur. Note that by definition, d(Ui, qi) = 1, for all i. 
The Laspeyres-Malmquist and Paasche-Malmquist quantity indexes are defined, respec-
tively: 
Qf.MQ = d(Uj, qi) 
J d(Uj, qj) 
Q1:_MQ _ d(Ui, qi) 1,J - . d(Ui, qj) 
d(Uj , qi) 
1 
1 
d(Ui, qj)" 
While it is possible to use QtMQ and Q~ MQ as welfare indexes, Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980, p.182) define the Laspeyres-Malmquist and Paasche-Malmquist welfare indexes 
respectively: 
It is apparent that: 
Q~.M _ d(Uj, qj) 1,J - . d(Ui, qj) 
Q f.M _ d(Uj, qi) 1,J - . d(Ui, qi) 
1 
d(Ui, qj) 
d(Uj , qi) 
1 
Q ~.M -QPMQ 1,J - ij 
Q f.M -QLMQ 1,J - ij . 
An advantage of the Malmquist welfare indexes is that they are defined independently 
of the existence of prices - this may be particularly useful in situations of rationing or 
when the budget constraint is nonlinear. Note that while the Malmquist index is not 
18The notational convention adopted above for distinguishing between quantity and welfare indexes does not hold with the Malmquist index, since the unobservable utility function appears in both indexes. 
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constructed using money metric utility, its construction still involves using a particular 
cardinalisation of utility and therefore all other possible positive monotonic transforma-
tions of the utility function are ignored. Finally, it can be noted (see Diewert (1981)) 
that: 
Q~.M > Q~-A 1,J - 1,J 
Qf;M < Qf;A. 
Calculating the welfare indexes - Stone-Geary example 
The calculation of the welfare indexes is now illustrated using the above two-good two-
country example where preferences are Stone-Geary. 19 The general Stone-Geary utility 
function is u(q) = Tif 1 (qz - ,z)f3z, Lzf3z = l , where ,z is minimum subsistence con-
sumption of good l. The Marshallian demand for good l is pzqz = pz,z + /3z (x - Lz pz,z). 
Substituting the Marshallian demand functions into the utility function gives the indirect 
utility function: 'lj;(x,p) = (x - LzPz,z)//30 f1zpfz , where /3o = l/f1zf3fz . Inverting this 
gives the expenditure function: e(U, p) = /3o f1zpfzu + LzPltl· 
For the two-good two-country example, the Allen welfare indexes are: 
/3 2/31 2/32 u1 (y2 2 ) Qfi = 0P1 P2 ~ 1 ,1 + P2,2 = 0_5639 
X 
1 
PA X Q12 = f3 f3 = 0.5646. f3oPi 1P~ 2U2 + (yi,1 + P~12) 
The Koniis welfare indexes are: 
Xl 
QLK _ -------,-------:,--------- = 0. 5646 12 - f3 f3 f3oPi 1P~ 2U2 + (yi,1 + P~12 ) 
/3 2/31 2/32 u1 + (y2 + 2 ) QPK _ 0P1 P2 111 P2,2 = 0.5639. 12 - 2 
X 
The Malmquist welfare indexes are: 
Qf2M = 0.5640 
Qf2M = 0.5644. 
19 The following exercise is an example of the functional approach to index number construction (which 
itself comes under the economic approach). The functional approach involves estimating the parameters 
of utility or expenditure functions (usually via estimation of the associated demand system) and then 
using those parameters to construct the various welfare indexes. 
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1.4.3 Classical and fixed-weight bounds to Allen welfare indexes 
The majority of empirical work on constructing welfare indexes has focused on the Allen 
indexes QhA and Q{; A and there£ ore these are the focus of the following discussion. In 
the above example, the Allen indexes were calculated for a particular form of the Stone-
Geary utility function; in practice, we do not know the form of the utility function and 
hence the Allen indexes cannot be directly calculated. However, given that the Allen 
indexes exist, it is possible to construct bounds to these indexes using only the demand 
data (that is, the price and quantity data). The condition for the Allen indexes to exist 
is now stated. 
Result 1.1. EXISTENCE OF THE ALLEN WELFARE INDEXES - VARIOUS: 20 The Allen 
Welfare Indexes QtA and Q{; A exist if and only if the demand data can be rationalised 
by a representative consumer. 
A formal proof of this statement is not given here. It is noted that if the consumers 
didn't share common preferences (and hence maximise a common utility function), then 
their expenditure functions would not be of the same form and the Allen indexes are 
defined for common expenditure functions . 
In Chapter 2, the different approaches to testing whether a given data set is consistent 
with the null hypothesis of common preferences are reviewed. In Proposition 2.1 it is 
shown that a given set of data can be rationalised by a utility function if the Generalised 
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) is satisfied. For the case of N = 2, the test of 
common preferences reduces to the following condition (see Chapter 2 for further details): 
Proposition 1.1. REVEALED PREFERENCE TEST OF COMMON PREFERENCES WITH 
N = 2 - VARIOUS: With N = 2, we do not reject the hypothesis that preferences across 
country i and country j are common if and only if the data satisfy the fallowing condi-
tion:21 
pi .qi > pi .qJ implies pj .qJ < pj .qi, 
20 The convention in this thesis is to attribute all propositions and results to particular authors (or to 
"various"). If no attribution is given directly or implied by the text then the proposition or result is 
original. 
21 Note that this condition is not the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). As shown in Chapter 2, WARP requires that there be a unique demand bundle at each budget, while the condition 
shown here allows for multi-valued demand functions. 
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which is equivalent to: 
Q~-< 1 implies QI:. < l. Ji - J i -
PROOF: See proof to Proposition 2.1. 
Given that the data do not reject the null hypothesis of common preferences then it is 
possible to construct bounds to the unobservable welfare indexes. In particular, fixed-
weight and classical bounds can be constructed. To this author 's knowledge, previous 
discussion on classical bounds to indexes has only been in the context of cost-of-living 
indexes (see, for example Varian (1982) and Manser and McDonald (1988)). The follow-
ing presentation is an adaptation of this previous work to the construction of classical 
bounds to welfare indexes. 22 
The construction of the classical and fixed-weight bounds to the Allen indexes involves 
finding bounds to the (unobservable) expenditure function, e(Ui , pi). The upper bound 
to this function is calculated by noting that since consuming the bundle qi is one way of 
achieving Ui, but not necessarily the cheapest when prices are pi , it must therefore be 
that pi .qi > e(Ui, pi).23 
The construction of a lower bound to e(Ui , pi) involves the concept of the classical 
pseudo-expenditure function, which is defined: 
ec(Ui,pj) = minpj.q subject to pi.q = xi. 
q 
The function ec(Ui, pi) is thus calculated as the cost (at prices pi) of the cheapest 
bundle that is just affordable at prices pi and income xi. Consumption of this bundle will 
typically give less utility than Ui, and thus cost less. Hence, by construction, ec (Ui, pi) 
must be (weakly) less than e(Ui, pi). Note that the classical pseudo expenditure function 
22 There have been differing definitions of the classical bounds to the cost-of-living index used in the 
literature. For example, Varian (1982, p.967) , and the NONPAR software which accompanies that art icle , 
uses a definition of the classical bound which is the inspiration for the definition employed here. Other 
authors have made use of the bounds provided by Lerner (1935) namely that the cost-of-living index 
(being some weighted average of price changes) must lie somewhere between the maximum and minimum 
of the ratio of the prices: 
. i . KT i . 
~m{pz/rz : l = l , . .. k} < Pi/ < mpx{Pzlrt : l = 1, ... k }. 
Pollak (1971) improved these bounds by noting that the Laspeyres index bounds the base-weighted cost-
of-living index from above. Hence authors such as Manser and McDonald (1988) and Blundell, Browning , 
and Crawford (1998) refer to the classical bounds to the cost-of-living index as the Laspeyres price index 
from above and the minimum price relative from below. 
23 The reflexivity of the preference relation guarantees this. 
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ec(Ui, pi) is only introduced here for heuristic purposes (to show the construction of the 
classical bounds to the bilateral true welfare indexes). It is called a pseudo expenditure 
function since, unlike the expenditure function, it can be calculated without knowledge 
of the form of preferences. That is, ui obviously does not figure in the calculation of 
ec(Ui, pi), however it can be said that a consumer spending this amount when facing 
prices pi could not achieve a level of utility higher than Ui (and typically will achieve a 
lower level of utility, unless there is a corner solution) . 
The fixed-weight and classical approximations to e(Ui, p-1) are shown in Figure 1.2 (where 
the diagram has been constructed under the assumption that P2 = 1, and hence expen-
diture can be measured along the vertical axis) . 
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Figure 1.2: The fixed-weight and classical approximations to e(Ui, p-1) 
The fixed-weight and classical bounds to the expenditure function can therefore be stated 
as: 
(1.3) ec(Ui, pi) < e(Ui, pi) < Pj .qi. 
To further illustrate the construction of the classical and fixed-weight bounds to the 
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expenditure function, we can consider particular examples of preferences and price vec-
tors. In Figure 1.3, Leontief preferences (where there is no substitution between goods 
in response to relative price changes) are illustrated and in this case, it is apparent that 
ec(Ui, pJ ) < e(Ui, pJ) = pJ .qi. 
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Figure 1.3: Approximations to e(Ui, pJ) - Leontief preferences 
The bounds to the expenditure function (1.3) can be manipulated to provide classical 
and fixed-weight bounds to the Allen welfare indexes, leading to the following result: 
Result 1.2. The classical and fixed-weight bounds to the Allen welfare indexes are: 
Q 9_L < Q~-A < Qr 
'lJ - 'lJ - 'lJ 
Qf; < Qf;A < Qbu, 
where Q& and Qf; are, respectively, the fixed-weight upper bound to Q&A and fixed-weight 
lower bound to Q½A, and the classical lower bound to Q&A and classical upper bound to 
Q½A are respectively: 
QbL = ec(if,pJ)/xj 
Qbu = xi/ec(Uj,pi). 
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In summary, when preferences across observational units (e.g., countries) are common, 
then the Allen welfare indexes exist. Since the exact form of the utility function is 
unknown, we are not able to directly construct these indexes and hence there is a problem 
of indeterminacy. However, we are able to construct the fixed-weight and classical bounds 
to the welfare indexes, and any index which is contained within these bounds must, by 
definition, itself be a welfare index. We are now in a position to state the definition of a 
true welfare index: 
Definition 1.1. TRUE WELFARE INDEXES If preferences across observational units are 
common then a set of numbers B = (B1 , B 2 , .. . BN) is a base-weighted true welfare 
index and a set of numbers C = ( C1 , C2 , ... CN) is a current-weighted true welfare 
index if: 
Q9.L < Bi/Bj 
'lJ -
L < Qij 
Q{; < Ci/Cj < Q~u, Vi,j = 1, ... ,N. 
From the above definition it is apparent that even if preferences are not common, then 
there may exist sets of numbers which satisfy the above inequalities. However, only 
if preferences are common can these numbers be interpreted as true welfare indexes. 
Having shown that a given set of demand data is consistent with the existence of a 
representative consumer, the next step is to construct the welfare indexes. By nature 
these are unobservable, but by the above definition, given that preferences are common 
then any set of numbers B and C which (by definition) are contained within the fixed-
weight and classical bounds to the welfare indexes themselves qualify as true welfare 
indexes. In Chapter 2, three methods for constructing the numbers B and C using RP 
methods are reviewed. 
It should be emphasised that constructing B and C using RP methods is equivalent 
to tightening the bounds to the Allen welfare indexes, since by the above definition, 
improved bounds to these welfare indexes are themselves true welfare indexes. It should 
be further noted that when N = 2 and preferences are common, the fixed-weight and 
classical bounds to the welfare indexes are true indexes. However, with N > 2 it is not 
necessarily the case that the fixed-weight and classical bounds will be true indexes. 
A final remark relates to the informational content of the true indexes B and C. It 
is possible to construct true indexes which do not have informational content in that 
I 
1.4. Economic approach to Welfare Measurement 39 
they do not provide improved bounds to Qt;A and Q~ A. However the three RP meth-
ods for constructing true indexes reviewed in Chapter 2 in fact produce numbers with 
informational content in that they provide tight bounds to Qt;A and Q~A. 
Classical and fixed-weight bounds - Stone-Geary example 
Above, the Allen welfare indexes for the two-good two-country Stone-Geary example 
were calculated. Under the more realistic situation where we do not know the form of 
the utility function, we can use the previous results to calculate fixed-weight and classical 
bounds to the welfare indexes for the example data: 
0.4 
0.5378 
QCL 12 
Qf2 
< 
< 
QLA < 12 
QPA < 12 
Qf2 
Qcu 12 
0.5874 
0.8. 
Since the data for this example have been generated so as to conform with the Stone-
Geary utility function, they must be consistent with common preferences. Hence, using 
Definition 1.1, the classical and fixed-weight bounds are themselves true welfare indexes. 24 
Example of non-common preferences 
To finish this sub-section on true welfare indexes, the following is an example of two 
countries which do not share common preferences. Assume the demand data are p 1 = 
{1, 1 }, q1 = {3, 1} and p 2 = {1/2, 1 }, q2 = {1, 2.5}. The classical and fixed-weight 
bounds for these data can be calculated as: 
0.667 
1.143 
2/3 
4/3.5 
QCL < 12 
Qf2 < 
QLA < 12 
QPA < 12 
Qf2 
Qcu 12 
2.5/3 
4/3 
0.833 
1.333. 
However, since these data do not satisfy the condition in Proposition 1.1 ( Qf2 < 1 
but Qf2 > 1), then the true indexes do not exist. Thus , though it is possible to find 
numbers that satisfy the above inequalities, these numbers cannot be interpreted as 
true indexes since preferences are not common. Similarly, the classical and fixed-weight 
bounds themselves do not form true indexes ( and in fact they really should not even be 
called bounds , since they do not bound anything). 
24 Note that since the budget sets for this particular example do not intersect , then the test of WARP 
has no power , and it is impossible to reject the null hypothesis that preferences are common whatever q 1 
and q 2 might be observed (this issue is discussed in depth in Chapter 2). 
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1.4.4 A unique welfare index 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that for a given data set that is consistent 
with common preferences, attempts to construct welfare comparisons between countries 
will be affected by issues relating to both indeterminateness and non-uniqueness. The 
indeterminateness arises because the utility function is unobservable, and hence only 
bounds to the welfare indexes can be constructed. However, a welfare comparison may 
also be affected by non-uniqueness in that the money metric utility ratios will depend on 
the choice of the reference price vector. 
In certain contexts it may be appropriate to choose a particular reference price vector for 
use in the welfare comparison. An example might be the construction of a series of real 
income for a particular country over time, where prices are set to the first year in the 
data set. However, in the context of cross-country welfare comparisons, non-uniqueness of 
welfare comparisons is a considerable drawback since it may not be feasible or appropriate 
to use the price vector of a particular base country in the comparisons. One would have 
difficulty promoting the validity of country welfare rankings if the rankings constructed 
using U.S. prices, for example, are significantly different to those constructed using the 
prices of India. 
However, this non-uniqueness does not exist when preferences are homothetic, and for 
this reason, considerable research in index number theory has focused on the case of 
homothetici ty. 
Proposition 1.2. EXISTENCE OF A UNIQUE WELFARE INDEX - VARIOUS: There exists 
a unique index comparing the welfare of country i and j and defined by: Qf;A = QtA = 
Ui /UJ, if and only if preferences are homothetic. 
PROOF: We first show the sufficiency of homothetic preferences for the existence of a true 
welfare index. If the utility function is linearly homogenous, then it was shown above 
that e(U, p) = Ub(p), for some linearly homogeneous function b(p). Hence, it follows 
that there exists a unique (i.e. price-independent) true welfare index which is the ratio 
of (money metric) utility levels, and the Laspeyres-Allen and Paasche-Allen quantity 
indexes are equal to this index. 
To show necessity of homothetic preferences for the existence of a unique welfare index, 
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we need to show that if there exists a unique index, then it must be that preferences are 
homothetic. The proof of this is fairly involved and is omitted here (see Samuelson and 
Swamy (1974, p.570) for an example of this proof).• 
The existence of the unique welfare index when preferences are homothetic is shown 
graphically in Figure 1.4 for a two-good two-country example (where it is assumed that 
p 2 = 1 so that expenditures can be measured along the vertical axis). The expansion 
path for country i is EP(pi) - with homotheticity the expansion path is a straight line 
through the origin. It is apparent from this figure that Qf{1 = OB /OA and Qf1A = OD /OC . 
Furthermore, the property of homotheticity allows us to show ( using similar triangles) 
that OB /OA = OD /OC and hence Qf{1 = Qf1A = U2 /U1 . Finally, it is apparent that 
Qf1 = OD /OE < U2 /U1, that is, the Paasche index is the lower bound to the unique 
welfare index ( and it can similarly be shown that the Laspeyres index is the upper bound 
to this index). 
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Figure 1.4: Homothetic preferences and the unique welfare index 
It has therefore been shown that with homotheticity, the bilateral Allen indexes coin-
cide and there exists a unique welfare index. Further, with homotheticity the Koniis 
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and Malmquist welfare indexes also reduce to the ratio of utility levels Ui /UJ (since 
e(Ui, pr)= Uib(pr) and d(qi, ur) = u(qi)/Ur) and thus are indifferent to the reference 
points used in their calculation. 
The next question is naturally: how do we test a finite body of demand data for con-
sistency with homothetic preferences? In Chapter 3 (Proposition 3.1) it is shown that a 
given set of data is consistent with the existence of a representative consumer who max-
imises a homothetic utility function if the data satisfy the Homothetic Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (HARP). For the case of N = 2 the test of common homothetic preferences 
reduces to the following condition: 
Proposition 1.3. REVEALED PREFERENCE TEST OF COMMON HOMOTHETIC PREF-
ERENCES WITH N = 2 - VARIOUS: With N = 2, we do not reject the hypothesis that 
preferences across country i and country j are common and homothetic if and only if the 
data satisfy the Paasche-Laspeyres (P-L) inequality, that is: 
Q~ < Qt. 
PROOF: In Proposition 3.1 it is shown that HARP is necessary and sufficient for the 
data to be rationalised by a homothetic utility function. With N = 2, HARP reduces 
to the condition that the Laspeyres index must be greater than or equal to the Paasche 
index.• 
Given that the data do not reject the null hypothesis of common homothetic preferences, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of the existence of a unique welfare index. This unique 
welfare index is unobservable, however it is possible to construct its bounds using a 
corollary of Result 1.2: 
Result 1.3. The fixed-weight bounds to the unique welfare index are: 
P i j L Qij < U /U < Qij, Vi, j = 1, ... , N. 
We are now in a position to define the unique true welfare index. 
Definition 1.2. UNIQUE TRUE WELFARE INDEX A unique true welfare index is a set 
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of numbers A= (A1, A2 , •.. AN) such that:25 
Q{;<Ai/AJ<Qt Vi,j=l, ... ,N. 
In Proposition 3.1 it is shown that the existence of the numbers A as defined above is 
necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalised by a homothetic utility function. 
However, it should be noted that the inherent unobservability of the utility function and 
the resultant indeterminateness of the unique welfare index means that there will in fact 
be an infinite set of candidate unique true welfare indexes that are consistent with the 
data. As shown in Chapter 3, it is possible to use RP methods to calculate particular 
unique true welfare indexes which have informational content in that they form tight 
bounds to all possible unique true welfare indexes ( and thus the range of indeterminacy 
to the unique unobservable welfare index Ui /UJ is reduced via the use of RP methods). 
When N = 2 and the P-L inequality holds, then the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes will 
both be unique true welfare indexes. However, as noted by Afriat (1987, p.205) , for N > 2 
the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes will not necessarily be unique true welfare indexes 
( even if all of the P-L inequalities hold). The reason for this is that the availability of 
more data generally leads to the removal of some of the indeterminacy and thus narrows 
the bounds around the unique true welfare index. With N > 2 the Paasche and Laspeyres 
quantity indexes can now fall outside the improved bounds to the unique true welfare 
index. 
Fixed-weight bounds to the true index - Stone-Geary example 
For the Stop.e-Geary example, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the data 
are generated by a homothetic utility function ( the Paasche-Laspeyres inequality holds 
for these data). 26 Thus we can state that the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes themselves 
are true indexes. More accurately, one candidate true index is formed from the Laspeyres 
25 Note that the lower bound of this statement is actually redundant and it is left out in the_ presentation 
in Proposition 3.1. I follow Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) here by using of the letter "A" to represent a 
unique true welfare index or ''Afriat number". This is in recognition of the pioneering work of Afriat in 
constructing true indexes, as discussed further in Chapter 3. 
26 As discussed in Chapter 5, the Stone-Geary utility is in fact an example of an affine homothetic 
utility function. However, the fact that the hypothesis of homotheticity is not rejected even though the 
data have been generated by an affine homothetic utility function (and the subsistence parameters are 
such in this example that homotheticity is ruled out) is a result of the low power of the test which occurs 
when N is small. 
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index as A 1 = {Ai, Ai} = {0.587, 1} and another candidate true index is formed from 
the Paasche index as A2 = { A§ , A~} = {0.538, 1 }. 
Example of data which do not satisfy common homothetic preferences 
The data introduced above which do not satisfy common preferences (p1 = {1 , 1 }, 
q1 = {3, 1} and p2 = {1/2, 1 }, q2 = {1 , 2.5}) will obviously also not satisfy common 
homothetic preferences. T his can be seen by the fact that the Paasche index exceeds the 
Laspeyres index. 
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1.5 Multilateral Indexes 
As noted by Samuelson and Swamy (1974, p.568) , among others, the fundamental point 
about a welfare index is that itself must be a cardinal indicator of ordinal utility. The 
authors note that if a particular index were to satisfy all the axioms devised by Fisher 
(1922) except that of circularity, the index would fail as a cardinal indicator of util-
ity. They illustrate this by showing that if a particular index Qij does not satisfy the 
circularity property, then the following could be possible: 
Q20 == Q10 == 1 
Q30 == Q10 == 1 
Q32 > 1. 
However, this would lead to the following intransitivity: 
u(q2)==u(q1) 
u(q3) == u(ql) 
u(q3) > u(q2). 
The moral of the story is summarised by Samuelson and Swamy (1974, p.576): "So long 
as we stick to the economic theory of index numbers , the circular test is required as is the 
property of transitivity itself. And this is regardless of homotheticity or nonhomothetic-
ity." The central importance of circularity to the usefulness of a welfare index number in 
multilateral comparisons leads to the following definitions. 
Definition 1.3. MULTILATERAL INDEX A multilateral index is an index which satisfies 
the property of circularity. 
Definition 1.4. BILATERAL INDEX A bilateral index is an index which is not a multi-
lateral index. 
As noted above, the Laspeyres, Paasche and Ideal Fisher indexes do not satisfy circularity 
- they are all bilateral indexes. 27 However, there are three multilateral indexes proposed 
in the literature which are now reviewed. 
27 The failure of the Fisher index to satisfy the circularity test led Fisher to declare " ... , therefore, a 
perfect fulfillment of this so-called circular test should really be taken as proof that the formula which 
fulfills it is erroneous." (1922, p.271) 
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1.5.1 Multilateral true indexes 
The major focus of this thesis is on the construction of multilateral true indexes, which 
are now defined: 
Definition 1.5. MULTILATERAL TRUE INDEX A multilateral true index is a true index 
which also has the property of being a multilateral index. 
The above definition appears trivial, however it leads to an important result. With 
N = 2 it was shown above that if the P-L inequality is satisfied, then the Paasche and 
Laspeyres indexes are both unique true indexes. However, since these indexes do not 
satisfy circularity (which reduces to base-country invariance when N = 2) , they are not 
multilateral true indexes, even when N = 2. In fact, it is apparent (and inherently 
reasonable) that a multilateral true index can only be constructed with N > 2. 
It should be further noted that any unique true index constructed for N > 2 must satisfy 
circularity (this is apparent from Definition 1.2) and hence the condition for the existence 
of a multilateral true index is the same as the condition for the existence of a unique 
true index, namely the data must be consistent with the existence of a homothetic utility 
function. The construction of multilateral true indexes is described in detail in Chapter 
3. 
Having defined a multilateral true index, it remains to define a bilateral true index. 
Definition 1.6. BILATERAL TRUE INDEX A bilateral true index is a true index which 
is not a multilateral true index. 
It is apparent that with N = 2, if the P-L inequality is satisfied then the Paasche and 
Laspeyres indexes are both bilateral true indexes. Further, any set of numbers B or C 
aefined in Definition 1.1 is a bilateral true welfare index. The construction of bilateral 
true welfare indexes is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
1.5.2 Superlative indexes 
While the multilateral true index defined above is the main focus of this thesis, it is 
important to review some of the "competing" multilateral indexes which are used in 
international comparisons. In this sub-section, a review of superlative index numbers is 
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presented. This approach is due to Erwin Diewert and provides a method for measuring 
the cost-of-living and welfare which allows for substitution, yet does not require the 
estimation of a consumer demand system. 28 
While the Ideal Fisher index has certain desirable properties, the fact that it does not 
satisfy circularity makes it of limited use for cross-country comparisons. A multilateral 
version of the Ideal Fisher index is the EKS index of Elteto and Koves (1964) and Szulc 
(1964) :29 
(1.4) Q~KS -IIN (Qf) (l/N) tJ - -7:ls.. 
k=l Q]k 
The EKS index is thus the geometric mean of the ratios of all N bilateral Fisher indexes, 
taking each country in turn as base. 
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) have proposed an alternative multilateral index, 
which is similar in resemblance to the EKS index, but possesses superior t heoretical 
properties. The basic "building block" for the CCD index is the bilateral Tornqvist 
index: 
i+ J Wl Wz 
Q½ = fr (q~) 2 
l=l q{ 
The CCD index then multilateralises the Tornqvist index in the same way as the EKS 
index extends the Fisher index: 
Q§CD = fr ( Q'&) (1/ N) 
k=l Q]k . 
While the Ideal Fisher and Tornqvist indexes do not satisfy circularity, the EKS and 
CCD indexes do. Further, the EKS index exhibits a high degree of characteristicity by 
construction since it is the solution to the problem of finding an index number which 
satisfies circularity and minimises the sum of squared deviations from the Fisher in-
dexes (Drechsler 1973). However both the EKS and CCD indexes fail to satisfy matrix 
consistency. 
28 See Diewert (1976, 1978, 1981 , 1983) for further reading on this approach. 
29 This index was in fact first proposed by Gini (1931). The EKS index is used by the OECD and 
by Eurostat (the Statistical Office of the European Union) to produce purchasing-power-parity-corrected 
real income data for their member countries. 
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Definition 1. 7. EXACT QUANTIY INDEx30 A quantity index Qij is exact for a given 
utility function u(q) if Qij = u(qi)/u(qj), where qi is the Marshallian demand for u(q). 
In other words, a quantity index number is exact if it exactly equals the ratio of the utility 
functions whenever the data is consistent with microeconomic maximising behaviour. 
The EKS index is exact when the utility function is a homogeneous quadratic, while the 
CCD index is exact for a homogeneous translog utility function. 31 
Definition 1.8. SUPERLATIVE INDEX A superlative index is an index which is exact for 
a utility function which is flexible (in that it provides a second-order approximation to an 
arbitrary twice-differentiable utility function). 
The popularity of the EKS and CCD indexes in empirical work can therefore be at-
tributed to the fact that they are both superlative index numbers. However, despite 
their popularity, the use of superlative indexes in multilateral comparisons can be ques-
tioned on three grounds. First , while these indexes are exact for particular (flexible) 
specifications of the utility function, there is no testing as to whether the data are con-
sistent with these utility functions. 32 In contrast, multilateral true indexes constructed 
under the RP approach only exist when the data has been found to be consistent with 
homothetic preferences. Despite being exact for homogeneous utility functions (which by 
definition are homothetic), neither the EKS nor CCD indexes are necessarily multilateral 
true indexes (as defined above) in that they do not always lie within the fixed-weight 
bounds to the true index. If the data were exactly consistent with these specific under-
lying (homothetic) utility functions, the EKS / CCD indexes would be multilateral true 
indexes. 
Second, while the EKS and CCD indexes exhibit circularity, Neary (2000) has noted 
that this is only a statistical property (it is an artifact of the averaging process used 
in their construction), and does not reflect an underlying preference structure which 
necessarily leads to circularity. 33 For example, the EKS index is a set of real numbers 
30 Note that the property of exactness was originally proposed for any aggregator function (that is, it 
applies to both utility functions and production functions) . 
31 In the context of superlative indexes, homogeneity is taken to mean linear homogeneity. 32 Afriat originally made this criticism of the finding by Byushgens (1925) that the Fisher index is exact 
for homogeneous quadratic preferences. 
33In practice it is found that Fisher indexes rarely exhibit circularity, suggesting that the underlying 
preferences are not homogeneous quadratic. Thus, imposing a specific homothetic functional form is 
likely to be too restrictive. 
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which are constructed as averages of N ratios of Fisher indexes and the EKS only exhibits 
circularity because this is an inherent property of the real number system. In contrast , 
the multilateral true index introduced above exhibits circularity by virtue of the fact that 
it is constructed when preferences are shown to be homothetic. 
Finally, Neary (2000) has argued that the property of exactness in fact makes the EKS 
and CCD indexes redundant and thus unsuitable for use in multilateral comparisons. 
The Neary Critique of the use of the EKS and CCD indexes in multilateral comparisons 
is now summarised. 
Result 1.4. EXACTNESS OF THE FISHER INDEX - KONUS AND BYUSHGENS (1926): 
The Fisher index is exact when the utility function is a homogeneous quadratic: U = 
( q' Aq) 1/ 2 , A symmetric. 
Since the homogeneous quadratic utility function is homothetic, the fact that the Fisher 
index is exact means that it is equal to the utility ratios: 
(1.5) Q[; = ui;uJ. 
As noted by Diewert (1976), the quadratic utility function is flexible in that it provides 
a second-order approximation to an arbitrary twice-differentiable linearly homogeneous 
utility function. Hence, the Fisher index is superlative. The fact that the EKS index is 
the multilateral version of the superlative bilateral Fisher index would appear to justify 
its use in multilateral comparisons. However, the following result does not support this. 
Result 1.5. EXACTNESS OF THE EKS INDEX - NEARY (2000): The EKS index is exact 
when the utility function is a homogeneous quadratic. 
This result follows from the substitution of (1.5) into (1.4): 
N ( i/ k) (1/N) 
Q~Ks = IT u _ u = ui;uj. 1,J UJ /Uk 
k=l 
The above shows that the EKS index is superlative in that when preferences are homo-
geneous quadratic it is equal to the ratio of utility levels, just as the Fisher index is. 
However, Neary (2000) argues that it is precisely this equality that provides an argument 
against the use of the EKS index for multilateral comparisons. When preferences are ho-
mogeneous quadratic, the EKS index is redundant since it is equal to the bilateral Fisher 
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index. In practice, we generally find an inequality between the Fisher and EKS indexes 
( and, relatedly, that the Fisher index does not satisfy circularity), thus indicating that 
the demand data could not be generated by homogeneous quadratic preferences. As men-
tioned above, the EKS index will by construction exhibit circularity, unlike the Fisher 
index. However, this is a statistical property and does not imply that the underlying 
preference structure has led to circularity. 
The Neary Critique of the CCD index is similar to the critique of the EKS index. 
Result 1.6. EXACTNESS OF THE TORNQVIST INDEX - DIEWERT (1976): The Tornqvist 
index is exact when the utility function is a homogeneous translog: In U == a0 + a' In q + 
½(In q)' A lnq. 
The translog is also flexible functional form, and is in fact more general than the 
quadratic; this suggests that the Tornqvist bilateral is even more "superlative" than 
the bilateral Fisher index. For this reason, the CCD index, which is the multilateral 
version of the Tornqvist bilateral index, has been advocated in multilateral comparisons. 
However, Neary (2000) again throws doubt on the use of the CCD index. 
Result 1. 7. EXACTNESS OF THE TORNQVIST INDEX - NEARY (2000): The CCD index 
is exact where the utility function is homogeneous translog. 
The above arguments cast serious doubt on the use of the EKS and CCD indexes in inter-
national comparisons research. However, these indexes are ( and probably will continue 
to be) popular in cross-country comparative research. 34 
1.5.3 The Geary index 
The Geary index, which is used by the ICP to compute purchasing-power-parity-corrected 
exchange rates and real income measures, is constructed in an entirely different manner 
to the construction of the other multilateral indexes discussed so far. 35 The index was 
34 0ne extension of the use of the CCD index is the stochastic approach of Selvanathan and Rao (1994) . 
This approach involves the use of an averaging process to eliminate random errors which make each price 
relative deviate from the overall price index. The method gives an estimate of the underlying signal, the 
price index, and provides standard errors for index numbers. 
35Khamis(1970, 1972) derived conditions for the Geary method to give a unique, positive solution and 
advocated the use of index numbers based on the Geary method. The Geary index is also known as the 
Geary-Khamis index, however Neary (1996) has argued that this may be over-generous to Khamis. The 
Geary index is used extensively in applied work and was popularised by its use in the Penn World Tables. 
The presentation here is based on Neary (2000). 
-------- ---- - d 
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first suggested by Geary (1958), and is constructed under the assumed existence of "world 
prices" 1r = (1r1 , ... , 7rK) and "true" exchange rates E = (E1, ... , EN). The true exchange 
rates are Laspeyres price indexes, which compare the world prices with the prices of each 
country in turn: 36 
(1.6) i = Lz 1rzqf 
"""" i i' Lil plql 
i == 1, ... , N. 
It is therefore apparent that each country's real income is the same whether valued at 
world prices (Lz 1rzqt) or valued at domestic prices, converted at the true exchange rates 
(Ei Lzpfqt). The world prices are defined by the requirement that total world spending 
on commodity l is the same whether valued at its world price ( 1rz I:i qt) or at domestic 
prices converted at the true exchange rates (Li Eipf qt): 
(1.7) 
i i i Li E Pz_qz, 
1rz = Li qJ l == 1, ... , K. 
Solving simultaneously for E and 1r, one can then calculate the real income of each country 
at world prices: 
'l 'l 'l 'l ... L . xa ==Ex = 1rzqz, i == 1, ... ,N. 
l 
The Geary real income measure implies a set of indexes, Qg = xbf x?c. 
Thus, with the Geary index, the welfare of each country is measured at world prices, 
1r. The Geary index exhibits circularity (and hence is a multilateral index), but only 
because the real income of each country is measured at the same consistent set of prices, 
1r. 37 However the world prices are artificial in that they are not faced by anyone (by 
construction, they reflect an "average international" price structure). 
One of the advantages of the Geary index is that it exhibits matrix consistency. However, 
the Geary index is a fixed-weight index and thus does not allow for any substitution 
36 Following the U.S. convention, the ICP defines the true exchange rates or "purchasing power pari-
ties" as the inverse of the definition presented above; Neary (2000) follows the U.K. convention since it 
facilitates the matrix algebra. 
37 As noted by Samuelson and Swamy (1974, p.577) in the absence of homotheticity, circularity is still 
satisfied in a sense if the welfare comparisons are made using a particular price vector. For example, if 
pr is used in the welfare comparison, then circularity will hold: 
Q~,r = e(Ui, pr) = e(Ui, Pr) e(Uk, Pr) = Q~,r QA?r 
tJ e(Uj,pr) e(Uk,pr) e(Uj,pr) ik kJ . 
However, there is no reason to choose pr over any other possible price vector for the welfare comparison; 
homotheticity is required for "true" circularity to hold. 
52 1. Cross-Country Welfare Comparisons: Theory and Estimation 
in consumption. The Geary reference price index 1r tends to be similar to the price 
vectors of richer countries; as discussed in Section 1.3.2, the presence of the Gerschenkron 
effect leads to the Geary index underestimating per capita income differences across 
countries. Using 1985 ICP data on 64 countries, Hill (2000) found that the Geary index 
overestimates per capita income for some poorer countries, relative to richer countries, 
by as much as 70 percent. 
The Geary method and measures of inequality and convergence 
Relatedly, the level of cross-country inequality is also underestimated when the Geary per 
capita income measure is used. Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) show that the variance of log 
GDP from the Penn World Table (PWT), which uses the Geary aggregation method, is 
relatively low ( compared with measures of variance constructed using poor country price 
vectors), reflecting the fact that the Geary international price vector resembles the prices 
of richer countries.38 Hill (2000) found for the 1985 ICP data that the Gini coefficient for 
real per capita income constructed using the Geary index was 0.57, which is toward the 
lower end of the range of Ginis calculated using all of the different country price vectors. 
Since the Geary international price vector is closer to the price vector of richer countries, 
it follows from the discussion in Section 1.3.3 that a convergence calculated using GDP 
constructed with the Geary method will be underestimated if prices are also converging. 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) calculate that the variance of log (PWT) GDP falls by 
0.016 between 1980 and 1990; this is substantially less than the fall of 0.023 which is 
found using their preferred measure of country welfare, the Ideal Afriat Index (which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
Geary-Allen International Accounts System 
From the above, it appears that the fact that the Geary index exhibits substitution bias 
seriously compromises its use in international comparisons research. However, recent 
important research by Neary (2000) aims to redress this drawback, while preserving 
38Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) also present measures of inequality and convergence calculated using 
GDP constructed by the ICP. However, the ICP used the Geary method in 1980 and shifted to the EKS 
method in 1990, the change in aggregation methods makes comparisons between years more difficult. For 
this reason, the focus here is on inequality and convergence using the PWT GDP series. 
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the spirit of the Geary method. Neary (2000) has proposed a new index, the Geary-
Allen International Accounts ( G AIA) System, which uses estimated parameters from 
the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) of Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel 
(1997) to incorporate substitution in consumption into the Geary index. 
A complete discussion of the GAIA is beyond the scope of this thesis; a brief outline 
follows. 39 The first step is to replace the fixed-weight Geary exchange rates (1.6) with 
their true equivalents, which are known as the Geary-Koniis exchange rates: 
(1.8) Ei = e(Ui' II) 
e(Ui, pi) 
~l Ilzqi7' 
~ ii' L..il plql 
i=l, ... ,N, 
where qi7' is the "virtual" or imputed quantity that the representative consumer would 
choose if he or she had country i's level of utility and faced the world prices II = 
{II1, ... , ITK }, and is calculated by applying Shephard's Lemma: 40 
q'zi = ez (Ui, II), 
where ez (Ui, II) = 8e(Ui, II)/ 8Ilz. The second step is to require that the world prices 
satisfy the Geary aggregation conditions and (1. 7) is therefore replaced with: 
~i Eipfqf 
Ilz = '"' i* , l = l, ... , K. 
i ql 
(1.9) 
Solving simultaneously for II and E = (E1 , ... , EN) - using an approach to be described 
further below - one can then calculated the G AIA real income of each country: 
x3A = Eixi = L Ilzq'zi = e(Ui, II), i = 1, ... , N. 
l 
The Geary-Allen true indexes of real income are: 
Q9A_x'3A_e(Ui,II) v· ·=1 N iJ - *J - (U} II) i, J ' ... ' . 
xGA e ' 
Neary (2000) proves that there exists a solution to (1.8) and (1.9) with all Ei, Ilz and 
qf* strictly positive. This solution is arrived at via a tatonnement process which can be 
described as follows. First, the Geary system (1.6) and (1. 7) is solved to calculate the 
Geary prices (see Appendix A for details of how this system may be solved). Next, the 
39 A difference with the presentation here, compared with that in Neary (2000), is that identical tastes 
worldwide are assumed from the outset; Neary (2000) introduces this assumption later. 
40 This footnote has been removed. 
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Geary prices are used to estimate a QUAIDS model - the estimate parameters of which 
are then used to calculate the virtual quantities qf* corresponding to the Geary prices. 
These virtual quantit ies are then used in the GAIA system (1.8) and (1.9) which is solved 
to find an estimate of IT. 
This estimate of G AIA world prices is then used in a second round estimation of the 
QUAIDS model and the implied virtual quantities. This iterative process continues until 
there is no further change in the G AIA prices and the final estimate of these prices is 
used for the construction of the Geary-Allen index of real income. Neary (2000) proves 
that there exists a unique tatonnement path from the Geary prices to the G AIA prices 
(however, it is not proved that this GAIA price vector is itself unique). 
The GAIA System and measures of inequality and convergence 
Using 1980 ICP data, Neary (2000) calculates Geary-Allen indexes using several different 
specifications of the QUAIDS model and compares these indexes with the EKS and 
Geary index. By construction, the Geary-Allen index does not exhibit substitution bias 
and consequently, the various Geary-Allen indexes constructed by Neary (2000) imply a 
less compressed distribution of world income, compared with the findings for the Geary 
and El(S index. Neary (2000) hypothesises that the use of the Geary-Allen index will 
similarly produce differing conclusions regarding convergence of incomes; it would be of 
interest to estimate the GAIA System for 1990 ICP data and see whether the implied 
CJ convergence is closer to that found by Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) using their Ideal 
Afriat Index. 
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1.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a review of the axiomatic and economic approaches to welfare measure-
ment was presented. The RP approach to welfare measurement, which is an example 
of the economic approach to index number construction, was outlined. A new frame-
work for constructing bilateral true welfare indexes was introduced, and this framework 
is used in Chapter 2 where three methods for constructing bilateral true welfare indexes 
are reviewed. The multilateral true welfare index, which is the main focus of this thesis, 
was also introduced and compared with other multilateral indexes which have been pro-
posed in the literature. Further results relating to the existence and construction of the 
multilateral true index are presented in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 
The Revealed Preference 
Approach to Welfare 
Measurement 
2.1 Introduction 
Under the money metric concept of utility, if a particular bundle of goods consumed by 
country A costs more than the bundle consumed by country B, when costs are measured 
using the same prices, then country A has higher utility than country B. There is an 
implicit assumption in money metric welfare comparisons that preferences are common 
across the countries being compared. 1 If this were not the case, and different countries 
had different utility maps, then one could not be certain that a bundle costing more 
imparted higher utility. 
In Chapter 1, money metric welfare indexes constructed under the economic approach to 
welfare measurement were introduced. It was shown that if preferences across observa-
tional units are common, then the Allen welfare indexes exist. These welfare indexes are 
not unique - the welfare between two countries can be compared using either the (base-
weighted) Laspeyres-Allen or (current-weighted) Paasche-Allen welfare index. Further, 
while these indexes exist when preferences are common, since we do not have complete 
information on consumer preferences, they are not directly observable. However, it was 
shown in Chapter 1 that bounds to the Allen welfare indexes are provided by the classical 
and fixed-weight quantity indexes. 
1 There is also an assumption of monotonicity of preferences . 
57 
58 2. The Revealed Preference Approach to Welfare Measurement 
As discussed in Chapter 1, for a given data set that is consistent with common preferences, 
a true index can be constructed as a set of numbers the ratios of which are contained 
within the classical and fixed-weight bounds to the Allen welfare indexes. A true index 
thus defined will not satisfy the property of circularity, that is, it will not be a multilateral 
index. Hence such an index is known as a bilateral true index. If a given data set does not 
reject the hypothesis that preferences are common and homothetic, however, then there 
will exist a unique true welfare index, which also has the property of being a multilateral 
index. Multilateral true indexes are the focus of Chapter 3. 
The revealed preference (RP) approach to welfare measurement employs revealed prefer-
ence methods for constructing bilateral true welfare indexes. 2 RP methods can be used 
to construct bilateral true indexes with informational content in that they form tight 
bounds to all possible bilateral true indexes. There are three main characteristics of 
the RP approach: (1) It is explicitly based on the utility maximisation framework (and 
therefore is an example of the economic approach to index number construction); (2) 
common preferences across countries are hypothesised and tested for 3 and (3) the tests 
of common preferences are conducted using revealed preference relations. 
In Section 2.2, RP tests of common preferences are reviewed. The RP approach to testing 
for common general preferences originated with the work of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) 
and Varian (1982), and the most easily implemented version of this test is that of the 
Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP). If a data set is found to satisfy 
GARP, then we cannot reject the hypothesis that preferences are common and hence 
there exists a bilateral true welfare index. 
One of the problems with the GARP test of common preferences is that it tends to have 
low power (in that it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis of common preferences). A 
related consequence of the low power of G ARP is that bilateral true indexes constructed 
2The methods which come under the RP approach have been referred to as "nonparametric" methods 
by other authors since they generally do not involve an assumption about the form of preferences. How-
ever, this term is not used in this thesis for the following reason. One of the methods described in this 
chapter (that of Blundell , Browning, and Crawford (1998)) expansion path information to improve the 
power of the RP test of common preferences. While Blundell , Browning, and Crawford (1998) estimate 
nonparametric Engel curves to obtain this expansion path information, their method could equally be 
used with a parametric specification of the Engel curve ( as is done in this chapter). In such a situation, 
the term "nonparametric" would be a misnomer. 
3 An assumption of common tastes is imposed in the construction of superlative indexes (EKS and 
CCD indexes), and also the Geary index. Note that under the RP approach intra-national preferences are 
assumed to be common and to satisfy aggregation conditions necessary for the existence of a representative 
consumer. 
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related consequence of the low power of G ARP is that bilateral true indexes constructed 
under the RP approach do not tend to be much tighter than the bounds provided by the 
classical and fixed-weight quantity indexes. In Section 2.3 it is shown how the power of 
the test of G ARP can be improved ( and, relatedly, the bounds to bilateral true indexes 
which are constructed via this approach can be tightened) if information on expansion 
paths is used. In particular, recent work by Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998) on 
incorporating expansion path information into RP tests of general common preferences 
is reviewed. 
Three methods for constructing the bounds to bilateral true indexes are reviewed in sec-
tion 2.3 (see Figure 2.1); one of the innovations of this chapter is the presentation of a 
framework for comparing these three methods. The GARP bounds of Varian (1982) are 
constructed without any information about the expansion path, and consequently are 
not particularly tight. In contrast, the improved GARP bounds of Blundell, Browning, 
and Crawford (1998) incorporate estimated expansion paths and are significantly tighter 
than the GARP bounds. Afriat (1987) has shown that given the existence of a utility 
function (i.e., given the data share common preferences), then the family of utility func-
tions consistent with the data may be bounded by the inner and outer envelope utility 
functions. Chavas and Cox (1997) have shown how the bilateral true indexes can be 
approximated using the Afriat envelope functions and one of the findings in this chapter 
is that even when no information about the expansion path is used, the bilateral true 
indexes constructed from the Afriat envelope functions are improvements on the G ARP 
bounds of Varian (1982). 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, RP tests of common preferences 
are presented and applied in an example. In Section 2.3 , it is shown how the power of the 
RP test can be improved via the use of expansion path information. Three RP methods 
for constructing bilateral true welfare indexes are reviewed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 
concludes this chapter. 
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The Revealed Preference Approach 
Bilateral True Indexes 
Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) 
Varian (1982) 
Multilateral True Indexes 
Afriat (1972,1981), Diewert (1973) 
Varian (1983) 
GARP bounds 
Varian (1982) 
Afriat envelope functions 
Chavas and Cox (1997) 
Improved GARP bounds 
Blundell, Browning and Crawford (1998) 
Bilateral comparisons 
Varian (1982) 
Manser and MacDonald (1988) 
Multilateral comparisons 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) 
Figure 2.1: The revealed preference approach to welfare measurement 
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2.2 The RP Tests of Common General Preferences 
In this section, the RP preference test of common preferences is reviewed. 4 This tests for 
the existence of a representative consumer who maximises general utility function. The 
three methods for conducting this test are first described and then implemented in an 
example. 
2.2.1 Preliminaries 
Revealed preference theory is associated with the work of Samuelson (1948) , Houthakker 
(1950), Richter (1966), Afriat (1976) and others. Before describing the RP test of the 
representative consumer hypothesis, it is useful to introduce some general concepts related 
to revealed preference analysis. 
The following definitions are used: 
1. qi is directly revealed preferred to q ( qi RD q) if pi .qi > pi .q; 
2. qi is strictly directly revealed preferred to q ( qi pD q) if pi .qi > pi .q; 
3 i · l d j d t ( iR ) ·f i i > i j ~ j > ......_i k m m > . q 1s revea e pre erre o q q q 1 p .q _ p .q , .v .q _ .v .q , .. . , p .q _ 
pm .q for some sequence of observations (qi , qJ , ... , q). In this case the relation R is 
said to be the transitive closure of the relation RD ; 
4. qi is strictly revealed preferred to q ( qi Pq) if :3 observations qJ and qk such that 
qiRqJ' qJ pDqk, qkRq. 
The simplest version of the RP test of common preferences involves the Weak Axiom of 
Revealed Preference (WARP), the definition of which follows (also see Figures 2.2 and 
2.3). 
Definition 2.1. The data satisfy WARP if qi RDqj implies not qJ RD qi. In other words 
qiRDqj implies pJ.qJ < pJ.qi. 
4 Much of this summary is drawn from Varian (1982). A major simplification in the presentation here 
is that comparisons are made only between consumption bundles which have been observed; the presen-
tation in Varian (1982) is more general as it allows for comparisons between observed and hypothetical 
consumption bundles. Also, the presentation here incorporates relevant results from Knoblauch (1992). 
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WARP therefore rules out inconsistencies of preferences. Thus if qi was chosen in pref-
erence to qJ (that is, qJ was affordable at pi), then it must be that qi was not affordable 
at pJ (i.e. qJ was not chosen in preference to qi). 
q2 q2 
0 q1 0 q1 
Figure 2.2: WARP is rejected Figure 2.3: WARP is satisfied 
The more general ( and empirically relevant) version of the RP test of common preferences 
involves the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) the definition of which 
follows (and examples are in Figures 2.4 and 2.5) . 
Definition 2.2. The data satisfy GARP if qi RqJ implies not qJ pD qi. In other words 
qiRqJ implies pJ.qJ < pJ.qi.5 
Intuitively, GARP also rules out preference reversals. If qi was chosen in preference to qJ 
at a particular set of prices, then if a new set of prices still allows both qJ and a bundle 
. . 
which is not inferior to q2 to be chosen, q1 will not be chosen. 
The revealed preference relation R summarises all of the preference information contained 
in the demand data. Having defined a revealed preferred relation for a given set of data, 
the next step is to use this relation to associate utility functions with the data set via 
the concept known as rationalisation. 
5There are other axioms of revealed preference, most notably the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(SARP). The data satisfy SARP if qi Rqi and qi -:/= qi implies not qi Rqi . It can be shown that SARP 
implies GARP , but not vice-versa. SARP and WARP both require single-valued demand functions (i.e. 
the indifference curves cannot have any flat spots), while GARP is compatible with multi-valued demand 
functions , and for this reason it is more general. 
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q2 
0 
(po' xo} 1 Xl 2 
Figure 2.4: GARP is rejected 
q2 
q1 0 
1 Xl 
2 
Figure 2.5: GARP is satisfied 
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Definition 2.3. A utility function w( q) rationalises the data (p, q) if w( qi) > w( q) V q 
such that pi .qi > pi .q i.e. w( q) rationalises the observed behaviour if it achieves its 
maximum value on the budget set at the chosen bundles.6 
Broadly speaking, if a utility function w(q) rationalises the data (p, q) , then w(q) could 
have generated the data. Note, however, that economists generally impose certain reg-
ularity conditions on the allowable utility functions that may rationalise a given set of 
demand data. For example, we may restrict w( q) to be of a class of nonsatiated, mono-
tonic and concave utility functions. 7 Afriat's theorem of the representative consumer 
hypothesis , which is presented below, implies that with no loss of generality such restric-
tions can always be imposed on the utility function. Conversely, with a finite amount of 
demand data that satisfy G ARP, it is impossible to find violations of these restrictions. 8 
The R? approach to constructing bilateral bounds involves using the concepts introduced 
above to establish sets of observations which are revealed preferred and revealed worse 
than a given observation. The set of observations revealed worse to q0 and revealed 
' preferred to q are defined, respectively: 
6The notation used here distinguishes an observable utility function w( q) that rationalises the data 
and is one of an infinite number of functions that could have generated the data from the underlying 
unobservable utility function u( q) that did generate the data. 
7 A utility function is monotonic if qi > qi • w(qi) > w(qi) and is locally nonsatiated if arbitrarily 
near each q there is a qi such that w (qi) > w ( q). 
8 The main point to note here is that the GARP test of common preferences does not rule out the 
existence of a utility function which does not have well behaved properties. However GARP being satisfied 
indicates that the data could have been generated by a well-behaved utility function. 
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Definition 2.4. 
RW(q0 ) = { q: q 0 Pq} 
' ' RP ( q ) = { q : qPq } . 
If q' is in RW ( q 0 ) then every concave, monotonic utility function that rationalises the 
data must rank q 0 ahead of q'. RP( q') has a similar interpretation. 
Result 2.1. q0 is in RP(q') if and only ifq' is in RW(q0 ). 
Examples of bounding an indifference curve using GARP are provided in Figures 2.6 
and 2. 7. In Figure 2. 7 the presence of intersecting budget lines results in quite a bit of 
information about the indifference curve passing through q 0 ; it can't intersect RW( q 0 ) 
or RP(q0 ), and hence it must lie between the two. 
q2 
0 
q1 
Figure 2.6: Bounding an indifference curve using GARP - example 1 
The set of bundles preferred to q 0 (using the true unknown utility function) must always 
contain RP(q0 ) and must be contained in the complement to RW(q0 ). This set is 
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q2 
0 
q1 
Figure 2.7: Bounding an indifference curve using GARF - example 2 
denoted N RW ( q 0), for "not revealed worse" than q 0 and is defined as: 
D·efinition 2.5. NRW(q0 ) = { q: p i .q > p i .qi for all q i such that q 0 Rqi} . 
RP ( q0 ) and N RW ( q0 ) thus form ''inner" and "outer" estimates of the set of bundles 
preferred to q0 , and in fact they are the tightest inner and outer estimates (Figure 2.8). 
2.2.2 RP tests of common preferences - theory 
The RP test of the representative consumer hypothesis is attributable to the work of 
Afriat (1967), D,iewert (1973) and Varian (1982). 
Proposition 2.1. COMMON PREFERENCES - AFRIAT (1967), D'IEWERT (1973 ) AND 
VARIAN (1982) The following conditions are equivalent: 9 
9In Afria.t 's original theorem , condition 2 was that the data satisfy ''cyclical consistency" ; Varian 
(1982) shows that this is equivalent to the data satisfying the much easier to t est GARP . 
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q2 
q2 
(p1, Xl) (po' xo) (p2' x2) 
0 
qi 
Figure 2.8: RP(q0 ) and NRW(q0 ) 
(i) There exists a locally non-satiated utility function w( q) that rationalises a finite set 
of data; 
(ii) The data satisfy CARP; 
(iii) For all i , j = 1, ... , N there exist numbers Wi, >..i that satisfy the Afriat inequalities: 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
)..1, > 0 
wi < wj + >..JpJ ( qi - qJ); 
(iv) There exists a concave, monotonic, continuous, locally non-satiated utility function 
w ( q) that rationalises the data. 
PROOF THAT (i)• (ii): 10 Let w( q) rationalise the data. Thus if pi .qi > pi .qJ, then by 
definition it must be that w(qi) 2:: w(qJ). Therefore qiRDqj implies w(qi) > w(qJ), and 
10The following proofs are based on those in Varian (1982) and Diewert and Parkan (1985). 
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it must also be that qiRqJ implies w(qi) > w(qJ). 11 If pi.qi> pi.qJ , so that qipDqJ, 
then it must be that w(qi) > w(qJ). If not , then w(qi) = w(qJ), but by local nonsatiation 
there must exist a bundle q close to qJ such that pi.qi > pi.q and w(q) > w(qi). But 
then w( q) could not rationalise the data point (pi, qi). Hence it must be that q i pD qJ 
implies w(qi) > w(qJ), and, equivalently, qJPDqi implies w(qJ) > w(qi). It has therefore 
been shown that q i RD qJ implies not qJ pD qi, since that would mean both w( qi) > w( qJ) 
and w(qJ) > w(qi). Thus GARP follows from w(q) rationalising the data. • 
PROOF THAT (ii)• (iii): Algorithm 3 in Varian (1982) uses a set of demand observations 
(p, q) and a revealed preference relation R that satisfies G ARP to construct the Afriat 
numbers. The proof is conducted by showing that Algorithm 3 (re-produced below) 
works i.e. that the numbers it produces in fact satisfy the Afriat inequalities. 
Algorithm 2.1. CONSTRUCTING AFRIAT NUMBERS Input: A set of demand observa-
tions (p, q) and the revealed preference relation R that satisfies GARF. An algorithm 
max( I ) which finds the maximal element from a set of demand observations I .12 Output: 
A set of numbers Wi and Ai > 0, i = 1, ... , N that satisfy the Afriat inequalities. 
1. 1={l, ... ,N}, B=0. 
2. Let m = max(I). 
3. Set E = {i in I: qiRqm}. If B = 0 , set Wi =Ai= 1 and go to 6. Otherwise go 
to 4. 
4. Set wm = miniEE mirljEB min{WJ + ).Jp-7.(qi - qJ) , WJ}. 
5. Set Am= maxiEE maxjEB max{(WJ - wm) / p i .(qJ - qi), l}. 
. . 
6. Set wi = wm, Ai= Am for all i EE. 
1. Set I= I\ E , B =BUE. If I= 0, stop. Otherwise go to 2. 
11 That is, if q iRD q \ then w(qi) > w(qk) and if qk RDqj then w( q k) > w(q j). Hence it must be that 
q i Rqj implies w(qi) > w(qj). 
12 An element q m of a set J is maximal with respect to the binary relation R if q i Rqm implies qm Rqi 
i.e. the only elements ranked ahead of q m are those that are indifferent to it. Varian (1 982, p.968) 
provides a two line algorithm, Algorithm 2, for finding the maximal element. Since (p, q ) is a finite set 
of data and R is a reflexive and transitive binary relations, then there is always at least one maximal 
element. 
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At each pass through the algorithm a set of indexes of "equivalent" elements, E, is 
removed from I and added to B, the set of indexes of "better" elements. The proof that 
(ii)=>(iii) involves showing that after step 6 in Algorithm 2.1 is executed, the Ws and As 
calculated up to that point all satisfy the Afriat inequalities. Varian (1982, p.969) shows 
that this is indeed the case.• 
PROOF THAT (iii)=>(iv): From the Afriat inequalities, the function w(q) can be defined: 
w ( q) = m~n { Wi + A ip i. ( q - qi)} 
'l, 
This is a piecewise linear function and therefore has the stated properties in (iv). How-
ever, it needs to be shown that w(q) rationalises the data. First, note that w(qi) = Wi 
for all i = 1, ... , N. If this were not the case, and the minimum were in fact obtained at 
say q m, then: 
w(qi) = wm + .Ampm.(qi - qm) < wi + .Aipi.(qi - qi)= wi. 
But if this inequality were ever strict , then there would be a violation of one of the Afriat 
inequalities, and hence it must be that w( qi) = Wi for all i = 1, ... , N . 
Suppose there is some q such that pJ qJ > pJ q. For w( q) to rationalise the data, it must 
be that w(qJ) > w(q). This follows directly from the following set of inequalities: 
w(q) = m~n{Wi + .Aipi.(q - qi)} 
'l, 
< Wj + Ajpj.(q - qj) 
. . 
< WJ = w(qJ), 
where the last line is obtained using the fact that .Aj pJ. ( q - qJ) < 0 ( since pJ qJ > pJ q) 
and .AJ > 0.0 
PROOF THAT (iv)=>(i): This is obvious. 
It has therefore been shown that a test of GARP is equivalent to a test for the existence 
of common preferences. However, it is worthwhile to also show that (iii)¢=(iv), since this 
enables an interpretation of the Afriat numbers. 
w( q) rationalises the data if it is the case that: 
qi solves max[w( q) : pi .q < pi .qi , q > OJ 
q 
i = l ... N. 
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If it is assumed that qi > 0 then the non-negativity constraints in the above maximisation 
problem are not binding. 13 With the further assumption that the utility function is 
weakly increasing (non-satiation), w( q) rationalises the data if it is the case that: 
qi solves max[w( q) : pi .q = x, q > OJ 
q 
i = l ... N, 
where x is total expenditure. The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
L ( q ' ). ) = w ( q ) + ). ( X - p i. q ) ' 
and the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions reduce to: there exist >.2 such that: 
(2.3) 
Dw( qi) = >.ipi 
).i > 0 i=l, ... ,N. 
where Dw(qi) = [8w(qi)/8q1, ... , 8w(qi)/8q~]T. A differentiable concave function has 
the property that any tangent hyperplane (i.e. any first-order Taylor series expansion) 
lies above the function. Therefore, for each j, the following inequality is valid for all 
q > 0: 
w(q) < w(qj) + Dw(qj ).(q - qj) j = l , ... ,N. 
Defining W j w ( qJ) for j = 1, ... , N and replacing q in the above equation with qi, i = 
1, ... , N gives the following N 2 inequalities: 
(2.4) wi < w j + >.J Pj. (qi - qj) , i,j=l, ... ,N. 
Hence, it has been shown that in order for a body of positive data (p i, qi) : i = 1, ... , N to 
be rationalised by a concave, monotonic, continuous , non-satiated utility function, it is 
necessary that there exist 2N numbers: W1, ... , WN (which can be interpreted as utility 
levels) and >.1 , ... , ). N (which can be interpreted as marginal utilities of income) such that 
the Afriat inequalities (2.3) and (2.4) are satisfied.• 
There are three approaches for testing for common preferences. The first approach de-
scribed here, testing for G ARP , is by far the easiest to implement and is generally used 
in empirical applications. 
13 Note that in showing that (iii)• (iv) it was not necessary to assume that q i > 0. 
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2.2.3 Three tests of common preferences 
Testing GARP 
As GARP is relatively easy to test, the equivalency between (ii) and (iv) in Proposition 
2.1 suggests a ready test for common tastes. The first stage of the test of GARP is the 
construction of the N by N matrix G which summarises the relation RD and whose ijth 
entry is given by: 
Gii 1 if pi.qi> pi.qi i.e. qi RD qi 
0 otherwise. 
The second stage is the construction of the matrix H which summarises the relation R: 
. . 
Hij 1 if q2RqJ 
0 otherwise. 
The matrix H is constructed by the operation of Warshall's minimum path algorithm 
(see Varian (1982 , Appendix II)) , which was originally developed in operations research 
to calculate the least cost of moving goods from one particular location to another, on 
G. Warshall's minimum path algorithm is reproduced below (using the Visual Basic 
programming language). 
Algorithm 2·.2. WARSHALL'S MINIMUM PATH ALGORITHM Input: G(i ,j) == 1 if pi.qi> 
p 2 .qJ, 0 otherwise. Output: H ( i, j) = 1 if qi Rqi , 0 otherwise. 
For r == 1 To N 
For i == 1 To N 
For j == 1 To N · 
If H(i,r) == 1 And H(r,j) == 1 Then H(i ,j) = 1 
Next 
Next 
Next 
The matrix H is used to check for GARP in the following way. If it is the case that 
Hij = 1 and p-7 .qi > p-7 .qi for some i and j then this is a violation of GARP. 
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Constructing the Afriat numbers using combinatorial methods 
It was shown above that the existence of numbers Wi and ).i such that the Afriat in-
equalities (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied is necessary and sufficient for a given body of 
data (p, q) to be consistent with utility maximising behaviour. The second method for 
checking whether a particular set of data is consistent with common preferences involves 
calculating the Afriat numbers directly using Algorithm 2.1. 
Constructing the Afriat numbers using mathematical programming 
The third approach for testing for common preferences is to solve the Afriat inequalities 
using mathematical programming techniques. Diewert and Parkan (1985) have shown 
that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of numbers Wi and ). i such 
that (2.1) and (2.2) are true for a given body of data (p, q) is that the objective function 
of the following linear programming problem attain its lower bound of zero: 
(2.5) 
min ~ ~ sij subject to 
WAS~~ 
' ' iENjEN 
sij _ wJ _ wi _ ).ipi.(qj _qi)+ 5ij 
x,, > 1 
. . . . 
i,j EN 
i EN 
siJ > 0, SiJ > 0 i, j EN, 
where W = {W1, ... , WN}, A= {).1 , ... , ).N}, and sij and Sij are non-negative slack 
variables that are used to convert the inequalities (2.2) into equalities. If the above 
objective function attains it lower bound of zero, then all the optimal sij = 0 and, given 
Sij > 0, inequality (2.2) must hold. Obviously ).i > 1 implies (2.1). Therefore, (2.5) 
attaining its lower bound of zero is sufficient for (2.1) and (2.2) to hold. If the inequalities 
(2.2) are satisfied with ).i > 0, i E N, then all of the numbers Wi and >.i can be scaled 
so that the same inequalities (2.2) are satisfied with >.i > 1, i E N. Hence the linear 
programming problem (2.5) will attain its lower bound of zero. It has therefore been 
shown that (2.5) attaining its lower bound of zero is both necessary and sufficient for set 
of demand observations (p, q) to be rationalised by a utility function and hence for the 
existence of common preferences. 
The constrained linear programming problem (2.5) can be converted into the following 
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unconstrained non-linear programming problem: 
min L L[siJ]2 subject to 
Wau 
' ' iEN jEN 
(2.6) sij = uJ - Ui - (a;+ l)pi.(qj - qi)+ a;j i , j EN. 
If we define Ai =a;+ 1 > 1 and 3iJ = a;j > 0 then it is apparent that (2 .6) corresponds 
to (2.5). 
The above tests of common non-homothetic preferences may also be conducted using 
normalised prices vi = pi /pi .qi. Replacing pi in (2.2) with vj gives: 
(2.7) Wi < wJ + AJ(vJ .qi - 1) i , j EN. 
Using normalised prices, the constrained and unconstrained programming problems for 
the tests of common non-homothetic preferences are respectively: 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
min ~ ~ sij subject to 
W>..S~~ 
' ' iEN jEN 
sij = w J - W i - Ai(vi .qj - 1) + Sij i , j EN 
Ai > 0 i EN 
sij > 0, 3iJ > 0 i , j E N. 
min L L[ij]2 subject to 
Wau 
' ' i EN j EN 
sij _ wJ - w i - (a; + l ) (vi. q j - 1) + al i, j E N. 
2.2.4 Exam ple 
The three RP tests for common general preferences were applied to example data for 6 
countries (note that in practice, only the test of GARP would be used as it is much easier 
to implement). The price vectors are: p 1 = {3 , 1 }, p 2 = {0.5, 1 }, p 3 = {1 , 1 }, p4 = {5, 1 }, 
p 5 = {0.25, 1} and p 6 = {1/3, 1 }, while the commodity bundles are: q1 = {1.25, 2.25} , 
q2 = {7, 2.5} , q3 = {2.5, 2.5}, q4 = {1.5, 7.5} , q5 = {6, 0.5} and q6 = { 4.5 , 2.5}. The 
data are shown in Figure 2.9. 
11 
I 
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Figure 2.9: Six country demand data 
Test of GARP 
For these data, the matrices relevant to the test of GARP are (where Pij = 1 if qipDqj 
and Pij = 0, otherwise): 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
G= 
1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
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P= 
H= I 
L 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
Since it is not the case that Hij = 1 and Pji = 1 for i,j EN, these data satisfy GARP. 
Constructing the Afriat numbers using combinatorial methods 
The data were then tested for common general preferences by calculating the Afriat 
numbers using Algorithm 2.1. The algorithm successfully calculated these numbers which 
are: W 1 = -5.5, W 2 = 1, W 3 = -1.25, W 4 = 1, W 5 = -5.5, W 6 = -0.25; ).1 = 1.083, 
).2 = 1, ).3 = 1, ).4 = 1, ).5 = 3.778 and ).5 = 1.5. Note, however that these numbers are 
not unique (there will, in general, be an infinite combination of numbers which satisfy 
the Afriat inequalities), and hence they cannot be used for computing utility bounds. 
Constructing the Afriat numbers using mathematical programming 
The third RP test of the existence of a representative consumer involves solving the 
mathematical program (2.9) for these data. For the particular starting values used, and 
normalising W 3 = 0, the Afriat numbers calculated are: W 1 = -0.663, W 2 = 0. 750, 
W 3 = o, W 4 = o.341 , w5 = -0.268, w6 = o.431; ).1 = 1.005, ).2 = 1.362, ).3 = 1.078, 
).4 = 1.717, ).5 = 1.445 and ).6 = 1.529. As above, however, these Afriat numbers are 
not unique and hence do not provide any information on the bounds to the bilateral true 
welfare indexes. 
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2.3 Using Expansion paths to Improve the Power of RP 
Tests 
A problem with the RP tests of the representative consumer hypothesis introduced above 
are that they generally suffer from low power (in that it is difficult to reject the null 
hypothesis of common preferences). In this section, it is shown how the power of RP 
tests of common preferences may be improved by use of expansion paths which show, for 
a given price vector, what commodity bundles would be demanded at different income 
levels. In the case of homothetic preferences, to be reviewed in Chapter 3, the expansion 
path is a straight line through the origin. With general preferences, Blundell, Browning, 
and Crawford (1998) show how information on the expansion path can be used to modify 
the combinatorial RP test of common preferences. Blundell, Browning, and Crawford 
(1998) estimate a nonparametric Engel curve and incorporated this into RP tests based 
on those originally devised by Varian (1982) .14 
The basic idea underlying the use of expansion path information to improve the power 
of the RP test of common preferences can be illustrated with reference to WARP. The 
+-est 
power of the RP I\ of common preferences can be improved if the "region of rejection" 
(the segment of a budget hyperplane where a consumption bundle must lie for revealed 
preference to be rejected) can be increased. In Figure 2.10, given q0 has been observed, 
q 1 can be anywhere along the budget hyperplane (p1, x1 ) , and there will be no rejection 
of revealed preference, i.e. there is no region of rejection. Thus in this particular example, 
the standard WARP test of common preferences has zero power ( and, in general, WARP 
has low power). 
With knowledge of the expansion path EP(p0 ), q0* is revealed preferred to bundles in the 
shaded region and the bold segment of (p1 , x 1) therefore becomes the region of rejection; 
if q1 is on the bold section of (p1, x1 ) then we have q1 RDqO* and q0* RDq1 and hence a 
violation of WARP. Therefore, for WARP to hold, q1 must be on the segment of (p1 , x1 ) 
which is not bold. 
If the budget hyperplanes do not intersect, then the standard WARP test of common 
14 The mathematical programming approach does not easily lend itself to incorporating expansion path 
information to improve the power of the test of common preferences, so it is not discussed further in 
this context. However, Chavas and Cox (1997) show how bounds on expansion paths can be used in the 
construction of true indexes using the envelope functions suggested by Afriat (1987). 
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Figure 2.10: Using the expansion path to improve the power of WARP 
preferences (where there is no knowledge of the expansion paths) will always have zero 
power (i.e. regardless of where q0 may be on the budget line, WARP will always be 
satisfied) . However, even when the budget hyperplanes do not intersect, if the expansion 
path is known then the power of the WARP test can be improved in a manner similar to 
that illustrated in Figure 2.10. 
2.3.1 Sequential maximum power path 
The more general ( and empirically relevant) version of the RP test of common prefer-
ences is the test of GARP. In this sub section, the approach of Blundell, Browning, and 
Crawford (1998) for using expansion paths to improve the power of the GARP test of 
common preferences is reviewed. Recall the (N x N) matrix G introduced above which is 
constructed so that Gst = 1 if q8 (x 8 )RDqt(xt). 15 The sub-sequence of total expenditures 
{x8, xt, ... , xv, xw} is said to be preference ordered if {Gst, Gtu, ... , Gvw} = {1, 1, ... , 1} 
i.e. if the demand associated with any total outlay is revealed at least as good as the next 
15 For notational convenience p is suppressed in the expression for the Marshallian demand. 
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one. From this , qs (xs)Rqw (xw) if there is a preference-ordered sub-sequence starting in 
s and ending in w. If, for a given preference-ordered sub-sequence { xs, xt, ... , xv, xw} , it 
is found that qw(xw)pDqs(xs), then the sub-sequence fails GARP. 
For a given sequence of demands , consider any preference-ordered sub-sequence 
{ xs , xt , ... , xv, xw}. Given total expenditure in the last country in the sub-sequence, xw , 
total outlay in the second-to-last country v is chosen so that the country w bundle is 
just affordable at country v prices; denote this xv = pv.qw(xw). Thus qv(xv) is directly 
revealed preferred to qw(xw). Total outlay in the previous country is then chosen so that 
qv (xv) is just affordable and so on. The sequential maximum power (SMP) path for the 
preference ordered sub-sequence { xs , xt , .. . , xv , xw} is given by: 
~s ~t ~v ~w s t (-t) t u(-u) v w(-w ) w X , X , .•• , X , X = p .q X , p .q X , •• • , p .q X , X . 
By construction, any SMP path is preference ordered. In the three country, two good 
example of Figure 2.11 , the order of the preference-ordered sub-sequence is q2 RD q1 RD q0 . 
GARP is rejected (since q2 Rq0 and q0 RDq2 ); however , if q2 is on the segment of (p 2 , x2 ) 
which is between q1 and the bold segment , then GARP will be accepted. With normal 
demands, it is apparent that if (p2 , x 2 ) is "pushed out", the region of rejection ( the 
bold segment of the budget hyperplane) will become shorter relative to the region where 
GARP will be accepted. This will minimise the probability of finding some rejection of 
GARP , and hence the power of the RP test of common preferences will decrease. 
In Figure 2.12, hypothetical expansion paths are added to the example of Figure 2.11. To 
construct the SMP path, start at the budget line (p0 , x0 ) at which q 0 (x0 ) is demanded. 
Choose a budget line under p 1 so that q0 can just be bought at p 1 ; this is labeled (p 1 , x1 ). 
The chosen q1 (x1 ) is such that q1 (x1 )RD q0 (x0 ) (where the notation x0 denotes that x 0 
is a member of a preference ordered sub-sequence that rejects GARP ) and it is found by 
moving along country l 's expansion path EP (p 1 ). Since the observed budget line was 
(p1 , x1), this is an example in which the budget line has shifted out , thus reducing the 
probability of finding a rejection. Now choose a budget line under p 2 so that q 1 can just 
be bought at p 2 ; this is labeled (p2 ,x2 ) . Now we have q2 (x 2 )RDq1 (x 1 )R Dq0 (x 0 ) and 
the region of rejection of q2 with respect to q 0 has been maximised. 
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Figure 2.11: A preference-ordered sub-sequence which fails GARP 
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Figure 2.12: Increasing the power of GARP using the SMP path 
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2.3.2 Bounding indifference curves using the BBC algorithms 
Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998) construct algorithms which operationalise their 
more powerful RP test of common preferences. T he BBC algorithms provide upper- and 
lower-bounds on an indifference curve through a given point in commodity space; if these 
bounds can be constructed for all countries in the data set , then the data satisfy common 
preferences. 
Algorithm 2.3. RP(q0 ) BOUND ALGORITHM - BLUNDELL , BROWNING , AND CRAW-
FORD (1998) Input: A set of demand observations (p, q) and estimated Engel curve. 
Output: The set RP of boundary points of which q0 is a member and which has N + l 
elements where pi .qi < pi .qJ V qi, qJ E RP and either qi RD q0 or qJ RD q0 V q i E RP. 
1. SetW={q0 } , T={O, l , ... , N} , E=(/J. 
2. Set R = {qt= (min{xlpt.qt = pt.qw}) qw E W , t ET}. 
3. Set E = {qi ER: pi.qi> pi.qj for qJ ER}. 
4. Set W = R/E. 
5. if E = (/J set RP= W and stop. Otherwise go to (2). 
Algorithm 2.4. RW(q0 ) BOUND ALGORITHM - BLUNDELL, BROWNING , AND CRAW-
FORD (1998) Input: A set of demand observations (p, q) and estimated Engel curve. 
Output: The set RW of boundary points of which q0 is a member and where pi .qi < p i .qJ 
V qi, qJ E RW and either q0 RD qi or q 0 RDqj \:/ qi ERP. 
1. Set B = { q0 }, T = {O, 1, .. . , N}, E = (/). 
2. SetR={qt=(max{xlpb.qb=pb.qt}) qbEB, tET} . 
3. Set E = {qi ER: pJ.qJ > pl.qi for qJ ER}. 
4- Set B = R/E. 
5. if E = (/J set RW = B and stop. Otherwise go to (2). 
Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998, p.20) prove that if the data local to the reference 
bundle q0 reject GARP, then RP(q0 ) and RW(q0 ) Bound Algorithms will not converge. 
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It is now illustrated how the BBC algorithms compute the upper bound to the indifference 
curve passing through q0 (see Figure 2.13). The process involves iteratively constructing 
three sets of bundles. Set W contains all bundles on the upper-bound to the indifference 
curve passing q0 (initially W only contains q0). Set R contains the bundles found to be 
revealed preferred to the bundles in W in any particular iteration. Set E contains those 
bundles in R which are revealed pref erred to at least one other bundle in R. In every 
iteration, W is updated as W = R/ E (i.e. W contains those bundles which are on the 
boundary of the set of bundles revealed pref erred to q0 , denoted RP ( q O)). 
q2 
0 
q1 
Figure 2.13: Bounding an indifference curve using the BBC algorithms 
In this example q 1 (x1') and q2 (x2') are both directly preferred to q0 and hence are 
added to W in the first iteration. The point q3l will also be added to R in the first 
iteration ( since p 3 .q3* = p 3 .q0) , but since q3* pD q2 ( x 2'), q3* lies above the indifference 
curve and will be added to E in the first iteration ( and therefore excluded from W in 
the first iteration) . At the end of the first iteration, we therefore have three bundles in 
---~~ ----~J 
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W: q 0,q1 (x1') and q 2 (x2'). 
In the second iteration R will contain the bundles which are revealed preferred to each 
of the three current members of W. The bundles revealed preferred to q0 will be q0 , 
q 1 ( x1'), q2 ( x2') and q3* again. There will be another four bundles ( one on each of the 
four expansion paths including EP(p0 ) , which is not shown in the figure) which are 
revealed preferred to each of the other members of W { q 1 ( x1') , q2 ( x2')} but , except for 
q 3 (x31 ) , these will all go into E since step 2 of Algorithm 2.3 selects the cheapest bundle 
on each expansion path. None of the four bundles in R will be strictly preferred to the 
others , and hence W will contain four bundles: q 0 , q 1 (x1'), q 2 (x2') and q3 (x3'). The 
newest addition to W , q3 (x 3') , is chosen such that p 3 .q3 (x3') = p 3 .q2 (x2'). Therefore, 
q3 (x3')RDq2(x2') and q2(x2')RDqo and hence q3 (x3' )Rq0 . Since E = 0, the algorithm 
terminates and the upper bound to the indifference curve passing through q 0 has thus 
been determined ( the lower bound is constructed in an analogous manner). 
2.3.3 Example 
The improved GARP test of the representative consumer hypothesis is now illustrated 
for the 6 country data. Assume that the following Engel curves have been estimated for 
the data (note it is assumed for simplicity that preferences are quasi-homothetic, and 
hence the Engel curves are linear): 
q} = -1/ 4 + 1/ 4x 
qf = 7 /13 + 14/13x 
q~ = 3/4 + 1/4x 
q~ = -7 / 26 + 6/13x 
qf=x/2 q~=x/2 
qi= -33/58 + 8/58x qi= 165/58 + 18/58x 
qf = 6/5 + 12/5x 
q~ = 9/10 + 9/l0x 
q~ = -3/10 + 2/5x 
q~ = -3/ 10 + 7 / l0x. 
The expansion paths implied by these Engel curves are shown in Figure 2.14. 
Algorithms 2.3 and 2.4 were run for the 6 country data using the above Engel curves, 
and these algorithms would not converge thus indicating that the data do not satisfy 
the improved RP test of common preferences. The reason the data do not satisfy the 
improved test of G ARP be illustrated by considering the construction of the RP bound 
to the indifference curve passing through q 3 (Figures 2.15 and 2.16). 
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Figure 2.14: Quasi-homothetic expansion paths 
ql 
In the first iteration of the RP( q3 ) bound algorithm, W contains three bundles 
W = { q3 , q1*, q2*}. The bundles on the other three expansion paths ( q4*, q5*, q6*) 
are not included in W in the first iteration since q4* pD q1*, q6* pD q 2* and q5* pD q2* 
and hence in the first iteration E = { q4*, q6*, q5*}. However, in the second iteration, 
W = { q 3 , q1*, q4**, q6**, q5**} and E = { q2*} (since q2* pDq6**). Thus, q2* has been 
dropped from W and RP( q3 ) will not converge since in the next iteration a bundle on 
EP(p2) will replace q6** and q5** in W, and so on. With country 6 dropped, however, 
the data satisfy the improved GARP test of common preferences. Note that the complete 
bounds to the indifference curve passing through q3 is shown in Figure 2.17. 
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Figure 2.15: First iteration of RP(q3 ) bound algorithm: W = {q3,q1*,q2*} 
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Figure 2.16: Second iteration of RP( q3} bound algorithm: W = { q3 , q1* , q4**, q6**, q5**} 
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2.4 Constructing Bilateral True Indexes 
Under the RP approach to welfare measurement , bilateral true indexes of welfare can only 
be constructed when the data do not reject common preferences. The approach used is 
first to test for common preferences and then for those countries which share common 
preferences, the bounds to the bilateral true indexes ( which, as argued above, can be 
regarded as true indexes themselves) are constructed. Thus, multilateral approximations 
to the bilateral true indexes are being calculated - the approximations are multilateral 
in the sense that third-party comparisons are used in their construction (i.e. via RP 
relations). 
2.4.1 Preliminaries 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are three true welfare indexes which have been proposed 
under the economic approach to welfare measurement. In the absence of homotheticity, 
real incomes could be ranked by either the Allen, Koniis or Malmquist true indexes, and 
each one could in turn be evaluated at any of an infinite number of reference points ( a 
reference price vector in the case of the Allen index, or a reference utility level in the 
case of the other two true indexes). The Allen index has mainly been used in empirical 
work, however, and this index is the focus of the presentation here. 
Without complete knowledge of preferences the Allen welfare indexes are unobservable, 
however the classical and fixed-weight bounds to these indexes are presented in Result 
1.2. Define L as the matrix of logarithms of Laspeyres indexes with typical element: 
{Lij} = log(pi.qj /pi.qi). 
Thus, the (logarithm) of the Laspeyres index comparing country i to country j , log Qt , 
is Lji and the (logarithm) of the Paasche index comparing country i to country j , log Qf; , 
is - Lij. Define C as the matrix of logarithms of classical upper bounds to the current-
weighted index, with typical element: 
{ Cij} = log[xj /ec(Ui, pj)]. 
Using this notation, the classical and fixed-weight bounds to the bilateral true indexes 
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can be restated in logarithms as: 
-Cji < log QJiA < Lij 
(2.10) -Lji < log Q]iA < Cij· 
While Land C provide bounds to the (unknown) true bilateral indexes, these bounds are 
generally not tight. The range of indeterminacy to the bilateral true indexes, however, 
may be reduced via the use of third-party comparisons implemented using RP methods. 
Using RP methods we want to construct improved bounds to the unobservable expendi-
ture function, and hence construct improved bounds to the unobservable bilateral welfare 
indexes. 16 The improved bounds to the expenditure function are denoted emax(Ui, pi) 
and emin ( Ui, pi) where: 
ec(Ui, pJ) < emin(Ui, pj) < e(Ui, pj) < emax(Ui, pj) < pj .qi_ 
Thus, emax ( Ui, pi) is the infimum ( or least upper bound) to the cost of attaining Ui 
when facing pi (and note that pi .qi is also an upper bound to this cost , but not the 
necessarily the least upper bound) and emin(Ui, pJ) is the supremum (or greatest lower 
bound) to the cost of attaining Ui when facing pJ (and ec(Ui, pJ) is a lower bound to 
this cost , but not necessarily the greatest lower bound). With the improved bounds thus 
determined, it is possible to construct improved bounds to the bilateral welfare indexes: 
i j j LA i j j emin(U , P )/x < Qij < emax(U , P )/x 
(2.11) i j i PA i j i X /emax(U , P) < Qij < X /emin(U , P ). 
Therefore, emin ( Ui, pi)/ xJ provides a lower-bound estimate of the base-weighted welfare 
index, while emax (Ui, pJ) / xJ provides an upper-bound estimate of this index. Similarly, 
xi/ emax (UJ, pi) and xi/ emin (UJ, pi) are, respectively, lower- and upper-bound estimates 
of the current-weighted welfare index. 
Define BRP as the matrix of logarithms of improved upper bounds to the base-weighted 
welfare index ( where the notation indicates that the improved bounds are constructed 
using RP methods) , with typical element: 
RP j i i {Bij } = log[emax(U , p )/x ]. 
16Note that these improved bounds are themselves true indexes. 
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Similarly, define cRP as the matrix of logarithms of upper bounds to the current-weighted 
welfare index, with typical element: 
RP . i . {Cij } = log[xJ /emin(U, p-7)] 
Using this notation, the bounds to the bilateral welfare indexes (2.11) can be restated 
(in logarithms): 
-Cf?:P < log Q~-A < Bf?:? Ji - Ji - iJ 
(2.12) -B{?P < log QfA < cF:P_ Ji - Ji - iJ 
In the remainder of this section, three methods for calculating BRP and cRP are reviewed 
and applied in an example. 
2.4.2 GARP bounds 
Varian (1982) constructs algorithms for calculating bounds to true cost-of-living and 
welfare indexes which are related to the GARP test of common preferences. 17 In this 
sub-section, a summary of Varian's algorithms for calculating the GARP bounds to true 
indexes is presented. 
The GARP bounds are estimated using a money metric utility function (Varian calls this 
the direct income compensation function) which is defined as: 
m(q0 , p) = inf p.q subject to q in P(q0 ), 
where P( q0 ) = { q : u( q) > u( q0 ) }. The money metric utility function can alternatively 
be defined as m(q0 ,p) = e(u(q0),p). From this latter definition, it is apparent that 
since the expenditure function is always increasing in utility, m( q 0 , p) is a monotonic 
transformation of a utility function and is therefore itself a utility function. 
Note that P( q0) and RP( q0 ) both describe sets of bundles which are preferred to q0 . 
However, unlike RP( q0), P ( q0 ) is unobservable since it is defined by the utility function 
u(q) which is itself unobservable. However, the following is known about P(q0 ). 18 
17The algorithms are implemented in a pascal program NONPAR which Professor Varian kindly made 
available to this author. 
18See Section 2.2.1 for definitions of RP(q0 ) and RW(q0 ). The following results are all from Varian 
(1982). 
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Result 2.2 . Let u( q) be any utility function that rationalises the data. Then for all q0 , 
RP(q0 ) c P(q0 ) C NRW(q0 ). 
Result 2.3. Let q 0 Rq'. Then RP(q0 ) c RP(q'), RW(q0 ):) RW(q') and NRW(q0 ) c 
NRW(q'). 
Result 2.4. If qi is in RP( qJ) then there exists a nonsatiated, continuous, concave, 
monotonic utility function that rationalises the data for which w(qi) > w(qJ). An anal-
ogous statement holds if qi is in RW(qJ). 
Accepting that m( q0 , p) is a reasonable cardinalisation of utility, the question then is 
how, without using a particular parametric form of the utility or expenditure function, 
can it be measured? From Result 2.2 we have the best inner and outer approximations 
to P(q0 ); this leads to upper and lower bounds on the money metric function: 
m+(qo, p) 
- inf p.q subject to q in RP(q0 ) 
m-(qo,p) - inf p.q subject to q in NRW(q0 ) -
Result 2.5. Let m+ and m- be defined as above. Then m-(q,p0 ) < m(q,p0 ) < 
m+ ( q, p 0 ) for all p 0 , q. 
Result 2.6. Let m+ and m- be defined as above. Then qiRq implies m+(qi, p 0 ) > 
m(q,p0 ) and m-(qi,po) > m-(q,p0 ). 
Result 2.5 shows that m+ and m- do bound the money metric function. Result 2.6 shows 
that m + and m- are themselves utility functions that respect the RP ordering. While 
m + and m - provide theoretically ideal bounds to the money metric function, Varian 
(1982) was uncertain as to whether one could easily calculate these bounds. Instead, 
Varian suggested two approximations to these bounds which are easily calculated via 
mathematical programming. The approximation to m + is calculated as: 
am+(q0,p) = infp.q subject to q is in CM(q0) , 
where 
CM(q0 ) = interior of convex hull of {q: q > qi, qiRq 0 } . 
Thus, to calculate am+ ( q0 , p) , it is necessary to calculate p.q only at the vertices of 
CM(q0) (where CM(q0) is the closure of CM(q0)) , and find the minimum of these 
2.4. Constructing Bilateral True Indexes 89 
values. Thus the calculation of am+ ( q 0 , p) becomes the following minimisation problem: 
(2.13) am+(q0 ,p) = minp.qi subject to qiRq0 . 
Varian (1982) proved that CM(q0) C RP(q0); this implies that am+(q0 ,p) > m+(q0 ,p), 
and thus Varian (1982) argued that the easily calculable upper bound to the money 
metric am+ ( q0 , p), was not as tight as the theoretically ideal bound m + ( q0 , p). However, 
Knoblauch (1992) proved that RP(q0 ) C CM(q0 ), so that m+(q0 ,p) = am+(q0 ,p) and 
therefore the theoretically ideal upper bound to the money metric function is in fact 
easily calculable using (2.13). 
Using the same logic, it is apparent that m-( q0 , p) is calculated as the following min-
imisation problem: 
(2.14) m -( q0 , p) = min p.qJ subject to pi .qj > pi .qi for all qi such that q0 Rqi. 
The GARP approximations to the expenditure function defined in (2.13) and (2.14) can 
be used to construct improved bounds to the bilateral true welfare indexes. Define BG as 
the matrix of logarithms of GARP upper bounds to the base-weighted true index, with 
typical element: 
{B3} = log[m+(qJ, pi)/xi]. 
Similarly, define cc as the matrix of logarithms of G ARP upper bounds to the current- . 
weighted true index, with typical element: 
{C3} = log[xj /m-(qi, pJ)]. 
Example 
For the 6 country data, the fixed-weight and classical bounds to the bilateral true welfare 
indexes are contained in the following matrices: 
0.000 1.365 0.511 0.693 1.126 0.981 
-0.736 0.000 -0.470 0.318 -0.539 -0.234 
-0.357 0.642 0.000 0.588 0.262 0.336 
L= 
I 
-0.568 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.710 0.511 
0.248 0.754 0.446 1.371 0.000 0.595 
-0.405 0.189 -0.182 0.693 -0.470 0.000 
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0.000 1.792 0.916 0.916 1.386 1.792 
0.000 0.00_0 -0.182 0.916 -0.405 0.000 
0.182 0.875 0.000 C= 1.099 0.470 0.875 
I 
-0.405 1.386 0.511 0.000 0.981 1.386 
1.099 1.099 0.916 2.015 0.000 0.693 
0.405 0.405 0.223 1.322 -0.405 0.000 
The Laspeyres index provides the upper bound to the base-weighted welfare index and 
thus, from L, the welfare of country 5 is at most e0·262 = 1.30 times the welfare of 
country 3, when using p 3 in the welfare measurement. The Paasche index provides the 
lower bound to the current-weighted welfare index and hence the welfare of country 5 
is at least e-0.446 = 0.64 times the welfare of country 3, when using p 5 in the welfare 
measurement. 
The bounds to the base-weighted true index, with country 3 as base are therefore: 
-C13 = -0.916 < logQLA < 21 - -0.357 = B31 
-C23 = 0.182 < log QLA < 21 - 0.642 = B32 
-C43 = -0.511 < logQLA < 31 - 0.588 = B34 
-C53 = -0.916 < log QLA < 41 - 0.262 = B35 
-C63 = -0.223 < log QLA < 51 - -0.336 = B36· . 
while the bounds to the current-weighted true index are: 
-B13 = -0.511 < logQLA < 21 - 0.182 = C31 
-B23 = 0.470 < logQLA < 21 - 0.875 = C32 
-B43 = 0.000 < logQLA < 31 - 1.099 = C34 
-B53 = -0.446 < logQLA < 41 - 0.470 = C35 
-B53 = 0.182 < logQLA < 51 - 0.875 = C35. 
Varian's (1982) GARP bounds were then calculated for the 6 country data: 
r 
0.000 1.365 0.511 0.693 0.981 0.981 
-0.736 0.000 -0.470 0.318 -0.539 -0.234 
BG= I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.588 0.262 0.336 
I 
-0.568 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.511 0.511 
0.248 0.754 0.446 1.371 0.000 0.595 
-0.405 0.189 -0.182 0.693 -0.470 0.000 
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0.000 1.792 0.916 0.916 1.386 1.792 
0.000 0.000 -0.182 0.916 -0.405 0.000 
CG= I 0
.000 0.875 0.000 0.916 0.470 0.875 
-0.511 0.875 0.000 0.000 0.470 0.875 
1.099 1.099 0.916 2.015 0.000 0.693 
0.000 0.345 0.000 0.916 -0.405 0.000 
L 
Several of the bounds have been improved as a result of using the G ARP relations. For 
example, the upper bound to log Q}( has been tightened from L1s = 1.126 to Bfs = 0.981 
and the upper bound to log Qf4A has been tightened from C42 = 1.386 to cg = 0.875. 
2.4.3 Improved GARP bounds 
For those countries which satisfy the improved GARP test of common preferences of Blun-
dell, Browning, and Crawford (1998), it is possible to construct improved (i.e. tighter) 
bounds to the bilateral true ·welfare indexes. Essentially, the RP and RW algorithms of 
Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998) use expansion path information to determine 
the regions RP( q) and N RW ( q). Then, using the results of Varian (1982), it is simply 
a matter of calculating the value of the bundles on the vertices of RP( q) and N RW ( q) -
these values will be the approximations to the expenditure function, which are then used 
in computing the bilateral bounds. 
The improved G ARP bounds are therefore calculated using the following approximations 
to the expenditure function: 
mi+(qo, p) 
mi-(qo,p) 
rmn p.q subject to q in RP( q0 ) 
mmp.q subject to q in NRW(q0 ). 
where RP(q0 ) and NRW(q0 ) are determined using the BBC algorithms. Define B 1G as 
the matrix of logarithms of improved GARP upper bounds to the base-weighted welfare 
index, with typical element: 
{BfjG} = log[mI+(qJ,pi)/xi]. 
Similarly, define cIG as the matrix of logarithms of improved GARP upper bounds to 
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the current-weighted welfare index, with typical element: 
{C&G} = log[xi /m1-(q\pi)]. 
Example 
It was shown above that the improved GARP test of common preferences is satisfied 
when country 6 is omitted from the example data set. The fact that the improved test 
of G ARP is satisfied implies that it is possible to construct improved inner and outer 
bounds on in the indifference curves for all countries in the data set. The RP and RW 
bounds to the indifference curve for country 3 are shown in Figure 2.17. 
q2 
12 
10 
8 
6l ". 
It ~ \ 
4 
mJ+(q3,p5) 
= 2.61 
mJ-(q3,ps)2, --....L \ 
= 1.73 
I, 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
I EP(p4) 
EF_(pl) 
/ 
/ 
\\ / / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
\\ ,✓ ~ / 
, ,-:"II. ..__ 
op --2--" 
-- - -
- -
4 
-1 
EP(p3) 
,I' 
/ 
/ 
/ 
,I' 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
E_,P(p2) 
.... 
-- E!_P(ps) 
---
6 8 10 12 
Figure 2.17: The RP and RW bounds for country 3 
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The matrix of log Laspeyres indexes for countries 1-5 is: 
r 
0.000 1.365 0.511 0.693 1.126 
-0.736 0.000 -0.470 0.318 -0.539 
L = I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.588 0.262 
-0.568 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.710 
0.248 0.754 0.446 1.371 0.000 
The matrix of classical upper bounds to the current-weighted welfare index is: 
0.000 1.792 0.916 0.916 1.386 
0.000 0.000 -0.182 0.916 -0.405 
C=' 0.182 0.875 0.000 1.099 0.470 
-0.405 1.386 0.511 0.000 0.981 
1.099 1.099 0.916 2.015 0.000 
Varian's (1982) GARP bounds for the 5 country data are: 
0.000 1.365 0.511 0.693 1.126 
-0. 736 0.000 -0.470 0.318 -0.539 
BG = I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.588 0.262 
CG= 
-0.568 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.710 
0.248 o. 754 0.446 1.371 0.000 
0.000 1. 792 0.916 0.916 1.386 
0.000 0.000 -0.182 0.916 -0.405 
0.000 0.875 0.000 0.916 0.470 
-0.511 0.875 0.000 0.000 0.470 
1.099 1.099 0.916 2.015 0.000 
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The improved GARP bounds of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998) for the 5 
country data are: 
r 
0.000 1.153 0.511 0.693 0.634 
-0.827 0.000 -0.470 -0.208 -0.539 
BIG = I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.262 0.123 
-0.568 0.624 -0.034 0.000 0.093 
-0.114 0.754 0.265 0.539 0.000 
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0.000 1.222 0.511 0.804 0.783 
-0.917 0.000 
-0.470 -0.245 -0.578 
c1a = I -0.407 o.670 0.000 0.323 0.146 
-0.543 0.635 -0.033 0.000 0.111 
-0.124 0.719 0.249 0.653 0.000 
The incorporation of expansion path information has led to the bounds to the bilateral 
welfare indexes being significantly tightened. Several of the bounds have been improved as 
a result of using the GARP relations. For example, the GARP upper bound to log Q!;f 
is BPs = 1.126 (which is equivalent to the fixed-weight bound), while the improved 
GARP upper bound is B{f == 0.634. Similarly, the GARP upper bound to log Qf4A is 
cg == 0.875, while the improved GARP upper bound is C[f = 0.635. 
2.4.4 Afriat envelope bounds 
As noted above, the Afriat numbers calculated using the mathematical program (2.9) are 
not unique; underlying this is the fact that for any set of demand data there will be a 
whole family of utility functions that rationalise the data. However, Afriat (1987) shows 
that the family of utility functions may be bounded by two particular representations 
of the utility function, which are known as the inner and outer envelope functions for 
the class of compatible utility functions associated with any particular solution to the 
Afriat inequalities. In this subsection the Afriat envelope approach to making multilateral 
approximations to bilateral true welfare indexes is outlined.19 
Conditional inner and outer envelope functions 
For given sets W and ,\ satisfying (2.1) and (2.2), the inner envelope function is a 
monotonic concave polytope function and is defined: 
(2.15) w1(q, W) = ms,x-[Lwi0i: Lqi0i < q, Lei== 1, 0i > 0, i E NJ. 
iEN iEN iEN 
19The following presentation is based on Chavas and Cox (1997) who use Afriat envelope functions to 
construct cost-of-living indexes using aggregate U.S. consumption data. 
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The outer envelope function is a monotonic concave polyhedral function20 and is defined: 
(2.16) wo(q, W, A)= m~n[Wi + .,\i(vi.q - 1): i E NJ. 
'Z 
Note that (2.16) can alternatively be expressed as the following primal linear pro-
gramming problem: 
(2.17) wo(q, W, A)= max[,: , < Wi + A\vi.q - 1) , i E NJ. 
' 
Since by construction wo ( q, W, A) and w 1 ( q, W) satisfy the Afriat inequalities, the 
following Lemma applies. 
Lemma 2.1. wo(q, W, A) and wr(q, W) are representations of consumer preferences 
which rationalise the demand data. 
Afriat (1987) has shown that the functions wo(q, W, A) and w1(q, W) provide bounds 
on the family of utility functions that are compatible with the demand data. 
Result 2.7. AFRIAT (1987) For W and A satisfying (2.1) and (2.2), the functions 
w1(q, W) and wo(q, W, A) provide, respectively, the outer bound and inner bound rep-
resentation of consumer preferences: 
wr(q, W) < w(q) < wo(q, W, A), 
where w( q) is any concave, monotonic, continuous, non-satiated utility function that 
rationalises the data and satisfying w( qi) = Wi for all i E N 
Result 2.7 shows that w1(q, W) and wo(q, W, A) provide the tightest possible bounds on 
all possible concave and non-satiated utility representations of u(q). However, it should 
be emphasised that these bounds are conditional on particular W and A satisfying the 
Afriat inequalities (2.1) and (2.2). 
Unconditional inner and outer envelope functions 
As previously mentioned, in general there will be more than one solution to the Afriat in-
equalities. This means that the conditional inner and outer envelope functions presented 
20The function (2.16) is a concave polyhedral because it is not defined for all prices; it is only defined 
for the finite number of price vectors in the data set. 
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above will not be unique. Chavas and Cox (1997) therefore suggest the need to calculate 
unconditional bounds for w(q), i.e. bounds that do not depend on the values taken by 
(W, A). 
Note that the concave function w( q) is only defined up to a positive linear transformation 
and without loss of generality, the Afriat inequalities (2.1) and (2.2) can alternatively be 
written as: 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
A2 > E, i EN 
Wi < Wi +Ai(vi.qi- l), i,j EN 
Wb=O 
-m < W 2 < m, i E N. 
where Eis a small positive scalar, Wb is the utility level for some base observation b EN, 
and m is some positive, finite scalar. Equations (2.18) and (2.19) correspond to (2.1) 
and (2.2). Equation (2.20) is a normalisation which arbitrarily fixes the utility level for 
some base observation b and (2.21) is used to ensure that the utility levels Wi remain 
bounded. It is apparent that (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21) are therefore an equivalent 
means of imposing the Afriat inequalities (2.1) and (2.2). 
We are now able to define unconditional bounds at point q: 
(2.22) 
and 
(2.23) 
wur(q) = min[wr(q, W) : Eq. (2.18) -- (2.21)] . 
w 
wuo(q) = max[wo(q, W, ..\) : Eq. (2.18) - (2.21)]. W,>. 
Result 2.8. CHAVAS AND Cox (1997} Given (2.18)-(2.21), the functions wu1 in (2.22) 
and wuo in (2.23) provide, respectively, the unconditional inner and outer bound repre-
sentations of consumer preferences at point q: 
wur(q) < w(q) < wuo(q). 
Result 2.8 shows that the two functions wu1(q) and wuo(q) provide the widest possible 
-
bounds on all possible concave and non-satiated utility representations of u( q). 21 
21 Note, however, that these bounds have been constructed using RP relations and hence they will 
generally be tighter than the fixed-weight and classical bounds. 
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Inner and outer expenditure functions 
The two unconditional bounds wu1(q) and wuo(q) provide a basis for conducting welfare 
or standard of living comparisons via the construction of nonparametric bounds to the ex-
penditure function. First, note that wu1(q) = w1(q, W1), where W1 = {W}, ... , Wf} 
is the unconditional inner-bound utility representation obtained in (2.22). Thus, using 
(2.15) , the unconditional inner-bound representation of the expenditure function is: 
e1(W8,p) 
(2.24) 
min[p.q: w1(q, W J) > W8; q > OJ 
q 
m~n[p.q : L wjei > W8; L qi0i < q; 
q, iEN iEN 
~ 0i = l· 0i > O· i EN· q > OJ ~ ' - ' ' - ' 
iEN 
where W 8 = WJ obtained in (2.22). Equation (2.24) is a linear program which can be used 
to find the expenditure function e1(W8 ,p) associated with wu1(q), the unconditional 
outer-bound representation of preferences, when prices are p. 
Similarly, note that wuo(q) = wo(q, W o, .Xo), where W o = {Wc5, ... , W6'} and .Xo = 
{Ah, ... , At} are the outer-bound representations obtained in (2.23). Thus, using (2.17), 
the unconditional outer-bound representation of the expenditure function is: 
eo(W8,p) 
(2.25) 
min[p.q: wo(q, W o, .Xo) > W 8 ; q > OJ 
q 
min[p.q: , > W8; 1 < Wb + .\b(vi.q - 1); i EN; q > OJ q,, 
min[p.q: W 8 < Wb + .\b(vi.q - 1) ; i EN; q > OJ, 
q 
where ws = W0 is obtained in (2.23). Equation (2.25) is a linear program which 
can be used to find the expenditure function e0 (W8 , p) associated with wuo ( q) , the 
unconditional outer-bound representation of preferences, when prices are p. 
The expenditure functions e1(W8, p) in (2.24) and e0 (W8, p) in (2.25) provide nonpara-
metric bounds to the (unknown) true expenditure function: 
Result 2.9. CHAVAS AND Cox (1997) Let {Wj , s E N} be the solution of (2.22) 
and {W0, s E N} be the solution -of (2.23). Then the functions e1(W8, p) in (2.24) and 
ea (W 8 , p) in (2.25) provide, respectively, the inner-bound and outer-bound representation 
of the expenditure function: 
(2.26) eo(W8,p) < e(W8,p) < e1(W8,p) , 
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where e(W8 , p) is an expenditure function that rationalises the data and is defined as 
e(WS, p) = millq p.q s.t. w(q) > W8; q > 0, and w(q) is a concave, non-satiated 
utility function which rationalises the data. 
By evaluating the expenditure functions e 1 (W s, p) and ea (W s, p) for different price vec-
tors, one can construct nonparametric bounds to welfare indexes. From (2.26), e1 (Wi, p-7) 
is the highest possible cost of attaining utility Wi when prices are p-7, and ea (Wi, p-1) is 
the lowest possible cost of attaining utility Wi when prices are pJ . Thus, the uncondi-
tional inner and outer bounds to the expenditure function can be used to provide bounds 
to the welfare indexes: 
(2.27) 
eo(Wi, pj)/xj < QhA < e1(Wi, pJ)/xj 
xi /e1(W\ pi) < Q~A < xi /eo(Wj ' pi). 
Therefore, eo(Wi, pJ)/xJ provides a lower-bound estimated of the base-weighted welfare 
index, while e1(Wi, pJ) /xJ provides an upper-bound estimated of this index. Similarly, 
xi/ e1(WJ, pi) and xi/ ea (WJ, pi) are, respectively, lower- and upper-bound estimates of 
the current-weighted welfare index. 
Now define BA as the matrix of logarithms of (Afriat envelope) improved upper bounds 
to the base-weighted welfare index, with typical element: 
{Bj} = log[e1(W\ pi)/xi]. 
Similarly, define cA as the matrix of logarithms of ( Afriat envelope) improved upper 
bounds to the current-weighted welfare index, with typical element: 
{Cj} = log[xj /eo(Wi,pj)]. 
Using this notation, the bounds to the bilateral welfare indexes (2.27) can be restated 
(in logarithms): 
-C~ < log Q~-A < BA J1, - J1, - 1,J 
(2.28) -B~ < logQfA < c~. J1, - Ji - 1,J 
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Example 
The Afriat envelope functions and the implied bounds to the bilateral welfare indexes 
are now constructed for the 6 country data. As shown in Section 2.2.4, when the linear 
program (2.9) was run with country 3 as the base country it attained the lower bound 
of zero ( and thus the data can be rationalised by a utility function) . The calculated 
Afriat numbers are: W 1 == -0.663, W 2 == 0. 750, W 3 == 0, W 4 == 0.341, W 5 == -0.268 
W 6 == 0.431; A1 == 1.005, A2 == 1.362, A3 == 1.078, A4 == 1.717, A5 == 1.445 and A6 == 1.529. 
Conditional inner and outer envelope functions The inner envelope function 
conditional on these Afriat numbers are shown in Figures (2.18) and (2.19) , while the 
conditional outer envelope function is shown in Figures (2.20) and (2.21). An overhead 
view, which shows the conditional inner- and outer-bounds to the indifference curve for 
country 3 is shown in Figure 2.22. 
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Figure 2.18: Conditional inner envelope function, country 3 as base 
Unconditional inner and outer envelope functions While the indifference curves 
in Figure 2.22 are constructed from the Afriat numbers and thus are consistent with 
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a utility function which rationalises the data, the fact that they are conditional on a 
particular set of Afriat numbers implies they are of limited use in the construction of 
welfare bounds. To construct the utility bounds we need information on the widest 
possible bounds · to the indifference curves passing through each data point that are 
consistent with the demand data. These indifference curves are computed by constructing 
the unconditional inner and outer envelope functions using (2.22) and (2.23). 
The unconditional inner envelope function (2.22) was calculated using country 3 as the 
base and the Afriat numbers are:22 W 1 = -1, W 2 = 0.038, W 3 = 0, W 4 = 0, W 5 = -1 
and W 6 = 0.017; >J = 1.5, .\2 = 0.1, ,\3 = 0.1 , .\4 = 0.1 , .\5 = 1.802 and ,\6 = 0.1. These 
numbers construct an envelope function which is the lowest possible envelope consistent 
with the data being rationalised by a general utility function. 
The unconditional outer envelope function (2.23) was similarly constructed and the Afriat 
numbers are: W 1 = -0.03, W 2 = 1, W 3 = 0, W 4 = 0.913 , W 5 = 0.942 and W 6 = 0.979; 
,\1 = 0.11 , .\2 = 0.1, ,\3 = 0.1 , .\4 = 0.1 , ,\5 = 0.1 and ,\6 = 0.1. These numbers construct 
an envelope function which is the highest possible envelope consistent with the data being 
rationalised by a general utility function. The unconditional inner and outer envelope 
functions are presented in Figures (2.23) and (2.24) .23 
The unconditional inner and outer indifference curves passing through country 3's com-
modity bundle are shown in Figure 2.25 ( which, for comparative purposes, also shows the 
conditional indifference curves). Together, the unconditional inner and outer indifference 
curves provide the widest possible bounds to the (unknown) indifference curve passing 
through country 3's commodity bundle. 
Bounds to the true bilateral welfare indexes For the 6 country example data, 
the fixed-weight and classical bounds (L and C) were shown above, as were the GARP 
bounds (BG and c0 ). The Afriat envelope bounds to the bilateral welfare indexes are 
now constructed for the 6 country data using the unconditional inner-bound and outer-
bound representations of the expenditure function, (2 .24) and (2.25). Given that the 
data can be rationalised by a utility function , it was shown in (2. 28) that the tightest 
22 A value of m = 1 was used in the constraint (2.21). 
23 Note that the unconditional inner envelope function is the same as the conditional inner envelope 
function, conditional on the unconditional (inner) Afriat numbers, and the unconditional outer envelope 
function is the same as the conditional outer envelope function , conditional on the unconditional (outer) 
Afriat numbers . 
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possible upper bounds to the base-weighted welfare index are provided by the elements 
of BA , which for this example is: 
0.000 1.365 0.511 0.693 0.954 0.981 
-0.736 0.000 -0.470 0.318 -0.539 -0.234 
BA= I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.588 0.262 0.336 
I 
-0.568 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.483 0.511 
0.248 0.754 0.446 1.371 0.000 0.595 
-0.405 0.189 -0.182 0.693 -0.470 0.000 
Compared with the GARP bounds in BG, the use of the Afriat envelope functions has 
led to a tightening of two of the upper bounds to the base-weighted welfare index. The 
GARP upper bound to log Qff is Bfs = 0.981, while the tightest upper bound is provided 
by Bj = 0.954. Similarly, the GARP upper bound to log Qff is Bfs = 0.511, while the 
tightest upper bound is provided by BA = 0.483. 
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The matrix of Afriat envelope upper bounds to the current-weighted welfare index is: 
0.000 1.232 0.357 0.916 0.827 1.232 
-0.713 0.000 -0.475 0.203 -0.595 -0.189 
CA= I -0.241 
0.875 0.000 0.675 0.470 0.875 
I 
-0.511 0.875 0.000 0.000 0.470 0.875 
1.099 1.099 0.916 2.015 0.000 0.693 
-0.385 0.251 -0.154 0.531 -0.405 0.000 
Compared with the GARP upper bounds to the current-weighted welfare index in cc, 
15 of the upper bounds in cA are tightened. Further, some of the bounds in cA are 
significantly tighter than those in cG. For example, the GARP upper bound to log Qf1A 
is C~ = 1.386, while the tightest upper bound is provided by B~ = 0.827. 
The above finding that the bilateral bounds constructed using the Afriat envelope ap-
proach are tighter than the G ARP bounds is somewhat surprising since both approaches 
use RP relations and neither uses expansion path information ( unlike the approach for 
constructing improved G ARP bounds). 
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2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a thorough review of the revealed preference approach to welfare mea-
surement has been presented. The first part of the chapter reviewed the testing of the 
representative consumer hypothesis. If the hypothesis of common preferences is not re-
jected for a given finite data set, then it is possible to construct bilateral true welfare 
indexes. Three methods for constructing bilateral true welfare indexes - the GARP 
bounds (Varian (1982)) , improved GARP bounds (Blundell, Browning, and Crawford 
(1998)) and Afriat envelope bounds (Chavas and Cox (1997)) - were reviewed, and a 
framework for empirically comparing these methods was developed. 
For an example data set, it was found that the improved GARP bounds were the tightest 
bounds to t he bilateral true welfare indexes. However, this was an expected result, since 
this method incorporates expansion path information into the calculation of the true 
indexes. An unexpected finding was that of the other two methods reviewed (which do 
not use expansion path information) , the Afriat envelope bounds were the tightest . 
11 
Chapter 3 
Multilateral true indexes 
3.1 Introduction 
It was shown in Chapter 1 that homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for the existence 
of a unique (i.e. base-country invariant) welfare index. However, the unobservability of 
preferences means that the unique welfare index is indeterminate (but it is contained 
within the Paasche-Laspeyres (P-L) bounds). A unique true index was defined as a set 
of numbers, the ratios of the elements of which are contained with the P-L bounds. It was 
further shown that a unique true index, if it exists, will have the property of circularity, 
and thus it can be called a multilateral true index. This chapter focuses on the existence 
and construction of multilateral true welfare indexes. 
In section 3.2, the RP test of common homothetic preferences, as developed by Afriat 
(1972, 1981), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1983) is reviewed. There are three ways the 
RP test of common homothetic preferences can be conducted, but the most easily im-
plemented test is that of the Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference (HARP). It is 
shown that a test of HARP is equivalent to a test for the existence of a multilateral true 
index. 
For a given data set that satisfies HARP there will in fact exist a infinite number of 
multilateral true indexes. However, one multilateral true index, the Ideal Afriat Index 
of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997), has certain desirable properties which make it appro-
priate for conducting cross-country comparisons of welfare. The Ideal Afriat Index is 
constructed for 1980 and 1993 ICP data and compared with another multilateral index 
( the EKS index). 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, the RP tests of common 
homothetic preferences are reviewed. In Section 3.3, there is a review of the construc-
tion of multilateral true indexes, with particular focus on the Ideal Afriat Index. The 
Ideal Afriat Index is constructed for 1980 and 1993 ICP data in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, 
respectively. Conclusions are presented in Section 3.6. 
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3.2 RP Tests of Common Homothetic Preferences 
Before stating the theory relating to the homothetic version of the RP test of common 
preferences, it is first discussed how homotheticity simplifies the Afriat inequalities (2.1) 
and (2.2). Using Roy's identity (see Appendix B), the Marshallian demand for good l is 
derived: 
8'1/;(pi) 
. op X . 
qz(x, pi) = _u~,;\ = qz(l, pi)x, 
or in matrix notation: 
q(x, pi) = q(l, pi)x. 
Therefore, we have: 
(3.1) 'lj;(x, pi)= u(q(x, pi))= u(q(l, pi)x) = u(q(l, pi))x, 
since u() is homogeneous of degree 1. By the Envelope Theorem (see Appendix B): 
a'lj;(x, pi) = Ai 
ax ' 
where Ai is the (unobservable) marginal utility of income for country i. However, by 
(3.1), we also know that: 
a'lj;(x, pi) = ui, 
ax 
and hence it must be the case that Ui = Ai. For the Afriat numbers to be consistent 
with homothetic utility maximisation, it must therefore be that Wi = ,\ i . The Afriat 
inequalities (2.1) and (2.2) therefore become Wi < WJ + WJ p.i. ( qi - qJ), which simplifies 
to ( denoting Ai = Wi as the homothetic Afriat number): 1 
(3.2) Ai < Aj pj .qi /pj .qJ. 
3.2.1 RP tests of common homothetic preferences - theory 
The homothetic version of the RP test of the representative consumer hypothesis , as 
developed by Afriat (1972, 1981), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1983), tests the joint 
hypotheses that preferences are common and homothetic. 
1 As shown in Chapter 4, geometrically, homotheticity forces the Afriat outer-bound envelope functions 
through the origin. 
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Proposition 3.1. COMMON HOMOTHETIC PREFERENCES - AFRIAT (1972, 1981), 
(DIEWERT 1973) AND (VARIAN 1983) The following conditions are equivalent:2 
i. There exists a locally non-satiated homothetic utility function a( q) that rationalises 
the data; 
ii. The data satisfy the Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference {HARP): for all 
d . . h . 1 · d (. . ) (~)(pi.qk) (pm.qi) . istinct C oices O in exes i, J, ... , m we have i i p3 j • • • m m > 1, p .q .q p .q 
in. There exists numbers A 2 > 0, i = l, ... ,N, such that: 
(3.3) Ai I Aj < pj .qi /pj .qi; 
iv. The numbers exp(Mji) 
exist; 
min .,.. . p .q pm qi . { ( .... . i qk ) ( k l ·(j,k, ... ,m,i) p.7.qJ pk .qk) ... (pm.~m)}, i,J = 1, ... ,N, 
v. There exists a concave, monotonic, continuous, locally non-satiated, homothetic 
utility function a( q) that rationalises the data. 
PROOF THAT (i)~(ii): For (i,j, ... m) let: 
sJ = v 2 .qJ 
sk == (vi.qi)(vi.qk) == si(vi.qk) 
8m == (vi.qi)(vi.qk) ... (vl.qm) == 8z(vl.qm) 
Note that use is made here of the normalised prices vi = pi/ (pi .qi), where vi .qi = 1 
and vi.(qi /si) = l. Since a(q) rationalises the data, this implies that a(qi) ·> a(qi /si) 
(because qi was chosen when qi/ si was affordable) . 
Similarly, (sivi).(qi /sj) == 1 and (sivi).(qk/sk) = l. Since by hypothesis a(q) is ho-
mothetic and qj is optimal at vj, this implies that ( qJ / sj) must be optimal at prices 
2 The presentation of this theorem and its proof is based on Varian (1983), however Varian (1983) 
did not include condition (iv). While condition 4 is not essential for showing that the test of HARP is 
equivalent to a test for common homothetic preferences (which was the main motivation behind Varian's 
presentation of the theorem), it is useful to include here since it introduces the bounds {Mij} to the true 
welfare index. 
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(sivi) (the budget line has been shifted inward parallel and all optimal quantities are 
consequently divided by si). Therefore a( qi/ si) > a( qk / sk) (since qk / sk is affordable at 
prices sJ vJ. 
By the same reasoning, ( szvz). ( ql / sz) 
a(qm/sm). 
1 and (slvl).(qm/sm) = 1. Hence a(qljsl) > 
It has therefore been shown that a(qi) > a(qi /si), a(qi /si) > a(qk/sk), and a(qljsl) > 
a(qm/sm). Combining these, a(qi) > a(qm/sm). 
Suppose that vm. ( smqi) < vm .qm. Since a( q) exhibits non-satiation, this implies that 
a( smqi) < a( qm). But by homotheticity, then it must be that a( q i) < a( qm / sm) (move-
ment along rays from the origin). However, this contradicts a(qljsl) > a(qm/sm), which 
was shown above. 
Therefore it must be that vm.(smqi) > vm.qm = 1 and therefore smvm.qi > 1, which is 
HARP.• 
PROOF THAT (ii)• (iii): Define 
Ai = . min . { (vi .qk) (vk .qz) ... (vm .qi)}. 
(J,k, ... ,m ,i) 
That is, Ai is a minimum of the given expression over all paths starting anywhere and 
terminating at i. It needs to be shown that this is well defined i.e. that a minimum 
actually exists. This is easily shown by use of an example. Consider the case where 
N = 3 and i = 3, then A 3 will be the minimum of the following expressions: 
(vl .q2) (v2 .q3) 
(vl .q3) 
(v2 .q1) (vl .q3) 
(v2.q3). 
One may ask the question: why is Ai calculated as the minimum only over expressions 
which do not include cycles (a path which starts and finishes at the same point)? For 
example, why is (v1 .q2)(v2.q1 )(v1 .q3), which is one of the infinite number of paths which 
contain cycles, not included in the above paths over which Ai is calculated? The reason 
is that by HARP we only need to consider strings (j, k , ... , m, i) which do not include 
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cycles ( since with HARP satisfied, any cycle must be > 1) and hence its inclusion will 
either increase or have no effect on the expression. Using the above example, by HARP 
it must be that (v1.q3 ) < (v1 .q2 )(v2 .q1)(v1 .q3 ) and hence the string with the cycle can 
be ignored. Given the data are finite, there are only a finite number of strings without 
cycles and therefore a minimum exists. 
It is apparent that the A's defined in this way must be non-negative. What remains is 
to show that they satisfy the Afriat inequalities given in condition (iii). However it is 
readily apparent that: Ai < AJ (vJ .qi) since by definition Ai is the minimum over all 
paths to i.• 
PROOF THAT (ii)• (iv). The number exp(Mji) is the minimum of the given expression 
over all paths starting at j and terminating at i. Given HARP is satisfied, it is possible 
to show that this minimum exists in the same way that it was shown that the numbers 
Ai exist.• 
By definition, it must be that: 
(3.4) exp(Mji) < vj .qi, 
since exp(Mji) is the minimum over all paths starting at j and terminating at i. However, 
the numbers exp(Mji) have a further special property that deserves highlighting. It is 
readily apparent that since: (a) Ai is the minimum of all (non-cyclical) paths starting 
anywhere and ending at i; (b) Aj is the minimum of all (non-cyclical) paths starting 
anywhere and ending at j and (c) exp(Mji) is the minimum of all (non-cyclical) paths 
starting at j and ending at i, then it must be the case that A i < AJ exp(Mji)- Hence, 
Ai/AJ < exp(Mji) and combining this with (3.4) it must be that: 
Ai/ Aj < exp(Mji) < vJ .qi . 
This result shows that exp(Mji) is the tightest upper bound to the unique true index 
Ai/ Ai, and exp(Mji) is itself bounded by the Laspeyres quantity index. This result is 
used later in the construction of bounds to true welfare indexes. 
PROOF THAT (iii)• (v): Define a(q) as: 
a( q) = m~n Aivi .q. 
i 
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It is clear that this function has the stated properties. It can be verified that it rationalises 
the data using an approach similar to the proof similar to that in Proposition 2.1. First 
note that a( qi) = Ai for all i = 1, ... , N. Suppose instead that the minimum is obtained 
at qm, then: 
a(qi) = Amvm.qi < Ai, 
but this contradicts the Afriat inequalities. 
Suppose we have some q such that p.i .qj > p.i .q. From the following set of inequalities, 
we can show that a(qj) > a(q), as required: 
a( q) = m~n Aivi .q 
i 
< AJvJ .q 
< Aj = a(qj).• 
PROOF THAT (v)=• (i): This is obvious. 
As was the case for testing for common non-homothetic preferences, there are three 
approaches for testing for common homothetic preferences. The test of HARP is the 
easiest to implement , but it is useful to outline the other two approaches. 
3.2.2 Three tests of common homothetic preferences 
Testing HARP 
By Proposition 3.1 , a test that the data satisfy HARP is equivalent to a test of common 
homothetic preferences. It is convenient to restate HARP in the form: ln ( ~: ~~:) + 
ln ( ~ ~~;) + .. ·. + 1n ( i::.d~) > 0. Or, equivalently: Lij + Ljk + ... + Lmi > 0. As with the 
test of GARP, testing HARP involves the use of Warshall's algorithm. Re-define L as an 
N by N matrix of "costs" of moving from location to location, with a particular element 
Lij interpreted as the cost of moving from location i to location j. In this context, the 
HARP inequality is a test of whether the cost of moving from i to itself can be made 
cheaper than zero; testing for HARP is therefore a test of whether there are any negative 
cost cycles in the data. The test of HARP can be summarised as follows: use Warshall's 
algorithm to replace each Lij with the minimum cost of moving from node i to j, thus 
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constructing the minimum path matrix M:3 
Mij == min {Lij, (Lik + Lkz + ... + Lmj)}. k, ... ,m 
If any of the diagonal elements of M are negative then this indicates a negative cost 
cycle and HARP is therefore violated. There is a more intuitive explanation for why the 
existence of homothetic preferences requires that HARP be satisfied. If HARP was not 
satisfied then it would be the case that Lij + Ljk + ... + Lmi < 0. Since with homothetic 
preferences it must be that aj - ai < Lij (this is condition (iii) in Proposition 3.1), where 
ai == log(Ai), then it must be equally true that,(aJ - ai) + (ak - ai) + ... + (ai - am) < 0. 
However, this implies that (ai-ai) < 0 and hence HARP must be satisfied for preferences 
to be homothetic. 
Constructing the Afriat numbers using combinatorial methods 
The second method for checking whether a particular set of data is consistent with 
common homothetic preferences involves calculating the Afriat numbers directly using a 
modified version of Algorithm 2.1. 
Algorithm 3.1. CONSTRUCTING HOMOTHETIC AFRIAT NUMBERS Input: A set of de-
mand observations (p, q) and the revealed preference relation R that satisfies HARP. An 
algorithm max(I) which finds the maximal element from a set of demand observations I. 
Output: A set of numbers Ai > 0, i == 1, ... , N that satisfy the Afriat inequalities (3.3) . 
1. I== 1, . .. , N , B = 0. 
2. Let m = max(I). 
3. Set E = {i in I: qiRqm}. If B = 0, set Ai== l and go to 5. Otherwise go to 4-
4- Set Am= miniEE minjEB min{Aipi.qi/pi.qi), Ai}. 
5. Set Ai == Am for all i E E. 
6. Set I= I\ E, B ==BUE. If I= 0, stop. Otherwise go to 2. 
3It is important to note that in constructing the minimum path matrix all of the relevant L's could 
be added together or just a subset. 
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Constructing the Afriat numbers using mathematical programming 
The mathematical programs of Diewert and Parkan (1985) which were used to test for 
common general preferences can be modified for testing for common homothetic pref er-
ences. Under the null hypothesis of homotheticity Wi = >,.i = Ai, and therefore (2.5) can 
be converted to the following unconstrained problem: 
min L L[sij]2 subject to 
A,o- iEN jEN 
sij - AJ - Aipi .qj /pi .qi + afj i, j E N 
where, as before, Sij = afj > 0. If the objective function in the above problem attains 
its lower bound of zero, then there exists a homothetic utility function which rationalises 
the data. With normalised prices, this problem becomes: 
min L L[ij]2 subject to 
Ao-
' iEN jEN 
(3.5) sij = Aj - Aivi.qj + o-fj i,j EN 
3.2.3 Example 
The three tests of common homothetic preferences were applied to the 6 country data 
introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.4). 
Test of HARP 
The minimum path matrix for the 6 country data is: 
0.000 1.037 0.511 0.693 0.377 0.803 
-0.871 -0.044 -0.514 -0.178 -0.704 -0.278 
. -0.357 0.526 0.000 0.336 -0.134 0.292 
M= 
' 
-0.568 0.469 -0.057 0.000 -0.191 0.235 
-0.117 0.709 0.239 0.576 0.000 0.476 
-0.682 0.145 -0.325 0.011 -0.514 -0.089 
Since two of the elements on the diagonal are negative, these data do not satisfy HARP 
and hence cannot be rationalised by a homothetic utility function. The fact that these 
data satisfied GARP illustrates that HARP is in general more difficult to satisfy than 
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GARP, since it implies that the expansion paths be rays from the origin (while GARP 
places no restriction on the expansion paths). With country 6 dropped, the minimum 
path matrix is: 
I 
0.000 1.153 0.511 0.693 0.614 
-0.827 0.000 -0.470 -0.134 -0.539 
M = I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.336 0.103 
-0.568 0.585 -0.057 0.000 0.046 
-0.073 0.754 0.284 0.620 0.000 
Since none of the elements of the diagonal of M are negative, the data satisfy HARP and 
hence can be rationalised by a homothetic utility function. 
Constructing the Afriat numbers using combinatorial methods 
Algorithm 3.1 was run using the 5 country data and the following Afriat numbers were 
calculated ( thus indicating that the data can be rationalised by a homothetic utility 
function): A1 == 0.438, A2 == 1, A3 == 0.625, A4 == 1 and As == 0.438. Note, however 
that these numbers are not unique (there will, in general, be an infinite combination 
of numbers which satisfy the Afriat inequalities), and hence they cannot be used for 
computing utility bounds. 
Constructing the Afriat numbers using mathematical programming 
The third RP test of whether the data can be rationalised by a homothetic utility function 
is conducted by solving the mathematical program (3.5). For the particular starting 
values used, and normalising A 3 = 1, the Afriat numbers calculated are: A 1 == 0.6 , 
A2 == 1.644, A3 == l, A4 == 1.114 and As == 0.774. As above, these Afriat numbers are 
not unique and hence do not provide any information on the bounds to the true welfare 
index. 
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3.3 Constructing Multilateral true indexes 
A multilateral true index was defined in Definition 1.5 as a true index which also has 
the property of being a multilateral index (i.e. it satisfies circularity). The Afriat num-
bers constructed using mathematical programming and combinatorial methods are by 
definition multilateral true· indexes. However, these numbers are dependent on the par-
ticular starting values used, and they do not contain any information on the bounds to 
the unique welfare index. In contrast, the Afriat numbers constructed during the HARP 
test of common homothetic preferences ( and are elements of the minimum path matrix) 
provide information in that they are tight bounds to all possible true welfare indexes. 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) have developed several general results on the construction 
of multilateral true indexes using the elements of the minimum path matrix, which are 
now summarised. In proving Proposition 3.1, it was shown that given that common 
homothetic preferences cannot be rejected by the data, then the system: 
Ai/ Aj < exp(Mji) < pj .qi /pJ .pj i, j E N, 
has a positive solution. By symmetry, it is also true (since AJ / Ai < exp(Mij) and hence 
Ai/ AJ > 1/ exp(Mij)) that: 
pi .qi /pi .pj < 1/ exp(Mij) < Ai/ Aj < exp(Mji) < p1 .qi /pj .pj . 
Using the logarithmic Afriat numbers ai, the matrix of log upper-bounds M to the set 
A of bilateral true indexes is represented: 
(36) A ={ -( 1 2 N)I( j i)<M··<l ( i J/piqi)=L··} . - a = a , a , . . . , a a - a _ iJ _ n p .q . - iJ . 
With homotheticity, M exists and it is in fact the minimum path matrix. 4 Using sym-
metry we can rewrite ( 3. 6) as: 
. . 
(3.7) -Mji < (a1 - ai) < Mij i,j = l, ... , N. 
Any true index, a, must satisfy these inequalities for each i, j. From the definition of the 
minimum path, it must be that: 
(3.8) Mkj < Mki + Mij i,j = 1, ... ,N. 
4 . . . . 
It follows from the above that with homotheticity Lij > aJ - ai and Lji > ai - aJ and hence 
Lij + Lji > O; the Laspeyres index must be greater than the Paasche index. 
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From this, Mkj - Mki < Mij; the terms on the left of this inequality are the jth and ith 
elements of the kth row of M ; this row therefore constitutes a true index as defined by 
(3. 7). The minimum path inequality (3.8) can also be written as -Mij + Mkj < Mki and 
hence the negative elements of column j also comprise a true index. 
These results can be extended to the following general proposition on the construction 
of multilateral true indexes. 
Proposition 3.2 . MULTILATERAL TRUE INDEXES ; DOWRICK AND QUIGGIN (1997) Let 
f : RN • R be any function which is non-decreasing in each of its arguments and for 
which f(x + c) = J(x) + c where c = (c,c, ... , c) , and let M.j and Mj. denote the jth 
column and jth row respectively of the minimum path matrix, M. {zJl[zJ = f(M .j) , j = 
1, ... , NJ or [zJ = f (-Mj.),j = 1, ... , NJ} is a true index. 
PROOF: It is apparent from (3.8) that: 
M1j 
M2j 
MNj 
< M1i +Mij 
< M2 · +M·· 
- 1, 1,J 
< Mni + Mij · 
Hence, J(M.j) < J (M.i +MijiN ), where iN is a N x 1 vector of ones. From the definition 
off() , f(M.j) < f( M .i) + M ij , and therefore, J(M .j) - f (M .i ) < Mij Similarly, from 
(3.8): 
- Mil - (-Mk1) < Mki 
- Mi2 - (- Mk2) < Mki 
-Min- (-Mkn) <Mki· 
Therefore, J(-Mi. - MkiiN) < J(-Mk.) , J(-Mi.) - Mki < J(-Mk.) and hence 
J(-Mi.) - f (-Mk.) < Mki· We therefore have that zJ - z i < M ij for all i , j and 
from (3.6) , z E A . • 
The elements of a t rue index can therefore be constructed by applying the appropriate 
transformation f to each column or to each (negative) row of the minimum path matrix. 
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Examples off are the ith element, or any other rank-dependent functions such as the 
minimum, maximum and median. 5 
From the definition of the true index in (3.6), any convex combination of true indexes 
is also a true index. To see this, assume we have two sets of bilateral true indexes 
a {a1,a2 , ... ,aNl(aJ -ai) < Mij} and b = {b1,b2 , ... ,bNl(bJ-bi) < Mij}- Define the 
convex combination of a and bas c = [K,a1 + (1- fi,)b1 , a2 + (1- fi,)b2 , . .. , aN + (l - K,)bN] 
where fi, E [O, 1]. To see that c is a true index, consider the following inequalities: 
. . 
K,[aJ - a2] < K,M· · 
- 1,J 
(1 - fi,)[b-7 - bi] < (1 - K,)Mij 
The sum of these inequalities is [K,aj + (1 - fi,)bJ] - [K,ai + (1 - fi,)bi] < Mij and we can 
therefore conclude that c is indeed a true index. 
The following are therefore multilateral true indexes: 
1. any row of the minimum path matrix, M, or of its negative transpose - MT; 
2. any row of the transformed matrix, Mr, or -MTr , where each column is the cor-
responding column of M or -MT reordered by rank; 
3. any convex combination of the above indexes. 
3.3.1 Graphical example of the minimum path algorithm 
From Result 1.3 we know that with homotheticity there exists a unique welfare index 
which is bounded by the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes. It is now graphically shown 
how multilateral comparisons ( and the minimum path algorithm in particular) can be 
used to tighten the bounds to the true welfare index. Assume we are wanting to compare 
the welfare between two countries for which the Laspeyres index exceeds the Paasche 
index (see Figure 3.2). 
5 A potential source of confusion here is that previously it was stated that the elements of a row and 
(negative) column of M are true indexes, but in Proposition 3.2 it is stated that f (M.j) (a function of 
column j of M) and f (-Mj.) (a function of the negative of row j of M) comprise true indexes. The 
explanation is that f (M.i) is reducing each column to a single element and the result of this is a row of 
numbers which is a true index. Similarly, f (-Mj.) is reducing each row to one element and this results 
in a column of numbers which is a true index. 
120 3. Multilateral true indexes 
q2 
p2 
0 
q1 
Figure 3.1: Constructing a lower bound to country 1 's indifference curve - N = 2 
Since these data satisfy homotheticity ( as shown in Proposition 1.3, with N = 2 the P-L 
in equality is necessary and sufficient for this) we know the expansion paths are rays from 
the origin and we can use these paths to construct bounds to the indifference curves. An 
argument similar to that used in Section 2.3 can be employed to show that country l's 
indifference curve cannot be in the shaded region in Figure 3.1. In particular, if the 
indifference curve were in this region, then we could have the following: q2* RD q and 
qRDq2*, that is, a violation of WARP. Hence it must be that with homotheticity, the 
shaded region forms a lower bound to country l's indifference curve. This lower bound 
is in fact the unconditional homothetic outer bound to country l's indifference curve. 6 
The lower bound to country 2's indifference curve can similarly be constructed (Figure 
3.2). These lower bounds can be used to construct bounds to the welfare indexes which 
are tighter than those provided by the fixed-weight and classical bounds. In particular, 
it is apparent that p 1 .q1* is an improved lower bound to e(U2 , p 1) and p 2 .q2* is an 
6 See Chapter 4 for more details on the construction of this bound. 
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improved lower bound to e(U1 , p 2) and hence: 
Pl .q1* e(U2, pl) Pl .q2 
--<---<--pl.ql - e(Ul, pl) - pl.ql 
P2 .q2 e(U2, p2) P2 .q2 
--<---<--p2.ql - e(U1,p2) - p2.q2* 
However, it is immediately apparent from the diagram that: 
pl.q1* 
pl.ql 
Oa Oc p 2 .q2 
-=-= ' Ob Od p 2 .q1 
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that is, with N = 2 the lower bound to country 2's indifference curve is redundant in 
the construction of a lower bound to Qf {1. Similarly, it can be shown that with N = 2 
the lower bound to country 1 's indifference curve is redundant in the construction of an 
upper bound to Qf1A. Thus, we have graphically shown the result in Chapter 1 that with 
N = 2 the tight bound to the welfare index is provided by the Paasche and Laspeyres 
indexes. 
q2 
0 
I 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
I 
\ 
1 
----_d_ 
.. ' ..... 
p2 
q1 
Figure 3.2: Constructing bounds to the true index - N = 2 
The lower bounds to the indifference curves, and (relatedly), the bounds to the welfare 
index comparing countries 1 and 2 can be improved by the introduction of a third country 
that shares common homothetic preferences with countries 1 and 2 (see Figure 3.3). 
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3 
qi 
Figure 3.3: Tightening the bounds to the welfare index using the minimum path 
With homotheticity, the fixed-weight upper bound to U2 /U1 is the Laspeyres index, 
v 1 .q2 . The minimum path algorithm will check all the possible indirect comparisons of 
the welfare between country 2 and 1 ( in the present example, there is only one such 
indirect comparison). Assume that v 1 .q3 = x and v 3 .q2 = y. With homotheticity, it 
is apparent that the welfare of country 3 is at most x times that of country 1, and the 
welfare of country 2 is at most y times that of country 3. Hence, it must be that the 
welfare of country 2 must be at most xy that of country 1. If it is the case that xy < v 1 .q2 
then the upper bound to U2 / U1 will have been tightened via the use of third-country 
comparisons. 
The workings of the minimum path algorithm can be illustrated using the diagram as 
follows. The fixed-weight upper bound to U2 /U1, v 1 .q2 , is equal to 0b/0a. Further, 
v
1 
.q3 = 0c/0a = 0d/0e (where the latter equality is found using similar triangles) and 
v3 .q2 = 0b/0d. The minimum path is (v1 .q3 ) (v3 .q2 ) = 0d/0e.0b/0d = 0b/0e < 0b/0a 
and thus the upper bound to U2 /U1 has been tightened via the inclusion of country 3 
into the analysis. 
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3.3.2 Bilateral comparisons - example 
As discussed above, if the data are consistent with homotheticity, then the tightest bounds 
to the unique welfare index are provided by the elements of M. The elements of M 
can therefore be used to make multilaterally consistent bilateral comparisons between 
observations. From the minimum path matrix constructed for the 5 country data (which 
satisfy HARP) in Section 3.2.3, we can therefore say that the welfare of country 5 is at 
most e0·103 = 1.11 and at least e-0-284 = 0. 75 times the welfare of country 3. 
3.3.3 Multilateral comparisons - the Ideal Afriat Index 
Above it was shown how the elements of M can be used to make multilaterally consistent 
bilateral comparisons between observations.7 However, in a cross-country context, one 
generally wants to make multilaterally consistent multilateral comparisons of welfare; i.e. 
the welfare of each country compared with the welfare of all countries in the sample. 
Such comparisons can be made using the Ideal Afriat Index proposed by Dowrick and 
Quiggin (1997). The Ideal Afriat Index has certain useful properties and thus is proposed 
as an appropriate index for conducting multilateral comparisons of welfare. 
Proposition 3.3. BOUNDS ON THE DISPERSION FROM THE MEAN OF A TRUE INDEX ; 
N N 
DOWRICK AND QuIGGIN (1997) Let ri = I: Mij/N and ci = I: Mji/N represent the 
j=l j=l 
means of the ith row and jth column, respectively, of the minimum path matrix, M. Then 
N 
-ri < ai - a< ci , where a_ I: ai/N. 
i=l 
PROOF: Snmming inequality (3. 7) over j gives: 
N N N 
"M· · < Nai - '""aj < "M·· L iJ- L -L Ji 
j=l j=l j=l 
or, 
. . . (3.9) -ri<ai-a<ci. • 
7 A cross-country example of multilaterally consistent bilateral comparisons would be using M to 
compare the welfare of all countries in the sample to that of the U.S., for example. Another (more 
common) example of such comparisons is in the context of constructing price indexes where Mis used to 
compare the cost of living in each year to that of a particular base year; for examples see Varian (1983) 
and Manser and McDonald (1988). 
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It can be shown that the bounds in (3.9) are tight in that they are attainable using a 
combination of elements from M. The true index a= Mi. gives the lower bound since 
its mean value is, by definition ri, ai = Mii = 0 and therefore ai - a = 0 - ri = -ri. 
Similarly, the true index a = -M.i gives the upper bound since its mean value is -ci , 
ai = -Mii = 0 and therefore ai - a= 0 - (-ci) = ci. 
Proposition 3.4. THE IDEAL AFRIAT INDEX; DOWRICK AND QUIGGIN (1997) Let 
a+ = ( c1 , c2 , ... , cN) and a- = (-r1, -r2 , ... , -rN) represent the vector of column 
means and the vector of negative row means, respectively, of the minimum path matrix, 
M . Define the Ideal Afriat Index as a* = (a++ a-)/2, the vector of overall means. 
(i) a*, a+ and a- are true indexes; 
(ii) the numbers a+i and a-i are the upper and lower bounds on the true index number 
for observation i relative to the sample mean; 
(iii) a*i is the midpoint of the range of ai - a; 
(iv) a* is equivalent to the Ideal Fisher Index when N = 2. 
PROOF: From Proposition 3.2, any row of M is a true index, as is the negative of any 
column vector and its convex combination. Statement (i) follows from this and (ii) and 
(iii) follow from (3.9) and the construction of a*i. When there are only two observations 
Mis equal to Land it follows that a* is equivalent to the Ideal Fisher Index. 
3.3.4 The Ideal Afriat Index: example 
The Ideal Afriat Index is now constructed for the 5 country data which satisfy homo-
theticity. For comparative purposes, the Ideal Afriat Index is compared with another 
multilateral index, the EKS index (as discussed in Section 1.5, however, the EKS index 
is not a multilateral true index). 
From Proposition 3.2, the ith row of M, Mi., is a true index, as is the negative of the 
ith column of M , -M.i. Further, the midpoint of these two indexes which is the vector 
(Mi. - M.i)/2 will also be a true index. Applying this to M calculated for the 5 country 
data (Section 3.2.3) gives the following matrix of midpoint true indexes (note that this 
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is equivalent to constructing Fisher indexes from M rather than from L): 
0.000 0.990 0.434 0.631 0.343 
-0.990 0.000 -0.556 -0.359 -0.646 
M = I -0.434 0.556 0.000 
-0.631 0.359 -0.197 
-0.343 0.646 0.090 
0.197 -0.090 
0.000 -0.287 
0.287 0.000 
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Thus, the row M 3_ gives a true index comparing the welfare of all countries with that of 
country 3 which is the midpoint of bounds to the true index. For example, it was shown 
above that the welfare of country 5 is at most 1.11 and at least 0. 75 times the welfare 
of country 3, the midpoint indicates the welfare of country 5 is e-0-090 = 0.91 times the 
welfare of country 3. 8 
It was shown in Chapter 1 that a true index satisfies the property of circularity, that 
is , a welfare comparison between countries i and j must be consistent with a welfare 
comparison constructed via third country k. The property of circularity is evident in the 
- - - -
true indexes in M. For example, M 35 = -0.09 and M 31 + M 15 = -0.434+0.343 = -0.09. 
The matrix M can be used to make multilaterally consistent bilateral comparisons (i.e. 
between country i and j), but in cross country analysis one is generally more interested 
in making multilaterally consistent multilateral comparisons (i.e. comparing the welfare 
of country i with that of the sample mean). The Ideal Afriat Index can be calculated as 
the mean of the columns of M, or equivalently, the negative of the mean of the rows of 
M. From Table 3.1, the welfare of country 5 is between 27.2 percent (1- e-0·317 = 0.728) 
below and 4.6 percent above the sample mean, with a midpoint estimated welfare of 87.3 
percent of the sample mean. 
Table 3.1: Ideal Afriat Index and bounds, 5 country data 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Country 5 
a * 
-0.479 0.510 -0.046 0.151 -0.136 
a -0.594 0.394 -0.145 -0.001 -0.317 
a+ 
-0.365 0.627 0.053 0.303 0.045 
8 -i.e. M ss = (Mss - Mss)/2. 
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Comparison with a multilateral index: the EKS index 
The matrix of log Laspeyres indexes for countries 1-5 is: 
r 
0.000 1.365 0.511 0.693 1.126 
-0.736 0.000 -0.470 0.318 -0.539 
L = I -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.588 0.262 
-0.568 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.710 
0.248 0.754 0.446 1.371 0.000 
The basic "building block" of the EKS index is the Fisher index: Qf; = ✓ Qt Q{;. For 
the present example, the matrix of logarithms of Fisher indexes is: 
0.000 1.050 0.434 0.631 0.439 
-1.050 0.000 -0.556 -0.299 -0.646 
F = I -0.434 0.556 0.000 
-0.631 0.299 -0.294 
-0.439 0.646 0.092 
0.294 -0.092 
0.000 -0.330 
0.330 0.000 
While the Fisher index has many desirable properties, it does not have the property 
of circularity. The lack of circularity of the Fisher index is evident from the elements 
of F , for example, F3s = -0.09 and F3i + Fis = -0.434 + 0.439 = 0.01. The non-
circularity of the Fisher index makes it unsuitable for use in multilateral comparisons, 
however the EKS index, which is a multilateral generalisation of the Fisher index, is 
commonly used in cross country welfare comparisons. The EKS index is the geometric 
mean of the ratios of all N bilateral Fisher indexes, taking each country in turn as base: 
( 
F ) (i/N) 
Q5K s = IT~ i ~~ . The matrix of logarithms of EKS indexes for the present 
example is: 
0.000 1.021 0.446 0.702 0.385 
-1.021 0.000 -0.575 -0.319 -0.636 
E = I -0.446 0.575 0.000 0.256 -0.061 
-0.702 0.319 -0.256 0.000 -0.317 
-0.385 0.636 0.061 0.317 0.000 
_J 
The EKS index satisfies the property of circularity: E3s = -0.06 and E3i + Eis = 
-0.446 + 0.385 = 0.06. However, as noted in Section 1.5.2 the circularity of the EKS 
index is purely a statistical artifact; it arises from the method of calculating the EKS 
( averaging over all countries), not because the underlying preference structure necessarily 
imparts circularity. While the EKS index satisfies c,ircularity by construction, it is not 
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a true index as defined in Definition 1.5. The reason is that it is possible for the EKS 
index to violate the fixed-weight bounds to the true index; in the present example, it is 
apparent from L that the welfare of country 4 cannot exceed e0·693 = 2 times that of 
country 1. Yet, from E, the EKS index suggests that the upper bound of the welfare of 
country 4 compared with country 1 is e0·702 = 2.02 times. Thus the EKS index violates 
the bounds to the true index provided by the fixed-weight indexes, and therefore cannot 
be a true index. 
A version of the EKS which can be used for (non-true) multilateral comparisons is con-
structed by taking the mean of the columns of E or, equivalently, the negative of the 
mean of the rows of E. This produces the following vector: [-0.511 ,0.510,-0.065 ,0.l91 ,-
0.l26] , and element i gives the EKS estimate of the welfare of country i relative to the 
sample mean. 
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3.4 Application to 1980 ICP Data 
In this section, the Ideal Afriat Index is constructed using 1980 data on 18 goods and 
services for 60 countries from International Comparisons Project (ICP) (see Appendix A 
for further details of the data). 
The test of HARP was not satisfied for all 60 countries, so an iterative procedure was 
used to find the maximum number of countries consistent with homothetic preferences. 
A subset of four countries satisfying HARP (Argentina, Austria, Botswana and the U.S.) 
was arbitrarily chosen and then countries were iteratively added to this subset if they 
satisfied HARP. This resulted in a total of 42 countries sharing common homothetic 
preferences; the Ideal Afriat Index (a*) and the bounds to this index (a+ and a-) are 
presented in Table 3.2. The country rankings based on a* are also in Table 3.2. 9 
Using the Ideal Afriat Index, the U.S. is ranked first with a true welfare level approxi-
mately 4.3 ( = el.456 ) times that of the sample average. The poorest country was Ethiopia, 
for which true welfare in 1980 was only approximately 12.9 percent of the sample average. 
For comparative purposes, the EKS index was constructed for the 42 countries which sat-
isfy HARP. The EKS index comparing country i with the sample mean is constructed as 
a geometric mean of the EKS indexes comparing country k with each of the N countries. 
This can be shown to be equal to (in logarithmic form): 
-1.{ ""N L N log Qf KS = N L..,i=l ik - I:j-l Lkj} 
2 
Thus, the EKS index comparing each country with the sample mean is simply a vector 
of overall means of the column and negative row means of L. This is exactly the same 
method for calculating the Ideal Afriat Index, except the latter involves M. 
The rankings produced by the Ideal Afriat and EKS indexes are very similar ( the Pear-
son's correlation coefficient is 0.999) but there are some differences. For example, the 
pairwise rankings of the following countries are changed: Argentina and Brazil, Belgium 
9 A problem with this procedure for finding the largest set of countries satisfying HARP is that the 
choice of the initial four countries will have an impact on the composition of the final set of countries (as 
will the order in which additional countries are tested). In the present example, countries were selected 
in alphabetical order and this is likely to be the reason why 25 of the 30 countries in the first half of 
Table 3.2 satisfy HARP, compared with only 17 of the 30 countries in the second half of the table. In 
Chapter 4 this issue is addressed. 
Ideal Afriat Index 
a* a - a+ 
Argentina 0.382 0.354 0.410 
Austria 1.156 1.131 1.180 
Belgium 1.262 1.244 1.279 
Bolivia -0.527 -0.554 -0.501 
Botswana -0.840 -0.863 -0.817 
Brazil 0.398 0.372 0.424 
Cameroon -1.148 -1.171 -1.124 
Canada 1.445 1.424 1.465 
Chile 0.278 0.240 0.315 
Colombia 0.093 0.069 0.116 
Costa Rica 0.245 0.227 0.262 
Ivory coast -0.895 -0.913 -0.878 
Denmark 1.275 1.255 1.296 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador -0.196 -0.219 -0.173 
El Salvador -0.452 -0.476 -0.428 
Ethiopia -2.046 -2.100 -1.992 
Finland 0.933 0.915 0.951 
France 1.221 1.200 1.243 
Germany FR 1.273 1.250 1.297 
Greece 0.574 0.556 0.591 
Guatemala -0.054 -0.076 -0.032 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 1.000 0.930 1.070 
Hungary 0.490 0.473 0.508 
India -1.646 -1 .679 -1.614 
Indonesia -0.990 -1.036 -0.944 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Table 3.2: Multilateral indexes, 1980 
EKS Index 
rank log Qf K 5 rank a* 
19 0.414 18 Japan 0.948 
8 1.174 8 Kenya -1.448 
5 1.272 6 Korea -0.212 
29 -0.537 29 Luxembourg 1.253 
32 -0.848 32 Madagascar -1.357 
18 0.400 19 Malawi -1.950 
35 -1.145 35 Mali 
2 1.461 2 Morocco -0.761 
20 0.297 20 Netherlands 
22 0.095 22 Nigeria 
21 0.221 21 Norway 1.090 
33 -0.875 33 Pakistan 
3 1.288 4 Panama -0.076 
Paraguay 
26 -0.201 26 Peru ~0.084 
28 -0.466 28 Philippines 
42 -2.093 42 Poland 
12 0.959 12 Portugal 0.465 
7 1.244 7 Senegal -1.160 
4 1.305 3 Spain 
13 0.574 13 Sri Lanka -0.653 
23 -0.068 23 U.R. Tanzania 
Tunisia 
10 1.009 10 U.K. 
16 0.482 17 U.S. 1.456 
39 -1.618 39 Uruguay 0.540 
34 -1.011 34 Venezuela 0.527 
Yugoslavia 
Zambia -1.810 
Zimbabwe 
I deal Afriat Index 
a- a+ rank 
0.916 0.980 11 
-1.472 -1.423 38 
-0.296 -0.129 27 
1.226 1.280 6 
-1.390 -1.325 37 
-1.999 -1.901 41 
-0. 786 -0. 735 31 
1.063 1.118 9 
-0.094 -0.057 24 
-0.127 -0.040 25 
0.420 0.510 17 
-1.191 -1. 128 36 
-0.725 -0.581 30 
1.438 1.473 1 
0.518 0.563 14 
0.476 0.578 15 
-1.836 -1.784 40 
EKS Index 
log QfKS rank 
0.960 11 
-1.464 38 
-0.240 27 
1.288 5 
-1.379 37 
-2.010 41 
-0.744 31 
1.093 9 
-0.085 25 
-0.083 24 
0.499 15 
-1.199 36 
-0.676 30 
1.494 1 
0.550 14 
0.485 16 
-1.823 40 
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and Luxembourg, Denmark and Germany and Panama and Peru. Only Portugal experi-
ences a change in ranking of more than one place (it slips from 17th place when welfare 
is measured by a* to 15th when ranked with EKS index). It is also apparent that the 
EKS index is slightly more dispersed than the Ideal Afriat Index. With the EKS index, 
the U.S. has a welfare level approximately 4.5 times the sample average, while true wel-
fare for Ethiopia is only 12.3 percent of the average. The difference in dispersion of the 
welfare indexes is also indicated by the standard deviation which is 1.034 for the Ideal 
Afriat Index and 1.049 for the EKS index. 
The high correlation between the Ideal Afriat Index and EKS index might suggest that 
in practice the choice between these indexes will have little significance. However, as 
Neary (2000) has noted, small differences between index numbers can have significant 
implications for policy issues when one allows for the cumulative effect over time. The 
U.S. Boskin Commission found a large impact on the social security bill associated with 
using differing methods for calculating the cost-of-living used in the indexing of pensions 
and other cash benefits. Neary (2000) simulated the impact of differing aggregation 
methods on aid flows using the 1980 ICP data. He assumed that each OECD country 
transferred 0. 7 percent of real consumption expenditure (grossed up by population) and 
found that the Geary index implied a transfer which is over US$0.3 billion greater than 
that implied by the EKS index. 
It is of interest to see the extent to which the use of multilateral comparisons tightens the 
bounds to the true index. Figure 3.4 presents normalised true and fixed-weight bounds 
to the true welfare index comparing each country to the U.S. Each set of bounds is 
normalised relative to the log of the EKS index ( Qfu1S), for reasons to be discussed 
below. Thus the normalised true bounds to the (log) welfare index comparing country i 
and the U.S. are {-Mius-log Qfu1s, Musi-log QfrfsS} and the normalised fixed-weight 
bounds are { - Liu s - log Qfu1 s, Lu Si - log Qf Js s}. 
It is apparent from Figure 3.4 that the elements of M provide significantly tighter bounds 
to the true welfare index. For example, the fixed-weight bounds suggest that in 1980, 
welfare in Ethiopia was between 1.8 and 27.9 percent that of the U.S. However, the 
minimum path matrix suggests that the true gap between Ethiopia and the U.S. must in 
fact lie between 2.9 and 3.1 percent.10 
10Because of the normalisation, these numbers are not directly observable in Figure 3.4 but can be 
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Recall that a true index must lie within the P-L bounds (Definition 1.2). Because we 
have normalised the fixed-weight bounds on Qfi.;~5 we are able to use Figure 3.4 to test 
whether the EKS index is a true index. For the several countries (Belgium, Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Guatemala, Japan and Venezuala) , the normalised fixed weight bounds lie 
above the zero axis, thus indicating that the EKS index lies outside of the P-L bounds 
and for these data, therefore cannot constitute a true index. 
Finally, it is of interest to see how the bounds to the true welfare index are tightened as 
the number of countries in the homothetic welfare comparison is increased. In Figure 3.5 , 
the (normalised) true bounds to the true welfare index for three countries (where the U.S. 
is base) are plotted against the number of countries included in the welfare comparison. 
The three countries (Argentina, Austria and Botswana) are shown since they are present 
in the original subset of 4 countries which share HARP. Thus, the true bounds on the far 
left of the figure are calculated using the elements from M when N = 4. while the bounds 
calculated using: Lusi = -3.329, Lius = 4.007, Musi= -3.456 and MiUs = 3.543. 
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on the far right of t he figure are calculated from M when N = 42. As expected, adding 
more countries to t he analysis progressively tightens the true bounds. With N = 4, the 
true welfare level of Botswana, for example, is between 8.4 and 11.0 percent of that of 
the U.S., while with N = 42 these bounds are significantly tightened so we can say that 
living standards in Botswana are between 10.0 and 10.2 percent of those in the U.S . (once 
again, because of the normalisation used these numbers are not directly observable in 
Figure 3.5) . 
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3.5 Application to 1993 ICP data 
The Ideal Afriat Index is now constructed using 1993 ICP data on 19 goods and services 
for 24 OECD countries (see Appendix A for further details of the data). 
As was found with the 1980 data, not all 24 countries share common homothetic prefer-
ences, so a subset of four countries satisfying HARP (Australia, Austria, Belgium and the 
U.S.) was arbitrarily chosen and the remaining countries were iteratively added to this 
subset if they satisfied HARP. This resulted in 19 countries sharing common homothetic 
preferences; the Ideal Afriat Index and its bounds, and the ranking based on this index 
are shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Multilateral indexes, 1993 
Ideal Afriat Index EKS Index 
a* a - a+ rank logQfKS rank 
Australia 0.013 0.004 0.022 11 0.013 11 
Austria 0.058 0.052 0.063 7 0.059 7 
Belgium 0.028 0.019 0.037 10 0.028 10 
Canada 0.105 0.100 0.110 3 0.100 3 
Denmark 0.094 0.085 0.103 4 0.089 4 
Finland -0.160 -0.165 -0.154 16 -0.162 16 
France 0.073 0.065 0.082 5 0.074 5 
Germany 0.043 0.038 0.049 9 0.043 9 
Greece 
-0.362 -0.372 -0.353 19 -0.358 19 
Iceland 0.067 0.061 0.073 6 0.064 6 
Ireland -0.300 -0.308 -0.292 18 -0.302 18 
Italy 0.003 -0.005 0.010 13 0.007 13 
Japan 0.052 0.042 0.063 8 0.046 8 
Luxembourg 0.400 0.394 0.406 1 0.410 1 
Nether lands 
New Zealand -0.133 -0.138 -0.127 15 I -0.135 15 Norway -0.084 -0.096 -0.073 14 -0.073 14 
Portugal 
Spain -0.267 -0.272 -0.262 17 I -0.265 17 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
U.K. 0.010 0.005 0.015 
1~ I 0.010 12 U.S. 0.359 0.353 0.365 0.352 2 
Of the 19 OECD countries which share common homothetic preferences, Luxembourg 
is the richest with a level of real income approximately 50 percent above the sample 
average, and Greece is ranked last with a welfare level of 70 percent of the sample 
average. The EKS index (and implied ranking) is also shown in Table 3.3. The welfare 
rankings according to the EKS index are identical to those constructed using the Ideal 
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Afriat Index. In contrast to what was found with the 1980 data, the dispersion of welfare 
is approximately the same when measured by the EKS and Ideal Afriat indexes. 
As with the 1980 data, we can graphically show how the bounds to the true welfare 
index are tightened by the use of multilateral comparisons. In Figure 3.6 the normalised 
bounds (with the U.S. as base) are shown. It is apparent that as was shown for the 1980 
data, the EKS index constructed using the 1993 data is not a true index (since both the 
normalised fixed-weight bounds for Japan lie below the zero axis) . The tightening of the 
welfare bounds for three countries as more countries are added to the analysis is shown 
in Figure 3. 7. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a review of the theory of the existence and construction of multilateral 
true indexes was presented. A particular multilateral true index, the Ideal Afriat Index 
of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997), has useful properties, and is the basis for the cross-
country comparisons of welfare in the remainder of this thesis. The Ideal Afriat Index 
was constructed using 1980 and 1993 data from the ICP. It was found that of the 60 
countries in the 1980 ICP data set, 42 share common homothetic preferences, while 19 of 
the 24 OECD countries in the 1993 data set satisfy HARP. The fact that utility consistent 
welfare comparisons cannot be made for all countries in the data sets is a problem and in 
Chapter 4, methods for including the "non-homothetic" countries into the welfare analysis 
( via the construction of approximate multilateral true welfare indexes) are presented. 
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Chapter 4 
Approximate multilateral True 
Welfare Comparisons 
4.1 Introduction 
The revealed preference (RP) approach to welfare measurement reviewed in Chapters 2 
and 3 is based on the notion of a utility maximising representative consumer, the existence 
of which is tested for via revealed preference relations. It was shown in Chapter 1 that 
homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique welfare index, and 
for a finite data set , the most easily implemented test of homotheticity is the test of 
HARP (introduced in Proposition 3.1). For a given data set which satisfies HARP, there 
exists a multilateral true welfare index ( defined in Definition 1.5) and the Ideal Afriat 
Index of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) has been proposed as an appropriate multilateral 
true index for making utility consistent cross-country welfare comparisons. 
One of the problems with the test of HARP (and the RP approach in general) is that 
it is non-stochastic - there is no allowance for the potential existence of errors in the 
vectors of quantities consumed. Such errors may be associated with measurement or 
with consumers not perfectly optimising their consumption choice, and may lead to the 
"all or nothing" HARP test rejecting common homothetic preferences for a particular 
data set. Varian (1990) has described RP tests as "sharp'' in that the data either pass t he 
tests exactly or else they don't and the hypothesis of utility maximisation ( or of common 
preferences) is rejected: the tests do not allow for an "error term,, . The implicat ions of 
this are apparent in Chapter 3, where HARP was satisfied for only 42 of the 60 countries 
in the 1980 data set, and 19 of the 24 countries in the 1993 data set. 
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There are several approaches which have been suggested for countering the overly sharp 
nature of RP tests. Manser and McDonald (1988) , Patterson (1991) and Swofford and 
Whitney (1994) have devised various methods for perturbing data to ascertain the ro-
bustness of revealed preference tests of common preferences. In particular, Swofford and 
Whitney (1994) conduct tests of Type I error (where the null hypothesis of common 
preferences is true, but is rejected because of measurement error in the data) and Type 
II error (where measurement error leads to a false null hypothesis of common preferences 
being accepted). Varian (1985) used an alternative approach to find the minimal per-
turbation of the data required for the RP tests to be satisfied. However this approach is 
computationally intensive; testing data consisting of 18 observations on three factors of 
production of two electricity generation plants for consistency with the cost minimisation 
hypothesis involved a quadratic programming problem of 54 variables and around 200 
constraints. 
Banker and Maindiratta (1988) suggest finding the largest set of observations consistent 
with optimising behaviour (this was the approach employed in Chapter 4), although a 
problem is that the composition of the set will be dependent on the order of selection of 
observations for testing. Another obvious question is what to do about the observations 
which are not included in the largest set of consistent observations? In a cross-country 
context in particular, it may not be feasible or desirable to simply drop countries from 
the comparative analysis because they do not share common homothetic preferences with 
the other countries. Thus, for cross-country comparative work it is necessary to look at 
methods for making multilateral comparisons for all countries in the data set , even if they 
do not all share common homothetic preferences. There are two ways the RP approach 
can be modified to allow one to make utility-consistent multilateral comparisons amongst 
a set of countries which do not share common homothetic preferences. 
The first approach is a method of imputing utility for those countries which fail the 
test of common homothetic preferences. This involves constructing the inner and outer 
homothetic envelope utility functions which bound all homothetic utility functions that 
rationalise the data ( these are homothetic versions of the Afriat envelope functions re-
viewed in Section 2.4.4). Under the Afriat envelope approach, the set of countries is 
divided into two subsets: the set 1-l which satisfy HARP, and the set R of countries 
which do not share common homothetic preferences with the countries in 1-l. For any 
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county r in set R , the method finds the utility of the representative consumer, whose 
preferences are homothetic and consistent with observations in the set 1-l, given they 
consumed the consumption bundle qr, even though the homothetic consumer would not 
have in fact chosen bundle qr at prices pr. Thus the approach imputes the utility bounds 
for those countries which do not share common homothetic preferences. 
The second approach to making utility comparisons for countries which do not share 
common homothetic preferences involves modifying the test of HARP itself. The Afriat 
critical cost efficiency index (Afriat (1967, 1972, 1987)) indicates how much each budget 
constraint has to be relaxed in order for the data to be consistent with utility maximisa-
tion. The Afriat efficiency index thus measures the overall "efficiency" of the consumer's 
choice behaviour and in the homothetic context, it is calculated as the smallest propor-
tion of income that the consumer must waste if the data are to be shown to be consistent 
with homothetic preferences. 
Varian (1990, 1993) used the Afriat efficiency index to define an approximate version of 
GARP for testing almost optimising behaviour. Afriat (1972, p.41) proposes a test of e 
cyclical ratio consistency, which is in fact the modified test of HARP employed in this 
chapter, as a test for almost homothetic optimising behaviour. In the present chapter, 
this previous research on testing data for consistency with almost optimising behaviour 
is extended to the construction of approximate multilateral true welfare indexes. In 
particular, an Ideal Afriat Index which incorporates specific levels consumer optimisation 
efficiency is proposed and constructed using ICP data. 
There are two advantages to this approach. First, it enables utility-consistent compar-
isons to be extended to countries which do not satisfy the standard test of HARP. Second, 
the use of the Afriat efficiency index in the construction of multilateral true indexes al-
lows one to evaluate the impact of the presence of optimising error on the welfare ranking 
between countries. In particular, if the pairwise ranking between two countries changes 
under differing assumptions regarding the level of consumer optimisation error ( up to an 
appropriate maximum), then it can be argued that two countries should really be ranked 
as equivalent. 
In this chapter, both the Afriat envelope and Afriat efficiency index approaches to making 
approximate multilateral comparisons are reviewed and implemented in an example. Of 
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the two approaches, the Afriat efficiency index method is preferred since, unlike the Afriat 
envelope approach, it directly tackles the existence of errors in quantities which may be 
leading to the failure of HARP. Under the Afriat envelope approach, we calculate what 
the bounds to the utility of country r would be if that country had the same preferences 
as the countries in 1-l. There is no attempt to model the errors ( either in qr or in the 
consumption bundles of the countries in 1-l) that may be leading to the failure of HARP; 
rather, it is implicitly assumed that the data are accurate and country r simply does not 
share common homothetic preferences. 
In contrast, the Afriat efficiency index approach to approximate multilateral comparisons 
directly models the existence of errors in quantities consumed and calculates the level of 
consumer optimising error that is required for the data to be consistent with approximate 
homothetic utility maximisation. For this reason, the Afriat efficiency index approach is 
preferred to the Afriat envelope approach and it is implemented here with 1980 and 1993 
ICP data. 
It is found that while 42 of the 60 countries in the 1980 data set share common homo-
thetic preference using the standard test of HARP, 59 countries satisfy HARP when 4.2 
percent consumer optimisation error is allowed for. Further, it is shown that two pairs 
of countries (Denmark and Germany, and Belgium and Luxembourg) should perhaps be 
ranked equivalent, since their pairwise rankings change with only moderate levels of con-
sumer optimisation error. While 19 of the 24 OECD countries in the 1993 data set satisfy 
HARP with zero optimisation error, all satisfy HARP when 2 percent optimisation error 
is allowed for. Further, it is found that the rankings of Italy, Australia and the U.K. are 
indeterminate and thus these countries should perhaps be ranked as equivalent. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, the Afriat envelope approach 
to imputing utility bounds is reviewed and implemented using a two-good six-country 
example. The Afriat efficiency index approach to approximate multilateral welfare com-
parisons is presented in Section 4.3 and illustrated using the example data. In Section 
4.4, the Afriat efficiency index approach is applied to the 1980 ICP data, and an applica-
tion to the 1993 ICP data is in Section 4.5. In section 4.6, the conclusions of this chapter 
are presented. 
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4.2 Approximate multilateral Comparisons Using Afriat 
Envelope Functions 
In this section, the Afriat envelope approach to approximate multilateral comparisons is 
described and implemented in an example. A given set of countries can be divided into 
two subsets: the set 1-l which satisfy HARP, and the set R which do not share common 
homothetic preferences with the countries in 1-l. 
4.2.1 Conditional Afriat homothetic envelope functions 
The Afriat numbers calculated as part of the mathematical programming test for com-
mon homothetic preferences ( equation 3.5 in Section 3.2.2) are not unique; underlying 
this is the fact that for any set of homothetic demand data, there will be a whole family 
of homothetic utility functions that are consistent with the data and the utility maximi-
sation hypothesis. The results on constructing Afriat envelope functions in Section 2.4.4 
are now adapted to show that a family of homothetic utility functions may be bounded 
by particular representations of the utility function, known as the inner and outer ho-
mothetic envelope functions for the class of compatible utility functions associated with 
any particular solution to the homothetic Afriat inequalities ( equation 3.3 in Proposition 
3.1). 
The inner homothetic envelope function is a monotonic concave polytope function and 
is defined for a given set of A satisfying the Afriat inequalities (3.3) as: 
(4.1) a1(q,A) = m:x [LAiei: Lqi0i < q , Lei= 1, gi > 0, i E 1-l]. 
iEH iEH iEH 
For a given set of A satisfying the Afriat inequalities (3.3) the outer envelope function is 
a monotonic concave polyhedral function and is defined: 
(4.2) ao(q, A)= m~n[Aivi.q: i E 1-l]. 
7, 
From Proposition 3.1 in Section 2.4.4, the following can be stated: 
Lemma 4.1. a1(q, A) and ao(q, A) are representations of consumer preferences which 
rationalise the demand data. 
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Adapting Result 3.3 in Section 3.2.l to the homothetic case, we can state the following. 
Result 4.1. For a given set of A satisfying (3.3), the functions a1(q, A) and ao(q, A) 
provide, respectively, the inner-bound and outer-bound homothetic representation of con-
sumer preferences: 
a1(q, A) < a(q) < ao(q, A), 
where a( q) is any concave, monotonic, continuous, non-satiated homothetic utility func-
tion that rationalises the data and satisfies a( qi) = Ai for all i E 1-l. 
Result 4.1 shows that a1(q, A) and ao(q, A) provide the widest bounds to all possible 
concave and non-satiated homothetic utility representations of u ( q). However, it should 
be emphasised that these bounds are conditional on a particular set of A satisfying the 
Afriat inequalities (3.3). 
4.2.2 Unconditional Afriat homothetic envelope functions 
The non-uniqueness of the solution to the Afriat inequalities (3.3) implies that the condi-
tional inner and outer homothetic envelope functions presented above will similarly not 
be unique. However, following Chavas and Cox ( 1997), we can calculate unconditional 
bounds for a(q), i.e. bounds that do not depend on the values taken by A. 
The concave function a(q) is only defined up to a positive linear transformation and 
hence, without loss of generality, the Afriat inequalities (3.3) can alternatively be written 
as: 
Ai /AJ < vJ .q\ i,j E 1-l 
(4.3) Ab= 1. 
where Ab is the utility level for some base observation b E 1-l. 
We are now able to define the unconditional homothetic inner bound at point q: 
(4.4) au1(q) = min[a1(q, A) : Eq. (4.3)]. 
A 
The unconditional homothetic outer bound at point q is similarly defined as: 
(4.5) auo(q) = max[ao(q,A): Eq. (4.3)]. 
A 
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Result 4.2. Given (4.3), the functions au1(q) in (4.4) and auo(q) in (4.5) provide, re-
spectively, the unconditional inner- and outer-bound homothetic representations of con-
sumer preferences at point q: 
au1(q) < a(q) < auo(q). 
Result 4.2 shows that the functions au1(q) and auo(q) provide the widest possible bounds 
on all possible concave and non-satiated homothetic utility representations of u( q); be-
cause these bounds are constructed using 3rd party comparisons, they will generally be 
tighter than the fixed-weight (P-1) bounds (and cannot be wider than these bounds) . 
Chavas and Cox (1997) presented mathematical programming methods for calculating 
wu1(q) and wuo(q) (the unconditional bounds to consumer preferences in the general 
case) and constructing the implied money metric utility bounds (see Section 2.4.4 for 
details). However, with homotheticity, the money metric utility bounds are provided 
directly from au1(q) and auo(q) that is , it is not necessary to take the additional step of 
constructing inner and outer expenditure functions. Further, the functions au I ( q) and 
auo ( q) are easily constructed using the elements of the minimum path matrix M . 
Proposition 4.1. The unconditional homothetic inner and outer bound envelope func-
tions are calculated as, respectively: 
(4.6) au1(q) = m;x [ L exp(-Mib)0i : L qi0i < q, L 0i = l , 0i > 0, i E 1-l ] 
iE1-l iE1-l i E1-l 
( 4. 7) auo ( q) = m~n[exp(Mbi)v2 .q : i E 1-l], 
i 
where Mij is the ij th element of the minimum path matrix, M , 1-l is the set of countries 
which share common homothetic preferences, and Ab = l. 
PROOF: For a data set which is consistent with homotheticity, the definition of M (see 
Section 3.3) implies that exp( -Mib) is a tight lower bound to Ai when Ab = l. Thus the 
numbers exp(-M.b) form a vector of tight lower bounds to the utility of the homothetic 
countries when Ab= l, and the unconditional homothetic inner bound envelope function 
( 4.5) follows. 
Similarly, the number exp(Mbi) gives the upper bound to Ai consistent with the data 
being rationalised by a homothetic utility function and Ab = l. Thus the unconditional 
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homothetic outer bound envelope function can be constructed using the bth row of M as 
( 4. 7) .• 
For q == q\ the value of the unconditional homothetic inner bound envelope function 
will be au1(qi) = exp(-Mib)- Similarly, it is apparent that since vi.qi= 1, auo(qi) = 
exp(Mbi) , for all i E 1-l. Further, as now shown, au1(q) and auo(q) can be used to 
construct lower- and upper-bounds to the utility of countries which are not in i E 1-l (and 
are thus not represented in the minimum path matrix). 
4.2.3 Imputing utility bounds 
The unconditional homothetic inner and outer envelope functions can be used to impute 
utility for countries which do not share common homothetic preferences. For any county 
r in R , au1(qr) and auo(qr) provide the bounds to the utility that the representative 
consumer ( whose preferences are homothetic and consistent with observations in the set 
1-l) would enjoy if he or she consumed the bundle qr, even though the consumer in fact 
would not have chosen bundle qr at prices pr . 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) propose using a variant of (4.7) to impute utility for those 
countries which cannot be included in a homothetic representation of the data either 
because of missing price information or because of inconsistent preferences. However, 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) suggest using the Ideal Afriat Index in ( 4. 7) rather than 
elements of M, that is, they define the following utility function: 
L(qr) = ~in(a*i + Lir), 
iE1-l 
where r is a country in R. This function returns a*i for observations within 1-l and an 
imputed utility ( the minimum of the Laspeyres valuations) for those observations in R. 
However, this function will only define an upper bound to the Ideal Afriat Index for the 
countries not in 1-l. Dowrick, Dunlop, and Quiggin (1995) therefore propose the following 
counterpart utility function: 
P(qr) = max(a*i - Lri), 
iE1-l 
which again returns a*i for observations within 1-l and an imputed utility ( the maximum 
of the Paasche valuations) for those observations not in 1-l. Dowrick, Dunlop, and Quiggin 
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(1995) further define the midpoint of these two functions: 
A*(qr) = [L(qr) + P(qr)]/2, 
as an extension of the Ideal Afriat Index to include observations which do not fit the 
homothetic representation. 
Note, however, that the function P( q) is not the unconditional inner envelope function 
( 4.6), and indeed, it is not apparent that it necessarily provides a representation of 
consumer preferences. Further, while by construction it must be that au1(q) < auo(q) , 
as Dowrick, Dunlop, and Quiggin (1995) note, for a particular country r not in 1l it is 
not necessarily the case that P(qr) < L(qr). If the aim of the utility imputation is to 
approximate homothetic behaviour for those countries not in 1l then the above finding 
is problematic. 1 
An alternative method of constructing A* ( q) is to use the unconditional inner envelope 
function to construct the lower bound to the Ideal Afriat Index, that is, to construct: 
P(qr) = m;x [L a*i0i: L qi0i < qr, L 0i = 1, 0i > OJ. 
iE1-£ iE7-l iE7-l 
This ensures P( qr) < L( qr), however there is still the remaining problem that the re-
sulting index A* ( qr) measures the utility of country r relative to the mean welfare level 
calculated only over the homothetic countries. 
4.2.4 The Augmented Ideal Afriat Index 
An alternative approach is to use the elements of the minimum path matrix (which, by 
definition, is constructed only over the countries in 1-l) to impute utility bounds using ( 4.6) 
and ( 4. 7). This leads to the construction of an "augmented" minimum path matrix, Ma, 
which includes all countries. The Augmented Ideal Afriat Index can then be constructed 
from Ma, and it will measure utility relative to the welfare of all countries in the sample. 
Definition 4.1. THE AUGMENTED IDEAL AFRIAT INDEX: For a given set of coun-
tries, let 1l represent the subset which satisfy HARP and R represent the subset which 
do not satisfy HARP. Using the minimum path matrix M ( calculated for countries in 
1 Another problem with this method is that it requires pr and thus the method cannot be used if pr 
has some missing elements. 
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1-l), utility bounds can be imputed for the countries in n via (4.6) and (4.7). Let Ma 
represent the augmented minimum path matrix which contains the elements from M 
and the utility bounds imputed for the countries in n. Let aa+ = ( c1, c2 , ... , cN) and 
aa- = ( -r1, -r2, ... , -rN) represent the vector of column means and the vector of 
negative row means, respectively, of Ma. Define the Augmented Ideal Afriat Index as 
aa* = ( aa+ + aa-) /2, the vector of overall means. 
The properties and interpretation of the Augmented Ideal Afriat Index are analogous to 
that of the Ideal Afriat Index (see Proposition 3.4). 
4.2.5 Utility approximation with the Afriat envelope approach - exam-
ple 
In Section 3.3.4, the minimum path matrix and Ideal Afriat Index were constructed for 
a two-good five-country example data set. The elements of M can be used to graph the 
unconditional homothetic inner and outer bound envelope functions using the approach 
outlined above. For this example, the unconditional envelope functions are constructed 
using country 3 as the base and hence aur(q) is constructed using M.3 (Figures 4.1 and 
4.2) , while auo( q) is constructed using M 3. and is shown in Figure 4.3. Together, the 
unconditional envelope functions bound all possible homothetic utility functions that are 
consistent with the data and normalised so that A 3 = l. The unconditional inner and 
outer bounds to the indifference curve passing through q3 are shown in Figure 4.4; any 
(normalised) indifference curve for country 3 must pass within these bounds. 
The Afriat envelope method of approximating utility can be illustrated by adding an 
extra country in the above example. As shown in Section 3.2.3, with country 6 included 
in the analysis (where p 6 = {1/3, 1} and q 6 = {4.5, 2.5} ), the data no longer satisfy 
HARP (this is because of a revealed preference violation between countries 2 and 6). 
However, utility consistent welfare comparisons may still be made for all six countries by 
using the elements of M ( calculated for countries 1 to 5) to impute utility for country 6 
via the functions aur(q) and au0 (q). The approximate utility bounds for country 6 can 
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then be "appended" to M to form an augmented minimum path matrix: 
0.000 1.153 0.511 0.693 0.614 0.847 
-0.827 0.000 -0.470 -0.134 -0.539 -0.234 
, -0.357 0.642 0.000 0.336 0.103 0.336 Ma= 
I 
-0.568 0.585 -0.057 0.000 0.046 0.279 
-0.073 0.754 0.284 0.620 0.000 0.520 
-0.593 0.305 -0.236 0.100 -0.234 0.000 
The matrix Ma can be used to make multilateral consistent bilateral comparisons includ-
ing country 6, even though this country does not share common homothetic preferences, 
and hence a representative consumer would not consume q6 when facing prices p 6 . For 
example, from Ma it is apparent that if the consumer were to consume q6 , then the 
utility gained is estimated to be at most e0·336 = 1.399 and at least e0·236 = 1.266 times 
the utility gained from consuming q3 . Multilaterally consistent multilateral comparisons 
can then be made for the six countries by constructing the Augmented Ideal Afriat Index 
(see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Augmented Ideal Afriat Index and bounds 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Country 5 Country 6 
aa* 
-0.447 0.497 -0.013 0.184 -0.221 0.256 
aa-
-0.564 0.386 -0.110 0.014 -0.368 0.142 
aa+ 
-0.329 0.608 0.084 0.354 -0.074 0.370 
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Approximate multilateral Comparisons Using the Afriat 
Efficiency Index 
It has been shown that the Afriat envelope functions can be used to impute utility bounds 
for countries which do not share common homothetic preferences. Thus, it is possible to 
make multilaterally consistent welfare comparisons for all countries in a data set, even 
if HARP is not satisfied for the entire set of countries. While this may be useful in 
applied work, a potential limitation of the approach is that it does not directly address 
the reasons why a particular country may not share common homothetic preferences. In 
particular, there is an implicit assumption that there is no measurement or consumer 
optimisation error and if a country is not included in the set of homothetic countries 
then this is because that country truly does not share common homothetic preferences. 
Thus, the · Afriat envelope approach to imputing utility can really be seen as an extension 
to the "all or nothing" RP approach, and does not address the presence of errors in the 
consumption vector which may lead the failure of HARP . 
In reality, however, it is to be expected that the quantities used in multilateral compar-
isons are subject to measurement and consumer optimisation error. In the example of 
the previous section, the failure of country 6 to share common homothetic preferences 
could be due to the representative consumer in country 6 not successfully consuming the 
. 
Marshallian demand bundle, or error in measuring exactly what the consumer purchased. 
For that matter, it could be the presence of errors in the consumption vector for country 
2 which are leading to the revealed preference violation with country 6, yet the Afriat 
envelope approach to imputing utility does not allow for this. 
An approach which does directly address the existence of measurement and consumer 
optimisation error involves the concept of the Afriat critical cost efficiency index of Afriat 
(1967, 1972, 1987), which shows how much each budget constraint has to be relaxed in 
order for the data to be consistent with utility maximisation. In the homothetic context, 
the Afriat efficiency index is calculated as the smallest proportion of income that the 
consumer must waste if the data are to be shown to be consistent with homothetic 
preferences. In constructing approximate multilateral welfare comparisons using the 
Afriat efficiency index, the researcher must decide how much consumer optimising error 
is considered acceptable; as suggested by Varian (1990), the "magic number" used in 
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significance tests in econometrics, 5 percent, is probably a reasonable guide. Note that in 
using this approach, one is implicitly assuming that the only source of error is consumer 
optimisation error ( and thus the presence of any measurement error will be treated as 
consumer optimisation error). 
4.3.1 Approximate revealed preference tests 
Varian (1990, 1993) used results from Afriat (1967, 1972) to define an approximate version 
of GARP for testing "almost optimising behaviour". In this sub section, these results 
are first reviewed then, following Afriat ( 1972), applied to the special case of homothetic 
preferences to define an approximate test of "almost optimising" homothetic behaviour. 
General preferences 
The revealed preference concepts introduced in Section 2.2.1 can be modified to take 
account of the presence of consumer optimisation error. 
Definition 4.2. Let ei for i EN be numbers with O < ei < l. 
1. qi is directly revealed preferred to q at efficiency level ei (qi RD ( ei)q) if eipi .qi > 
pi.q,-2 
2. qi is revealed preferred to q ( qi R( ei)q) at efficiency level ei if eipi .qi > pi .qJ , 
ej p-i .qj > pi .qk , ... , empm .qm > pm .q for some sequence of observations 
(qi, qj, ... , q). In this case the relation R( ei) is said to be the transitive closure 
of the relation RD ( ei). 
The parameter ei is the Afriat efficiency index for observation i. It shows how much less 
the potential expenditure on a bundle qj has to be before it will be revealed worse than 
the observed choice qi. Thus, if ei is 0.9 and qj would cost only 5 percent less than the 
cost of qi, we would not consider this a significant enough difference in cost to conclude 
that qi is preferred by the consumer to qj. Therefore, we are allowing the consumer to 
have a "margin of error" of ( 1 - ei). 
2 Note that RD (1) is the standard direct revealed preference relation. 
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Given the above, we can now make a definition of GARP which incorporates consumer 
optimisation error: 
Definition 4.3. The data satisfy GARP(ei) if qiR(ei)qJ implies eJpJ.qj < p-7.qi. 
If ei = 1 then we have the standard test of GARP, while if ei = 0 then the data will 
trivially satisfy the test. A measure of the overall efficiency of optimising behaviour in 
the data set can be found by finding how close the ei must be to 1 for the data to satisfy 
GARP(ei). 
Afriat (1967) proposed using a uniform bound in the calculation of the efficiency index. 
That is, let ei = eJ for all i, j E N and then find the largest number e* such that 
qiR(e*)qJ implies e*p-7.qi < pJ.qi.3 The number e* is the Afriat critical cost efficiency 
index, and it measures how much every budget constraint must be relaxed in order for 
the data to appear to be consistent with utility maximisation. The Afriat efficiency index 
indicates that the consumer is "wasting" a fraction 1 - e* of income at each observation. 
If e* is close to one, the consumer is wasting very little income, while if e* is small then 
the consumer is wasting quite a lot of income. In this sense, e* measures the overall 
"efficiency" of the consumer's choice behaviour. 
Homothetic preferences 
The test of e cyclical ratio consistency proposed by Afriat (1972, p.42) is an application 
of the above results to the special case of homothetic preferences and thus defines a test 
of approximate homothetic behaviour. Afriat's test modifies HARP to account for the 
presence of consumer optimisation error in the following way: 
Definition 4.4. 'rhe data satisfy HARP(ei) if for all distinct choices of indexes 
(.. ) h (vi9j) (vjqk) (vmqi) 1 . l l ( i J) ( j k) ( m i)> i, J, .. . , m we ave ~i ej . . . e,.;,, > , or equiva ent y, v .q v .q ... v .q _ 
i J m e e . .. e . 
If, as before, one is employing a uniform efficiency number e, the test of HARP ( e) is 
easily implemented by constructing the minimum path matrix incorporating a particular 
3In order to identify which observations are leading to revealed preference violations Varian (1993) 
suggested an approach for calculating observation-specific efficiency indexes i.e. ei # ej for all i , j E N. 
In the present context , where the goal is the construction of multilateral true indexes rather than the 
identification of observations failing HARP, it seems appropriate to use a uniform bound in the calculation 
of the efficiency index. 
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level of the Afriat efficiency index, which can be denoted Me. This matrix is constructed 
by applying Warshall's algorithm to a modified matrix of log Laspeyres indexes: {L[j} = 
(vi.qi/ e). If all elements on the diagonal of Me are non-negative, then the data satisfy 
HARP ( e). As above, one can define a uniform efficiency bound e* which is the largest 
number such that HARP(e*) is satisfied. If e* is close to 1 then the observed choice 
behaviour can be said to be efficient. 4 Alternatively, one can say that there only need 
to exist a small level of optimisation error for the data to be consistent with homothetic 
preferences. Note that the interpretation of e* is slightly different to that used in the 
non-homothetic case. If HARP(e*) is satisfied then we can say that the data satisfy 
homotheticity when the level of consumer optimisation error is (1/e* - 1)100 percent. 
For example, HARP(0.909) implies an optimisation error level of (1/0.909 - 1)100 ~ 10 
percent. 
4.3.2 The Approximate Ideal Afriat Index 
The Afriat efficiency index approach to conducting tests of approximate homotheticity 
can be extended to the construction of an approximate multilateral true welfare index. 
Definition 4.5. THE APPROXIMATE IDEAL AFRIAT INDEX: Let a+(e*) = (c1 ' c2 ' ... 'cN) 
and a-( e*) = ( -r1, -r2 , ••• , -rN) represent the vector of column means and the vector 
of negative row means, respectively, of the minimum path matrix incorporating the Afriat 
critical cost efficiency level e*, M( e*). Define the Approximate Ideal Afriat Index as 
a*(e*) = (a+(e*) + a-(e*))/2, the vector of overall means. 
The properties and interpretation of the Approximate Ideal Afriat Index are analogous 
to that of the Ideal Afriat Index (see Proposition 3.4). 
4.3.3 Example 1 
The approach for incorporating optimisation error into welfare comparisons can be illus-
trated using the simple three country example in Figure 4.5. 
For these data, the matrix of log Laspeyres indexes and the minimum path matrix are 
4 Note that if e* = 0, any set of data will be consistent with homotheticity. 
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Figure 4.5: Three countries that do not share homothetic preferences 
respectively: 5 
0.000 1.365 0.981 
L = I -0. 736 0.000 -0.234 
-0.405 0.189 0.000 
0.000 1.170 0.936 
M = I -0. 780 -0.044 -0.278 
-0.591 0.145 -0.044 
These data do not satisfy homotheticity and this is indicated by the fact that two 
of the diagonal elements of the minimum path matrix are negative ( for example, 
M33 = L32 + L23 = -0.044). It is now shown how the presence of optimisation error 
can be incorporated into the data and thus how the data can be made to approximate 
homothetici ty. 
5Note that the minimum path algorithm in Varian (1983) would result in an M which is slightly 
different to that shown here. The algorithm used in the present example is changed for heuristic purposes 
(not e, however that the different algorithms will not result in different minimum path matrices when 
HARP is satisfied, nor will they differ in whether a given data set satisfies HARP). 
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Assume that consumers have homothetic preferences but they do not optimise their con-
sumption perfectly and hence are not able to achieve their Marshallian demand bundles. 
In particular, assume that the level of optimisation error is approximately 10 percent. 
In practical terms this means that if consumers optimised without error then they could 
have achieved the same level of utility spending 10 percent less of their budget, or al-
ternatively, given the presence of optimisation error, consumers would have to spend 10 
percent more of their budget to achieve the utility they would gain from consuming the 
Marshallian demand bundle. 
From (3.3) in Proposition 3.1, the Laspeyres index vi .qj gives an upper bound to Aj /Ai. 
With 10 percent optimisation error, all the Laspeyres indexes are increased by 10 percent, 
creating a new matrix of error-inclusive Laspeyres indexes { L?3909 } = vi .qj x 1.1. The 
interpretation is that for a given country j, the presence of optimising error means that q1 
is not the Marshallian demand. With perfect optimisation, the consumption of qj would 
give utility Aj, however the presence of optimising error (and homothetic preferences) 
means that the vector qj x 1.1 would need to be consumed to achieve Aj. The Marshallian 
demand for consumer j is then found by finding the consumption bundle on j's budget 
constraint that will cost pi .qJ x 1.1. 
For the above example, the cost of country 2's consumption vector at country 3's prices 
is p3 .q2 = 4.833, but with 10 percent optimisation error the value of the Marshallian 
demand at country 3's prices is in fact p 3 .q2 x 1.1 = 5.316. Thus, as shown in Figure 
4.6, the Marshallian demand for country 2 can be shown to be q 2M,3 where the notation 
indicates that p 3 was used in the determination of this bundle. The Marshallian demand 
for country 3 using p 2 can similarly be constructed (Figure 4. 7). Note, however, that 
q 2M,3 is not the only Marshallian demand for country 2 implied by the data - another 
demand bundle, q 2M,1, can be found using country l's prices as shown in Figure 4.8. 
With optimisation error of 10 percent the data will now satisfy HARP. This can be 
seen by applying the minimum path algorithm to the modified matrix of log Laspeyres 
indexes: 
0.000 1.461 1.076 
L0 ·909 = I -0.640 0.000 -0.138 
-0.310 0.285 0.000 
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Figure 4.6: Finding country 2's Marshallian demand using p 3 
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Figure 4.7: Finding country 3's Marshallian demand using p 2 
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Figure 4.8: Country 2's Marshallian demands implied by p 1 and p 3 
The minimum path matrix for these data is: 
0.000 1.361 1.076 
M0 ·909 = I -0.640 0.000 -0.138 
-0.356 0.285 0.000 
As there are no negatives on the diagonal, the data satisfy HARP (in particular, note 
that L~l09 + L~i09 = 0.147). 
The elements of M 0-909 provide the tightest possible bounds to the welfare index con-
ditional on the presence of 10 percent optimisation error. For example, the element 
M 0-909 which is constructed as min{L0-909 L0-909 + L0-909 } - -0 356 gives the tight-31 , 31 , 32 21 - · , 
est upper bound estimate of A 1 / A 3 . Note that this upper bound is less tight than the 
fixed-weight bound with no optimisation error (L31 = -0.405) - but since the data do 
not satisfy homotheticity when there is no optimisation error, it is not clear in that 
case what the fixed-weight bound provides an upper bound to. The construction of this 
upper bound is illustrated in Figure 4.9. The Marshallian demand of country 1, calcu-
lated using p 2 is denoted q 1M,2 and is the bundle on country 1 's constraint such that 
p 2 .q1M,2 = p 2 .q1 x 1.1 = 3.163. With both q 1M,2 and q 2M,3 determined, the outer bound 
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to country 3's indifference curve, auo(q), is constructed in the figure in the same manner 
as when there is no optimisation error (see, for example, Section 3.3.1). 
q2 
'~----- auo(aj 
\ 
6 
4 
3.2 r·-.... 
.... 
·- ........ 
··-
------------- .. _ 
q 2 ··-
"•...-.. ......... 
2 
0 2 4 6 8 Q1 
Figure 4.9: Constructing auo ( q) for country 3, 10 % optimisation error 
4.3.4 Example 2 
The Afriat efficiency index approach to approximate welfare comparisons is now illus-
trated using the six-country example data. These countries do not satisfy HARP and 
the question is: what is the minimum level of consumer optimisation error which leads to 
the data satisfying HARP? This question is answered by using a grid search procedure: 
e is initially set equal to 1, and then in each step is decreased by 0.005 and HARP(e) is 
tested. 6 The process was continued until HARP ( e) is satisfied, and using this method, 
the data were found to satisfy HARP(0.975). That is, if the consumer is allowed to 
make optimisation error of 2.6 percent, then the data are consistent with homothetic 
preferences. 
6Houtman and Maks (1987) suggested an alternative search procedure (which is µiore accurate than 
the one used in the present chapter). Start with e = 1 and test for HARP. If the data do not satisfy 
HARP, try e = 1/2. If e = 1/2 doesn't work, try e = 1/4. If the data do satisfy HARP with e = 1/2, 
try e = 3/4 and so on. After n revealed preference tests, one will be within 1/2n of the actual efficiency 
index. 
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The minimum path matrix for e* = 0.975 is: 
0.000 1.112 0.536 0.718 0.453 · 0.898 
-0.776 0.000 -0.445 -0.058 -0.653 -0.208 
M0.975 = I -0.331 0.576 0.000 0.387 -0.083 0.362 
-0.543 0.570 -0.007 0.000 -0.089 0.355 
0.003 0.779 0.334 0.722 0.000 0.571 
-0.561 0.215 -0.230 0.157 -0.445 0.000 
The process of the constructing the Afriat efficiency index can be further understood by 
comparing the unconditional homothetic outer bound to country 3's indifference curve 
( constructed using the elements of M 0·975 above) with the outer bound constructed from 
M calculated for countries 1-5 (where HARP(l) is satisfied - this is auo(q) in Figure 
4.4). In Figure 4.10 it is apparent that the shape of the unconditional homothetic outer 
bound constructed from M 0·975 is altered so as to incorporate all the countries in the 
sample. The expansion paths indicate that the Marshallian demand bundles are different 
to the quantities actually consumed - the utility maximising bundles have "shifted" so 
that they are on the expansion paths that are consistent with HARP(0.975). 
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Figure 4.10: auo(q) for country 3, constructed using HARP(0.975) and HARP(l) 
Approximate multilateral welfare comparisons can be made using the Approximate Ideal 
Afriat Index calculated from M 0·975 (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index and bounds, e* = 0.975 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Country 5 Country 6 
a * (0.975) -0.494 0.449 -0.060 0.137 -0.269 0.237 
a- (o.975) -0.620 0.357 -0.152 -0.048 -0.401 0.144 
a+ (0.975) -0.368 0.542 0.032 0.321 -0.136 0.330 
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4.4 Application to 1980 ICP Data 
For reasons discussed above, the Afriat efficiency index approach is considered a prefer-
able method for making approximate multilateral welfare comparisons. In this section, 
the Afriat efficiency index approach is applied to the 1980 ICP data. 
As discussed in Section 3.4, the standard test of homothetic preferences, HARP(l), was 
only satisfied for 42 of the 60 countries in the 1980 data set (the Ideal Afriat Index 
and implied rankings are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.3 (these numbers are 
reproduced from Table 3.2). The set of 42 countries that satisfy HARP was found by 
first arbitrarily choosing a subset of four countries (Argentina, Austria, Botswana and 
the U.S .) and then iteratively adding countries to this subset if they satisfy HARP. A 
problem with this procedure for finding the largest set of countries satisfying HARP is 
that the choice of the initial four countries will influence the composition of the final set 
of countries ( as will the order of selection of the remaining countries for testing) . This 
problem is avoided by introducing consumer optimisation error into the test of HARP, 
since this will reduce the likelihood that a country is found to reject homotheticity because 
of the presence of another country in the set of homothetic countries. 
As outlined above, a step procedure can be used to determine the maximum level of 
e* which will allow a particular country to be consistent with homotheticity. This step 
procedure was applied to each of the 18 countries which do not satisfy HARP(l) . From 
column 4 of Table 4.3 it is apparent that seven countries (Italy, Nigeria, Poland, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe) will each be able join the set of homothetic countries 
when e* = 0.995. This implies only a very small level of consumer optimisation error of 
0.5 percent. Note, however, that not all seven countries will necessarily join the set of 
homothetic countries when e* is set to 0.995 since there is likely to be inconsistencies of 
preferences amongst these countries which will not be resolved unless a smaller level of 
e* (and thus higher level of optimisation error) is set. It is also apparent from column 
4 that some countries require a large level of optimisation error before they are found 
to share common homothetic preferences; the Dominican Republic, for example requires 
e* = 0.96. 
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a* 
~rgentina 0.382 
Austria 1.156 
Belgium 1.262 
Bolivia -0.527 
Botswana -0.840 
Brazil 0.398 
Cameroon -1.148 
Canada 1.445 
Chile 0.278 
Colombia 0.093 
Costa Rica 0.245 
Ivory coast -0.895 
Denmark 1.275 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador -0.196 
El Salvador -0.452 
Ethiopia -2.046 
Finland 0.933 
France 1.221 
Germany FR 1.273 
Greece 0.574 
Guatemala -0.054 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 1.000 
Hungary 0.490 
India 
-1.646 
Indonesia 
-0.990 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Table 4.3: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index for different e*, 1980 
rank e* a* (0.99) rank e* a* (0.98) rank e* a* (0.97) rank e* a* (0.96) rank e* 
19 0.382 22 0.408 24 0.441 25 0.427 26 
8 1.154 9 1.166 9 1.203 9 1.205 9 
5 1.270 4 1.275 4 1.312 5 1.306 6 
29 -0.529 33 -0.521 38 -0.436 38 -0.479 41 
32 -0.840 36 -0.841 42 -0.830 43 -0.847 45 
18 0.408 21 0.417 23 0.467 23 0.443 25 
35 -1.153 39 -1.145 46 -1.114 47 -1.139 49 
2 1.442 2 1.447 2 1.491 2 1.486 2 
20 0.289 24 0.312 27 0.315 27 0.305 28 
22 0.081 26 0.101 29 0.129 29 0.117 30 
21 0.260 25 0.257 28 0.288 28 0.288 29 
33 -0.901 37 -0.897 43 -0.839 44 -0.856 46 
3 1.267 5 1.274 5 1.317 4 1.318 4 
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 -0.136 35 
26 -0.189 30 -0.188 33 -0.161 34 -0.168 36 
28 -0.457 32 -0.460 37 -0.443 39 -0.452 40 
42 -2.052 48 -2.059 55 -2.042 57 -2.053 59 
12 0.939 14 0.924 15 0.962 15 0.967 15 
7 1.229 7 1.240 7 1.280 7 1.281 7 
4 1.285 3 1.295 3 1.334 3 1.335 3 
13 0.563 16 0.568 18 0.633 18 0.603 19 
23 -0.062 27 -0.063 30 -0.028 30 -0.046 31 
0.985 0.965 0.965 0.96 0.94 
10 0.991 12 0.997 13 1.042 13 1.020 13 
16 0.486 19 0.482 21 0.523 21 0.530 22 
39 -1.643 44 -1.628 51 -1.581 52 -1.612 54 
34 -0.974 38 -0.984 44 -0.916 45 -0.936 47 
0.99 0.666 15 0.674 17 0.711 17 0.721 17 
0.975 0.975 0.96 0.96 0.693 18 
0.995 1.081 11 1.089 12 1.137 11 1.138 12 
a* 
Japan 0.948 
Kenya -1.448 
Korea -0.212 
Luxembourg 1.253 
Madagascar -1.357 
Malawi -1.950 
Mali 
Morocco -0.761 
Netherlands 
Nigeria 
Norway 1.090 
Pakistan 
Panama -0.076 
Paraguay 
Peru -0.084 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 0.465 
Senegal -1.160 
Spain 
Sri Lanka -0.653 
U.R. Tanzania 
Tunisia 
U.K. 
U.S. 1.456 
Uruguay 0.540 
Venezuela 0.527 
Yugoslavia 
Zambia -1.810 
Zimbabwe 
Table 4.3: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index for different e*, 1980 (cont.) 
rank e* a* (0.99) rank e* a* (0.98) rank e* a* (0.97) rank e* a* (0.96) rank e* 
11 0.952 13 0.953 14 0.994 14 0.989 14 
38 -1.462 43 -1.469 50 -1.456 51 -1.477 53 
27 -0.220 31 -0.213 34 -0.172 35 -0.200 37 
6 1.264 6 1.274 6 1.311 6 1.306 5 
37 -1.369 42 -1.396 49 -1.356 50 -1.366 52 
41 -1.947 46 -1.963 53 -1.936 55 -1.971 57 
0.975 0.975 0.975 -1.920 54 -1.951 56 
31 -0.783 35 -0.774 41 -0.724 42 -0.725 44 
0.99 1.192 8 1.197 8 1.247 8 1.239 8 
0.995 -1.271 41 -1.283 48 -1.253 49 -1.279 51 
9 1.087 10 1.093 11 1.135 12 1.138 11 
0.99 0.98 -0.727 40 -0.698 41 -0.699 43 
24 -0.071 28 -0.074 31 -0.048 31 -0.057 32 
0.985 0.975 0.975 -0.110 33 -0.115 34 
25 -0.101 29 -0.089 32 -0.059 32 -0.076 33 
0.99 0.985 -0.343 36 -0.306 37 -0.314 39 
0.995 0.985 0.408 25 0.445 24 0.468 24 
17 0.448 20 0.467 22 0.501 22 0.519 23 
36 -1.162 40 -1.170 47 -1.141 48 -1.165 50 
0.99 0.985 0.849 16 0.897 16 0.904 16 
30 -0.644 34 -0.637 39 -0.602 40 -0.613 42 
0.995 -2.010 47 -2.019 54 -1.996 56 -2.012 58 
0.995 0.985 -0.296 35 -0.260 36 -0.264 38 
0.99 0.985 1.107 10 1.147 10 1.148 10 
1 1.465 1 1.466 1 1.507 1 1.507 1 
14 0.547 17 0.550 19 0.579 19 0.575 20 
15 0.536 18 0.536 20 0.540 20 0.539 21 
0.995 0.349 23 0.356 26 0.395 26 0.395 27 
40 -1.794 45 -1.807 52 -1.745 53 -1.768 55 
0.995 0.985 -1.131 45 -1.110 46 -1.136 48 
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A test of HARP (0.99) was conducted next and 48 countries were found to share com-
mon approximate homothetic preferences. 7 The Ideal Afriat Index and implied country 
rankings for e* = 0.99 are shown in columns 5 and 6. This process was continued until 
all countries except the Dominican Republic were found to share common approximate 
homothetic preferences. The Afriat efficiency index required to show the 59 countries 
being rationalised by an approximate homothetic utility function was e* = 0.96. This 
implies a level of consumer optimisation error of 4.2 percent. To bring the Dominican 
Republic into the set of homothetic countries would require e* = 0.94; this implies a level 
of optimisation error which is greater than the 5 percent which has been suggested as an 
appropriate upper limit . 
One of the problems with the use of the standard Ideal Afriat Index is that it is not 
possible to assess the significance of pairwise rankings between particular countries. For 
example, in column 2 of Table 4.3 the Ideal Afriat Index for Denmark-is 1.275 and the 
welfare level for Germany is 1.273. The question is: how confident are we that Denmark 
is truly ranked higher than Germany? While the use of the Approximate Ideal Afriat 
Index does not enable the construction of confidence intervals around the welfare indexes, 
it can be used to identify pairwise rankings which change under differing assumptions 
regarding the level of consumer optimisation error. 
In Figure 4.11 the rankings of the 42 countries which satisfied HARP(l) are shown under 
differing assumptions regarding the level of e*. Note that the countries are arranged along 
the horizontal axi.s according to their ranking implied by the standard Ideal Afriat Index 
( e.g., that shown in column 3 in Table 4.3). This figure can be used to easily identify 
those countries which experience a change in their pairwise rankings under differing 
levels of the Afriat efficiency index ( a ''dip'' in a line in the figure is evidence of such a 
change). For example, while Denmark is ranked higher than Germany withe* = 1, this 
ranking is reversed with an Afriat efficiency index as high as 0.99 (which implies only 
1 percent optimisation error). One can therefore conclude that Denmark and Germany 
should perhaps be ranked as equivalent. Of the 42 countries found to satisfy HARP(l), 
the pairwise ranking between four other countries (Belgium and Luxembourg, and El 
Salvador and Bolivia) change under differing assumptions regarding the level of e*. 
7Note that the iterative procedure used to select the 48 countries started with an initial subset of the 
42 countries which satisfy HARP(l), not the subset of four countries used previously. 
4.4. Application to 1980 ICP Data 
30 ,--,---,--,.--,----,--,--r--r---r-----r--,---,-~-...---...--.---.----,--.--.---, 
25 
20 
b015 
s::::: ;.g 
s::::: 
~ 
1-4 
10 
5 
,,,, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,:, 
.,,,,...,,,.,,. 
,, 
,.,, 
, 
,,,, 
;:,,.,,.,' 
1/'/. ,~ ,,,,,.,, 
,,,,,,...,," 
,,,,,,,' 
,/ 
e · = 
e* = 
e* -
e* -
~ 
---?IE---
~ 
---... ---
0 .____._____.____.__..___...._____.____,_____,__~--.L-----'------1--.I...-...L...--1------1--.1....--...L...---I....---'--'----' 
\) :o· ~~~ (§"f> ~~-"'~~ dj~ ~v'(; ~i"~~~1 a~~ ~~~\.~~b, ~~v~ ~~~ ~~~ (§~ ~~ ~i~ i"'~~~~~~"'v~ C?~ ~~ ~~~~ ~ ~,~ 't-.._~':J~a ~ ~~~-"'~ G' ,~~ ~~ ~~~ ~\~ ~, '(;~ u ~ 
-<v~ ~~ y <Si~ V \- ~~ ~ \) ,,'(;~ ~ ~0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ V ~ 
Figure 4.11: True welfare rankings calculated for different e*, 1980 
60 ,-----,--...--.---.----,-~-..----.---.--,---r----,r----..--...--.---,----,--r--r--,---r--, 
55 
50 
,,T' 
.,,.,,,.,,,11(" 
,,, 
, .. ,,,✓ 
,.,,,.,, 
>,,...,,., 
Ji<. 
/ 
.,x',,,,. 
,,T'' 
.,,.,,,,,,,' 
,;,, 
,.,,,,✓ 
)I( 
,)I( 
45 
bO 
,,, .. // 
,.,,.. 
,,,.,,,' 
s::::: ;.g 
S::::: 40 
~ 
1-4 
35 
30 
,,.,.,,', 
.,,,,, 
.,.,, 
, 
/ 
,,.,/ 
,, .. /',..; .. 
~,, y. . .111'-
, 
,,,r 
;,,'' 
/Yi'-.... ,71_ / /_)I( 
e · -
*-e = 
e* = 
e* = 
~ 
- - • ?IE- - -
~ 
___ .,. __ _ 
25 .__.____.____.._..__...____,1,_----1, _ _,___,J,__._____,J'---...J.._---L-___J.-.l...--'----l...----l-::i:::....:::.:.i...==i::::::;::_J 
~o-"~:i~:c,-"~::-,~t0t:c,ti'~~t;o~~""~0:~~::,~:"~~~,{~-'~~"~~~~~"t0~~" 
(;0 r,~\j \. V s~ c..'\" ~r -0.0 ~ . '~,~'v> r~"' -.,J ~\j V ~r % 
u • -.) v\~a \. u f~ 
Figure 4.11: True welfare rankings calculated for different e*, 1980 (cont.) 
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4.5 Application to 1993 ICP Data 
The Afriat efficiency index approach to making approximate multilateral welfare com-
parisons is now applied to the 1993 ICP data on 24 OECD countries. As discussed in 
Section 3.5, not all 24 countries share common homothetic preferences, and the iterative 
approach resulted in a maximum of 19 countries sharing common homothetic preferences; 
the Ideal Afriat Index and ranking based on this index and the implied ranking of coun-
tries are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.4 (these are reproduced from Table 
3.3). 
For the 5 countries which do not satisfy HARP, the step procedure was used to determine 
the maximum level of e* which will allow each country to individually join the set of 
homothetic countries. As shown in Table 4.4, the Netherlands and Turkey each join 
the set of homothetic countries when e* = 0.995, while an Afriat efficiency index of 
0.98 (which implies 2 percent consumer optimisation error) is required before Portugal 
and Switzerland are found to share common homothetic preferences with the rest of the 
OECD countries. Thus, with only 2 percent consumer optimisation error, all 24 OECD 
countries are found to share common homothetic preferences. This compares with the 
4.2 percent optimisation error which was necessary for 59 of the 60 countries in the 1980 
data set to be rationalised by a homothetic utility function. The finding that a lower 
level of consumer optimisation error is required for the 1993 data to be consistent with a 
homothetic utility function is not surprising since by construction the OECD countries 
are more homogenous. 
As before, the Afriat efficiency index can be used to assess the significance of the pairwise 
rankings implied by the Ideal Afriat index. The rankings implied by different Approx-
imate Ideal Afriat Indexes are shown in Figure 4.12 for the original 19 countries which 
satisfied HARP calculated for the (where, once again, these countries are arranged ac-
cording to the ranking implied bye*= 1). The non-monotonicity of the line fore*= 0.98 
immediately alerts us to a change in the rankings of Australia, the U.K. and Italy. From 
a* in Table 4.4, the true welfare of Australia is 1.3 percent above the sample mean, 
which ranks it above the U.K. (1 percent above the mean) and Italy (0.3 percent above 
the mean). However, withe* = 0.98 the welfare levels of these three countries are almost 
identical at approximately 7 percent above the mean, and when a* (0.98) is reported to 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
U.K. 
U.S. 
Table 4.4: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index for different e*, 1993 
a* rank e* a* (0.995) rank e* a* (0.99) rank e* a* (0.98) rank 
0.013 11 0.069 11 0.068 11 0.067 13 
0.058 7 0.114 7 0.112 7 0.115 8 
0.028 10 0.084 10 0.083 10 0.084 11 
0.105 3 0.160 3 0.159 3 0.158 4 
0.094 4 0.145 4 0.146 4 0.135 5 
-0.160 16 -0.108 17 -0.105 18 -0.105 19 
0.073 5 0.129 5 0.127 5 0.130 6 
0.043 9 0.099 9 0.098 9 0.097 10 
-0.362 19 -0.304 20 -0.306 21 -0.308 23 
0.067 6 0.123 6 0.124 6 0.126 7 
-0.300 18 -0.238 19 -0.241 20 -0.235 21 
0.003 13 0.059 13 0.060 13 0.067 12 
0.052 8 0.108 8 0.105 8 0.101 9 
0.400 1 0.459 1 0.458 1 0.440 1 
0.995 0.031 14 0.029 14 0.029 15 
-0.133 15 -0.080 16 -0.079 17 -0.080 18 
-0.084 14 -0.023 15 -0.023 16 -0.013 17 
0.98 0.98 0.98 -0.238 22 
-0.267 17 -0.212 18 -0.213 19 -0.211 20 
0.99 0.99 0.016 15 0.015 16 
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.244 3 
0.995 -1.098 21 -1.098 22 -1.093 24 
0.010 12 0.067 12 0.065 12 0.066 14 
0.359 2 0.415 2 0.414 2 0.411 2 
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4 decimal places, Italy is in fact ranked above Australia and the U.K. The finding that 
with only 2 percent consumer optimisation error that the pairwise rankings between A us-
tralia, Italy and the U.K. change is evidence that these three countries should perhaps 
be ranked as equivalent. 
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Figure 4.12: True welfare rankings calculated for different e*, 1993 
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4.6 Conclusions 
One of the criticisms of the RP approach to welfare measurement is that it is an "all or 
nothing" approach: the data either satisfy the RP test exactly or else they don't and 
the hypothesis of utility maximisation is rejected. In the context of the existence and 
construction of multilateral true welfare indexes, the HARP test of common homothetic 
preferences does not allow for the fact that consumption data are likely to be measured 
with error, and also consumers are unlikely to optimise without error. In certain contexts, 
it may be sufficient to simply find the largest set of observations which satisfy HARP 
and construct multilateral true indexes for that set. However, in a cross-country context, 
it is undesirable to simple drop countries which do not satisfy homotheticity from the 
analysis, and it is thus important to investigate methods for making utility consistent 
comparisons for all countries in a given data set. 
In this chapter, two methods for making approximate multilateral true welfare compar-
isons were reviewed. The first was the Afriat envelope approach, which can be used to 
impute utility bounds for those countries which do not share common homothetic pref-
erences. While the Augmented Ideal Afriat Index can be used to compare the welfare 
of countries in a data set that does not satisfy HARP, a problem with this approach is 
that the source of the failure of common preferences is not identified. In effect , the data 
are taken as if they were measured without error and there is no consumer optimisation 
error. 
The Afriat efficiency index approach, in contrast, can be used to specifically incorporate 
different levels of consumer optimisation error into welfare comparisons. The Afriat 
efficiency index approach was applied to 1980 ICP data on 60 countries and it was found 
that while 42 countries share common homothetic preferences using the standard test 
of HARP, 59 countries satisfy HARP when 4.2 percent consumer optimisation error is 
allowed for. The Approximate Ideal Afriat Index was constructed and it was found that 
with only moderate levels of consumer optimisation error, the rankings of three pairs 
of countries change. It was suggested that these countries should perhaps be ranked 
equivalent , since their pairwise rankings change under differing (moderate) levels of e* . 
All 24 OECD countries in the 1993 data set satisfy HARP when 2 percent optimisation 
error is allowed (while 19 satisfy HARP with zero optimisation error). Further, the 
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pairwise rankings of Italy, Australia and the U.K. were found to indeterminate in that 
they change with different levels of e* . 
The Afriat efficiency index method for constructing approximate multilateral true welfare 
indexes can be used in other contexts. In Chapter 5 the method is used in the construction 
of an approximate multilateral true marginal welfare index, and in Chapter 6 the method 
is applied in the context of leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons. 
Chapter 5 
Multilateral True Marginal 
Indexes 
5.1 Introduction 
"Empirical experience is abundant that the Santa Claus hypothesis of homoth-
eticity in tastes and in technical change is quite unrealistic. Therefore, we must 
not be bemused by the undoubted elegances and richness of the homothetic the-
ory ... we must accept the sad facts of life, and be grateful for the more complicated 
procedures economic theory devises." P.A. Samuelson and S. Swamy (1974, p.592). 
In making cross-country comparisons of welfare, it is intuitively desirable that welfare 
measurements not depend on which country is being used as the base in the comparison. 
As shown in Chapter 1, a welfare index that is invariant to the price vector used in its 
construction only exists when preferences are homothetic and for this reason, homothetic-
ity has been integral in the construction of utility-consistent international comparisons of 
welfare. In Chapter 3, HARP was used to test 1980 and 1993 ICP data for the existence 
of a multilateral true welfare index, and for those countries sharing common homothetic 
preferences, welfare comparisons were conducted using the Ideal Afriat Index of Dowrick 
and Quiggin (1997). 
However, homotheticity is a very restrictive assumption and may not be satisfied by all 
countries being studied. Further, homotheticity implies that in consumption space, the 
(linear) expansion paths originate from a single point, the origin, and consequently for 
any given relative price vector budget shares are constant across income levels (income 
elasticities are constrained to one). Individuals in rich and poor countries are therefore 
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restricted to devote the same share of their budget to food, for example, and this con-
tradicts empirical evidence that food is a necessity and its share in the budget decreases 
as income increases. Authors such as Varian (1983) and Manser and McDonald (1988) 
have found that U.S. time series consumption data satisfy HARP, however evidence from 
econometric studies (such as that by Blackerby, Boyce, and Russell (1978)) has tended 
to reject homotheticity for aggregate data. 1 
It therefore appears that an investigation of the construction of true indexes in the 
absence of homotheticity is warranted, especially in the context of cross-country compar-
isons of welfare. In the present chapter, a multilateral true marginal index is defined and 
constructed using ICP data. The multilateral true marginal index proposed is a direct 
analog of the Ideal Afriat Index, except it measures the utility gained from marginal 
consumption ( consumption in excess of a predetermined minimum subsistence bundle, 
denoted 1 ), and for this reason it is named the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index, conditional 
on 1 . The Ideal Afriat Marginal Index is constructed under the less restrictive assump-
tion of affine-homothetic preferences, that is, the linear expansion paths originate from 
a particular point ( the subsistence bundle), not necessarily the origin. 
Affine homotheticity is still restrictive in terms of implied economic behaviour, however 
it is a significant relaxation from homotheticity. Under affine homotheticity the income 
elasticities for marginal consumption are constrained to one, but the income elasticities 
for consumption may differ from one (and thus goods can be found to be necessities or 
luxuries). Homotheticity is in fact a special case of affine homotheticity (when 1 == 0) and 
hence the Ideal Afriat Index is a special case of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 2 More-
over, it is shown that affine homotheticity is the only generalisation from homotheticity 
which is consistent with one being able to make multilaterally consistent (marginal) wel-
fare comparisons. 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that without complete knowledge of preferences, the Allen 
welfare index is unobservable and this leads to indeterminateness in that there is a range 
within which the index can lie (and any index within this range itself qualifies as a true 
1 One may question, however, an approach which uses a demand system derived from a particular 
preference structure since it really involves a test of the joint hypothesis that the functional form is 
correct and the data do not satisfy homotheticity. 
2further, since homotheticity is a special case of affine homotheticity, it is to be expected that in any 
data set more observations will be shown to be consistent with affine homotheticity. 
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index). The use of revealed preference methods can t ighten the bounds to the true index, 
however the unique welfare index can never be exactly determined and there will always 
exist a family of homothetic functions that are consistent with any given data set that 
satisfies HARP. One of the main contributions of this chapter is to identify that there are 
really two sources of indeterminateness in the construction of utility consistent welfare 
comparisons. For any given data set satisfying affine homotheticity, there will be a set 
denoted Q containing an infinite number of ,s which, by definition, are consistent with 
common affine homothetic preferences, and there will be a family of affine homothetic 
functions consistent with each I in Q. 3 
The approach in this chapter, therefore, is not to attempt to estimate a single minimum 
subsistence consumption bundle for use in the construction of the Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Index. The reason for this is that there is no empirical reason to base welfare comparisons 
on just one of the bundles in Q. Rather , for a given data set that satisfies HARP, an 
iterative approach is used to find a sample of ,s and the bounds to the Ideal Afriat 
Marginal Index are then calculated. These bounds to the true marginal welfare index 
are then compared to the Ideal Afriat Index. 
The Ideal Afriat Index and Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes both measure the true 
(marginal) welfare of each country relative to the sample mean. It is conjectured that 
as soon as we "move off the origin" and begin using the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index in 
welfare comparisons, for "richer" countries, this index will be higher than Ideal Afriat 
Index, and the reverse will be true for "poorer" countries. We are therefore able to use 
the Ideal Afriat Index and the bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes to identify 
poor and rich countries. In particular, a country is defined as rich if its true welfare 
as measured by the Ideal Afriat Index is equal to the lower bound to its true marginal 
welfare as measured by the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes. Similarly, a country is defined 
as poor if the Ideal Afriat Index is equal to the upper bound of the Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Indexes. 
Results in Chapter 4 on the construction of approximate welfare comparisons are ex-
tended to the construction of the Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Index and applied 
to the ICP data. For the 1980 data, it is found that five of the pairwise country rankings 
implied by the Approximate Ideal Afriat Index are contradicted by the bounds to the 
3 If the data also satisfy HARP, then 1 = 0 will be one of these bundles. 
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Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes. That is, while the use of 1 = 0 results in 
particular country rankings, there exist other minimum subsistence consumption bundles 
in g which result in these rankings being reversed. The conclusion is that these 5 pairs 
of countries should perhaps be considered equivalent. It is also found that of the 59 
countries for which (approximate) welfare comparisons can be made, 17 ( or 28.8 percent) 
are poor. With the 1993 ICP data on 24 OECD countries, several inconsistencies in 
the country rankings implied by the Ideal Afriat Index are also identified. It is further 
found that 5 countries (or 20.8 percent of the sample) are poor, although it should be 
emphasised that these countries are poor relative to the other OECD countries. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2, previous work on constructing 
marginal indexes is reviewed. Results on the construction of multilateral true marginal 
welfare indexes are presented in Section 5.3, and a method for constructing bounds to 
the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes is proposed. In Section 5.4, the method is applied 
to a 5 country example data set, and results on classifying countries as either rich or 
poor and estimating income elasticities of demand are presented. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 
present applications of the method to 1980 and 1993 ICP data, respectively. Section 5. 7 
concludes this chapter. 
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5.2 Previous Work on Constructing Marginal Indexes 
As is the case with most topics associated with index number theory, the construction of 
marginal index numbers has been thoroughly investigated in the literature. Wald's (1939) 
"New Formula" for the cost of living index is based on an assumption that expansion 
paths are linear (but not necessarily from the origin). With two observed consumption 
bundles for each relative price vector, the expansion path is fully determined; Wald 
(1939) used this result to derive a formula to measure the cost of living between two 
periods which is consistent with linear expansion paths ( and since a general quadratic 
utility function generates linear expansion paths which do not pass through the origin, 
the index is consistent with the existence of such a utility function). 
Sidney N. Afriat showed in various articles that Wald's "New Formula" could be derived 
using a generalisation of the result of Byushgens (1925) that the Fisher index is exact 
for homogeneous quadratic preferences.4 Afriat raised a major concern with the use of 
the Wald 's "New" index and also the Fisher index. Afriat was not concerned that in 
both cases preferences were assumed to be of a of a particular form ( in the case of the 
Fisher index, homogeneous quadratic, and in the case of Wald's "New" formula, general 
quadratic), rather that there was no explicit testing of whether such preferences held for 
the observations for which the welfare or price comparison was being made. 5 
In developing his critique Afriat employed quasi homotheticity ( which is characterised 
by the Gorman Polar Form expenditure function). A feature of quasi-homothetic pref-
erences is linear expansion paths and hence a general quadratic utility function is an 
example of quasi homotheticity ( as is homogeneous quadratic utility, to the extent that 
it implies homothetic preferences, and homotheticity is a special case of quasi homoth-
eticity). Afriat used quasi homotheticity to define a money metric true index which he 
called the marginal index and he further showed that Wald's index was in fact a marginal 
index and how if the linear expansion paths originated from the origin, then the marginal 
index was identical to the Fisher index. 6 
Afriat also gave several important new results on the construction of marginal indexes. 
4 Afriat (1987) contains a summary of this research. 
5 As a multilateral generalisation of the Fisher index, this same critique can be leveled at the EKS 
index, or indeed any superlative index. 
6 Most of Afriat's work on marginal indexes related to the marginal price index, but the results are 
easily adapted to the construction of a marginal welfare index. 
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First , he showed that given predetermined linear expansion paths (for example via knowl-
edge of two consumption bundles for every set of relative prices), revealed preference could 
be used to test whether the data were consistent with the preferences underlying the lin-
ear expansion paths. Second, Afriat constructed bounds to the bilateral true marginal 
indexes ( and showed how in the special case of homotheticity with N = 2 these bounds 
collapse to the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes). 
Finally, Afriat showed that in the (more realistic) situation of knowledge of only one 
consumption point per expansion path, it was still possible to test for the existence 
of a true marginal index and construct bounds to this true index. His "Four point 
theorem" was therefore a completely nonparametric method for constructing bounds to 
welfare indexes - all that was required was an assumption of general quadratic preferences 
and the relevant consumption data. In this sense, Afriat 's "Four point theorem" is a 
more general version of his own results on using nonparametric methods to constructing 
homothetic welfare indexes, later developed by Varian (1983) and used in a multilateral 
context by Dowrick and Quiggin (1997). However, Afriat showed that in general, his 
nonparametric approach only worked for four countries (hence the name of the formula) 
and since multilateral comparisons of welfare are usually conducted for more than four 
countries, the "Four point theorem" is of limited use in the present context. 
Afriat's work on marginal indexes provides a fertile ground of ideas which apparently have 
not been extensively researched. Afriat (1977) calculated bilateral marginal price indexes 
using 1969 Canadian data, but while Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) have extended Afriat's 
early work on true indexes (which by definition require homotheticity) to multilateral 
comparisons, there does not appear to be any work on investigating the use of marginal 
indexes in the multilateral context. 7 
7 Afriat (1972, p.63) notes that his results on marginal indexes may be extended to more than two 
countries. 
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5.3 Affine Homotheticity and the Multilateral True Marginal 
Welfare Index 
It was shown in Chapter 1 that homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for the existence 
of a unique welfare index. In Chapter 3, several methods for testing the consistency of 
a given finite set of data with homotheticity were presented; of these tests, the test of 
HARP is the most easily implemented. A particular multilateral true index, the Ideal 
Afriat Index of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) has been suggested as appropriate index for 
making cross-country welfare comparisons and in Chapter 3, this index was constructed 
for the 1980 and 1993 ICP data. 
In this section, the above results on the existence and construction of multilateral true 
indexes are generalised. A multilateral true marginal welfare index which measures the 
utility gained from marginal or supernumerary consumption ( consumption in excess of 
a predetermined minimum subsistence bundle) is defined and a test for its existence 
is presented. It is shown that affine homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a marginal welfare index, and that an easily implemented test of affine 
homotheticity involves the Affine Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference (AHARP) . 
A particular multilateral true marginal welfare index, the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index is 
proposed and later in the chapter, the bounds to this index are constructed using the 
ICP data. 
5.3.1 Quasi-homothetic preferences 
Afriat (1972, 1977, 1987) investigated the construction of marginal indexes which are 
defined under quasi-homothetic preferences. Quasi homotheticity is characterised by the 
Gorman Polar Form (GPF) expenditure function: 
(5.1) e(U, p) = a(p) + b(p)U, 
where a(p) and b(p) are positive and homogeneous of degree 1 functions of prices. The 
GPF has the economic interpretation that a(p) is the fixed cost of attaining the base 
utility level (normalised to be zero) and thus is the cost of purchasing a subsistence 
bundle of goods, and b(p) is marginal price of attaining utility U above the subsistence 
level. 
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Applying Shephard's lemma to (5.1) gives the Hicksian demand function for good l: 
(5.2) hz(U, p) = v'za(p) + v'zb(p)U, 
where v'za(p) = 8a(p)/8pz and v'zb(p) = 8b(p)/8pz. Using (5.1) to substitute for U in 
the above gives the Marshallian demand function for good l: 
qz(x,p) = v'za(p) + v7zb(p)/b(p)[x - a(p)]. 
Thus, quasi homotheticity implies linear expansion paths and Engel curves. A demand 
system is theoretically plausible vis-a-vis aggregate data only if they can be generated 
from an aggregate preference ordering (i.e. are consistent with the existence of a utility 
maximising representative consumer). It can be shown that linear Engel curves (for which 
quasi homotheticity is both necessary and sufficient) are the minimum requirement for 
exact aggregation consistency (see, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). For 
this reason, demand systems derived from the GPF (such as the Linear Expenditure 
System, LES) have been used extensively in empirical research using aggregate data. 8 
The expansion paths for quasi-homothetic preferences are illustrated for the two-good 
case in Figure 5.1. EP(p1 ) and EP(p2 ) are expansion paths at prices p1 and p2 , respec-
tively, and the subsistence level consumption bundles are v7 a(p1) and v7 a(p2 ) (found by 
setting U = 0 in (5.2)).9 Note that since v7a(p1 ) is not in the positive orthant in this 
particular example, EP(p1) is piecewise linear from the origin to the point q. 
Homotheticity is a special case of the GPF, generated by a(p) = 0. With homotheticity 
the base utility curve degenerates to a single point - the origin - and all expansion 
paths are rays (Figure 5.2). An intermediate special case is affine homotheticity which 
is generated by: 
a(p) = L 1lPl , 
l 
in which case the base utility curve degenerates to the point , 
necessarily the origin (Figure 5.3) . 
(,1, • •. , 1K ), not 
8 For an example of estimating the LES using aggregate cross-country data, see Lluch, Powell, and 
W illiams (1977). 
9In general , "'( = Va(pr) . 
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Figure 5.1: Quasi-homothetic preferences 
5.3.2 Marginal welfare indexes 
EP(p2 ) 
Q1 
A~alogous to the discussion in Section 1.4.2, there are three marginal welfare indexes 
which can be constructed. However, the Allen, Koniis and Malmquist marginal wel-
fare indexes coincide when preferences are affine homothetic, and hence the following 
discussion is limited to the Allen marginal index. 
First assume preferences are quasi homothetic. The Allen marginal welfare index at 
reference prices pr is defined ( using 5.1): 
Q~M,r = e(Ui , pr) - a(pr ) 
iJ e(UJ , pr ) - a(pr ) · 
The Allen marginal welfare index gives the fraction of the cost of attaining country j 's 
marginal utility level required to attain country i 's marginal utility level at the reference 
prices. The natural candidates for pr are p.i and p i, giving the Laspeyres-Allen and 
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Figure 5.3: Affine-homothetic preferences 
Paasche-Allen marginal welfare indexes, respectively: 
QrAM == e(Ui, p-7) - a(p-7) 
iJ e(UJ, pJ) - a(pJ) 
Qf AM == e(Ui' pi) - a(pi) 
iJ e(UJ, pi) - a(pi) · 
The Allen marginal welfare indexes QhAM and Q{;AM are not directly observable, how-
ever, analogous to the discussion in Section 1.4.3, we can construct classical and fixed-
weight bounds to these indexes. 10 The Laspeyres and Paasche marginal quantity indexes 
are defined, respectively: 
LM pJ .(qi - ,J) 
Qij == pJ.(qJ - ,J) 
i ( i i) Qf.M == p. q - , 
1,J pi.(qJ - , i)" 
The bundle (qi - ,J) is one way of achieving Ui == u(qi - ,J) , but not necessarily the 
cheapest when prices are p-7 ; hence p-7.(qi - ,J) > e(Ui, p-i) - a(p-7). By definition, 
p-7 .( qJ - -/) == e(UJ, pJ) - a(p-7) == xJ - a(pJ) . Hence: 
Q~-M == p-7.(qi - ,J) > e(Ui , p-7) - a(pJ) == Q~_AM 
iJ pJ. ( qJ - 1 J) - xJ - a (pJ) iJ ' 
that is, the Laspeyres marginal quantity index is the upper bound to the base-weighted 
Allen marginal welfare index. Using similar reasoning the Paasche marginal quantity 
10The classical bounds are redundant under a:ffine-homothetic preferences, and hence are not discussed 
here. 
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index is the lower bound to the current-weighted Allen marginal welfare index: 
i ( i i) i ( i) Qf.M = P_· q_ -, _ < ~ - _a P . = f.AM_ 
iJ pi.(qJ _ ,i) - e(UJ , pi)_ a(pi) QiJ 
5.3.3 A true marginal welfare index 
With general quasi-homothetic preferences ,i =/- ,j and it is apparent that the property 
of base-country invariance will not be obtained: Qt AM =/- QtAM. However, with the 
special case of affine homotheticity, ,i = ,J = 1 , and there exists a unique true marginal 
welfare index. This follows from the long-recognised result (see for example Lloyd (1979)) 
that an affine-homothetic utility function is homothetic in the marginal quantities (q- 1 ). 
Alternatively, an affine-homothetic function may be said to be homothetic to the point 
/ • 
Proposition 5.1. EXISTENCE OF A UNIQUE MARGINAL WELFARE INDEX: There exists 
a unique index comparing the marginal welfare of country i and j and defined by: QtAM = 
Q{;AM = Ui /UJ , if and only if preferences are affine homothetic. 
PROOF: Analogous to the proof to Proposition 1.2. 
Having thus shown that there exists a unique marginal welfare index when preferences 
are affine-homothetic, the next step is to devise a test for the consistency of a given finite 
data set with affine homotheticity. In Proposition 3.1, it was shown that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the consistency of a given finite set of data with homotheticity is 
the test of HARP. This leads to the follo~ing test for affine homotheticity: 
Proposition 5.2. COMMON AFFINE HOMOTHETIC PREFERENCES: A finite set of de-
mand data is consistent with the existence of common affine homothetic preferences if 
and only if there exists a quantity vector which can be defined as a minimum subsistence 
consumption bundle 1 , that is: 
1. 1 = { 'Yl, ,2, · · · , 'Y K} > 0; 
2. 1 is such that no country has negative marginal consumption of any good;11 
11 While in theory it is possible to have negative marginal consumption, this is inconvenient since the 
test for common affine homothetic preferences involves taking logarithms of values. 
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3. The data satisfy the Affine Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference ( AHARP ): 
For all distinct choices of indexes (i,j, ... , m) we have: 
pi.(qi _ ,) pi .(qk _ ,) pm.(qi _ ,) 
{ · 1 · \ }{ - · } ••• {---} > 1 
...... i ~i -· ....... 1 f~1 __ \ ...... m f~m _,\ -
PROOF: Analogous to the proof to Proposition 3.1. 
Thus, a data set is consistent with affine homotheticity if there exists a quantity vec-
tor which can be defined as a minimum subsistence consumption bundle. From the 
above proposition, a quantity vector can be defined as a minimum subsistence bundle 
if all elements are non-negative, no country has negative marginal consumption and 
it is consistent with the data satisfying AHARP. For a given ,, AHARP can be eas-
ily tested by inputting a matrix of logarithms of Laspeyres marginal quantity indexes 
{ L"!J} == log QJiM into Warshall's algorithm to construct a minimum path matrix defined 
over marginal quantities Mm. If any of the diagonal elements of Mm are negative, then 
the data do not satisfy affine homotheticity. 
With affine homotheticity, it is apparent that the unique marginal welfare index will be 
bounded by the fixed-weight marginal quantity indexes: 
Q{;M < ~; < QtM. 
This leads to the definition of the unique true marginal welfare index which can be used 
empirically. 
Definition 5.1. UNIQUE TRUE MARGINAL WELFARE INDEX For a given minimum sub-
sistence consumption bundle 1 , a unique true marginal welfare index is a set of numbers 
Am = (Aml, Am2 , ... AmN) such that: 
Q PM < Ami/Amj < QLM w· · _ 1 N ij . - ~ ij vi,J - , ... , . 
5.3.4 The Ideal Afriat Marginal Index 
The results on the existence and construction of multilateral true welfare indexes pre-
sented in Chapters 1 and 3 can be generalised to multilateral true marginal welfare 
indexes. 
Definition 5.2. MULTILATERAL MARGINAL INDEX A multilateral marginal index is a 
marginal index which satisfies the property of circularity. 
' 
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The Laspeyres and Paasche marginal quantity indexes do not satisfy circularity, and 
hence do not quality as multilateral marginal indexes. 
Definition 5.3. MULTILATERAL TRUE MARGINAL INDEX A multilateral true marginal 
index is a true marginal index which also has the property of being a multilateral marginal 
index. 
We are now in a position to define a particular multilateral true marginal welfare index 
which will be used in the empirical part of this chapter. 
Definition 5.4. THE IDEAL AFRIAT MARGINAL INDEX: For a given minimum subsis-
tence consumption bundle 1 , let ~ = ( c1 , c2, ... , cN) and a;, - (-r1, -r2 , . .. , -rN) 
represent the vector of column means and the vector of negative row means, respectively, 
of the minimum path matrix defined over marginal quantities, Mm. Define the Ideal 
Afriat Marginal Index as~=(~+ 3.m)/2, the vector of overall means. 
The properties and interpretation of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index are analogous to 
that of the Ideal Afriat Index (see Proposition 3.4). Finally, it can be shown that the 
Ideal Afriat Marginal Index is a generalisation of the Ideal Afriat Index. 
Proposition 5.3. IDEAL AFRIAT MARGINAL INDEX AND IDEAL AFRIAT INDEX: The 
Ideal Afriat Index is a special case of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 
PROOF: This follows from the fact that homotheticity is a special case of affine homoth-
eticity, that is, preferences are homothetic when, = 0. 
5.3.5 An approach for determining the bounds to , 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that without complete knowledge of preferences, the welfare 
index is unobservable and this leads to indeterminateness in that there is a range within 
which the welfare index can lie (and any index within this range itself qualifies as a true 
index). While the use of revealed preference methods can tighten the bounds to the 
true index, the unique welfare index can never be exactly determined because a whole 
family of homothetic functions will be consistent with any given data set that satisfies 
HARP. However, as shown above, homotheticity is a special case of affine homotheticity 
and the multilateral true welfare index is a special case of the multilateral true marginal 
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welfare index where 1 = 0. Hence, there are really two sources of indeterminateness in 
the construction of true utility consistent welfare comparisons. For any given data set 
satisfying AHARP, there will be an infinite number of ,s ( contained within a particular 
range) which, by definition, are consistent with common affine homothetic preferences12 
and there will be a family of affine homothetic functions consistent with each 1 . 
Definition 5.5. SET OF MINIMUM SUBSISTENCE BUNDLES For a given finite set of 
demand data, the set of minimum subsistence bundles is denoted g. 
For a set of data that satisfies AHARP, g will contain an infinite number of ,s, contained 
within a particular range. For a set of data that is consistent with HARP, one of the 
vectors in g will be 1 = 0. Obviously, for a given data set there may not exist any 1 ; in 
that case g will be the empty set. 
If we had complete know ledge of preferences, we would know the , to be used in the 
construction of the multilateral true marginal welfare index. However, this is not the 
case, and for a given data set which satisfies AHARP, there is no empirical reason to 
choose a particular 1 in g for use in the construction of the relevant Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Index. Hence, in using the Ideal Afriat Index for cross-country welfare comparisons we 
are in fact ignoring all the other elements of g which can be equally validly used to specify 
the family of a:ffine-homothetic utility functions which rationalises the data. Rather than 
arbitrarily selecting a particular , in g and constructing the appropriate Ideal Afriat 
Marginal Index, the approach proposed in this chapter is to empirically determine the 
bounds to g, and thus construct bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes. 
The bounds to g are determined in the following way. For a given data set of N coun-
tries that satisfies HARP, a quantity vector is randomly chosen from a uniform distribu-
tion, the boundaries of which are a vector of zeros and a vector of minimum quantities 
qmin = miniEN[qf : l = 1, ... K]. This quantity vector is a "potential" 1 , and hence it 
cannot result in any country having below subsistence consumption. The test of AHARP 
is then conducted using the selected quantity vector as a minimum subsistence consump-
tion bundle, and if the test is satisfied then the quantity vector is placed in the set g. 
This process is repeated until g contains enough elements so that we can be reasonably 
confident that ,s close to the boundaries of g have been selected. Note that it essentially 
12This assumes that the consumption quantities can be measured continuously. 
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an arbitrary decision as to when enough ,s have been collected for the boundaries of g 
to be adequately known. 13 
Once enough elements of g have been collected using this process , the Ideal Afriat 
Marginal Index is constructed for each , in 9. The range in which ~ and the im-
plied rankings lie are then presented and compared with the Ideal Afriat Index ( and 
implied rankings) .14 
131n a future version of this research , the process of finding the boundaries to 9 will be made more 
accurate via a grid search procedure. 
14 1n a previous version of this chapter, the approach used was to select a particular , in 9 for the 
construction of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. In particular, the mean 1 was used. However , there are 
two problems with this approach. First, the selection of the mean, for use in constructing true marginal 
welfare comparisons relies on the fact that 9 is a convex set ( otherwise the mean , may lie outside 9, 
that is, it wouldn 't be a minimum subsistence consumption bundle) . While it is this author 's belief that 
9 is a convex set, this has not been proved. Second, even if 9 is convex, as mentioned earlier, there is no 
reason to base the welfare comparisons on a single vector in 9 . 
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5.4 Bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index - Example 
The data used in this example consist of five observations on two goods - the same data 
that were used to construct the Ideal Afriat Index in Section 3.3.4. Using the approach 
outlined above, 100 elements of Q were identified - these are drawn as dots in Figure 5.4 
(note that since these data satisfy homotheticity, 1 = 0 is one of the elements of Q). 
q2 
4 
2 
0 
2 4 
Ql 
Figure 5.4: An estimate of Q - five country homothetic demand data 
Next , the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index was calculated for each I in Q - the ranges of these 
100 a~s are presented in Table 5.1, as well as the Ideal Afriat Index (which is replicated 
from Table 3.1) . 
Table 5.1: Ideal Afriat Index and Ideal Afriat Marginal Index bounds, N = 5 
a* 
. * min. am 
* max. am 
Country 1 
-0.479 
-0.819 
-0.479 
Country 2 
0.510 
0.510 
0.656 
Country 3 
-0.046 
-0.067 
-0.036 
Country 4 
0.151 
0.151 
0.427 
Country 5 
-0.136 
-0.192 
-0.136 
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5.4.1 A classification of poor and non-poor countries 
A somewhat surprising feature of Table 5.1 is that for 4 of the 5 countries, the Ideal 
Afriat Index provides either the lower- or upper-b ound to the range of the Ideal Afriat 
Marginal Index. In particular , for the countries ranked first and second according to 
a* ( countries 2 and 4), the Ideal Afriat Index is the lower bound to ~' while for two 
bottom ranked countries (countries 1 and 5), a* provides an upper bound to a:n . For the 
country ranked in the middle in terms of welfare ( country 3) , a*3 lies within the range 
of t he Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 
On reflection, this is not such an unexpected result. The Ideal Afriat Index measures 
the true welfare of each country relative to the sample mean: as soon as we acknowledge 
the potential existence of a minimum subsistence consumption bundle (which is the same 
for all countries) and consequently begin using the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index (which 
is also calculated relative to the sample mean) , it is conjectured that a:n will be higher 
than a* for "richer,, countries, and the reverse will be true for "poorer" countries . This 
observation can be formalised in the following definition. 
Definition 5.6. RICH AND PO OR COUNTRIES: For a given data set that satisfies HARP; 
countries can be classified into three categories: 
1. Country r is defined as rich if: a *r = minf 1 a~ [g] · 
. Country pis defined as poor if: a *P = maxf 1 a;,f[g] · 
3. Country u is defined as neither rich nor poor if: minf 1 a~[g] < a *u < 
G *U[ ] max9=1 a~ g 
where a~[g] is the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index comparing the true marginal welfare of 
country i to the sample mean calculated using the gth minimum subsistence consumption 
bundle in Q, and the total number of vectors sampled from Q is G. 
Applying the above definition to the example data set, countries 2 and 4 are rich, country 
3 is undetermined (neither rich nor poor), and countries 1 and 5 are poor. Below, this 
definition is used to classify the countries in the ICP data sets. 
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5.4.2 Calculating bounds to income elasticities of demand 
With affine homotheticity, the income elasticity of marginal consumption will obviously 
be equal to one for all goods. However, the income elasticity of consumption for a 
particular commodity is not constrained to one and can be calculated as shown in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 5.4. INCOME ELASTICITY OF CONSUMPTION For a given bundle in Q, 
denoted_ i , country i's income elasticity of consumption for good l is given by: 
. . . . . 
cf = <fl: xi 
xi qt' 
where ifl = qz - 1z and xi = pi .qi. 
PROOF: For a given i in Q we know that the income elasticity of marginal consumption 
of good l for country i: 
(5.3) ~~ xi . ql - = l, -i - - .. Ez - ~xi ifl 
where <fl = qt - 1, and "affine" income or expenditure is xi = pi .qi. The objective is to 
calculate the income elasticity of consumption of good l: 
i ~qt xi Ez = --.- .. 
~xi qz 
Assume that affine income has increased by a factor of t, that is ~xi/ xi = t - l. First, 
note that ~qt= ~ifl- Using (5.3), it is therefore apparent that: 
::::'I, 
A i _ q l A -i _ -i ( ~ 1) uqz - -i ux - qz I:, - • 
X 
Similarly, since ~xi = Lz pf ~qf = Lz pf <fl ( t - 1), the income elasticity of consumption 
for good l can therefore be calculated as: 
i ifl(t - 1) xi ifl xi ifl xi 
E - -----'----- - --- - • l - i ~ 2 - i ~ 2 - -i 2 · Lz Pzqz (t - 1) ql Lz Pzqz qz x ql 
The above proposition can be used to nonparametrically estimate the bounds to income 
' 
elasticities using cross-country data. For the 5 country example data, one of the minimum 
subsistence consumption bundles is (1.06,0.08). For country 3, p 3 = 1, 1, q 3 = 2.5, 2.5, 
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- 44 2 4 i - d -i - 3 86 H 3 - ii] x 3 - 1.44 5 - 0 75 d . ·1 1 q - 1. , . 2, x - 5 an x - . . ence c1 - x3 q] - 3_86 2_5 - . an s1m1 ar y 
c~ = 1.25. For this particular, we would therefore conclude that for country 3, good 1 
is a necessity and good 2 is a luxury. 
Rather than focusing on the income elasticities implied by a single element of Q, another 
approach is to calculate the range in which the income elasticities vary. For the example 
data, this information is presented in Table 5.2 along with descriptive statistics for the 
quantities and minimum subsistence consumption bundles (note that in this table, c is 
calculated for the average country). 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for , and c, N = 5 
mean q min. q max. q min. 1 max. 1 min. c max. c 
good 1 3.65 1.25 7.00 0.00 1.14 0.89 1.05 
good 2 3.05 0.50 7.50 0.00 0.49 0.89 1.25 
192 5. Multilateral True Marginal Indexes 
5.5 Application to 1980 ICP Data 
In this section, the bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index are constructed for the 
42 countries in the 1980 ICP data set that were found to share common homothetic 
preferences ( see Section 3 .4 for details on how these countries were selected). The Ideal 
Afriat Index for the 42 countries which satisfied HARP, and ranking based on this index, 
are presented in Table 5.3 ( these columns are replicated from Table 3.2). 
For the 42 countries that satisfy HARP, we know Q contains at least one vector, namely 
1 = 0. The iterative process outlined in Section 5.3.5 was used to find 500 other vectors 
in Q - this took 756 iterations. The descriptive statistics of the 500 minimum subsistence 
consumption bundles in Q are presented in Table 5.4. 
The impact of having countries with very low per capita consumption in the data set 
is evident; the upper bound to Q shown in column 6 in Table 5.4 is constrained to be 
low (relative to the mean consumption for each good). A conclusion from this is that 
for the 1980 ICP data, conditional on affine homotheticity as a maintained hypothesis, 
the assumption of homotheticity is reasonable ( except perhaps for food). Because the 
minimum subsistence bundles are relatively small, the bounds to the income elasticities 
of demand (calculated for the average country) shown in Table 5.4 are all close to one. 
Despite this, we get some interesting results when we calculate the bounds to the Ideal 
Afriat Marginal Index ( calculated over the 500 vectors in Q) which are shown in Table 
5. 3. The first thing to note is that the pairwise ranking between Cameroon and Senegal 
implied by the Ideal Afriat Index are contradicted by the bounds to the rankings implied 
by the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. While a* ranks Cameroon at 35th and Senegal at 
36th, it is apparent that there also exists at least one other minimum subsistence con-
sumption bundle which results in these pairwise rankings being reversed. The conclusion 
is that since there is no empirical reason to choose, = 0 (and hence use a* as the welfare 
measure) over a , which gives an alternative ranking of these countries, the countries 
should perhaps be ranked equivalent. 15 
Next, Table 5.3 can be used to classify countries according to Definition 5.6. In Figure 
15 Note, however, that a * is only one of an infinite number of multilateral true welfare indexes that can 
be constructed in the homothetic case and it is equally possible that some of these other indexes may 
provide welfare rankings different to that implied by a*. 
en 
Table 5.3: Ideal Afriat Index and Ideal Afriat Marginal Index Bounds, 1980 en 
a* a:n rank a* a:n rank > m m tl 
a* rank min. max. min. max. a* rank min. max. min. max. tl ........ 
Argentina 0.382 19 0.382 0.464 19 19 Japan 0.948 11 0.948 1.041 11 11 
..... 
n p, 
Austria 1.156 8 1.156 1.255 8 8 Kenya -1.448 38 -1.633 -1.448 38 38 
c-t-
..... 
0 
Belgium 1.262 5 1.262 1.364 5 5 Korea -0.212 27 -0.212 -0.172 27 27 ~ 
Bolivia -0.527 29 -0.529 -0.516 29 29 Luxembourg 1.253 6 1.253 1.355 6 6 
c-t-
0 
Botswana -0.840 32 -0.876 -0.840 32 32 Madagascar -1.357 37 -1.506 -1.357 37 37 
I-' 
c:o 
Brazil 0.398 18 0.398 0.470 18 18 Malawi -1.950 41 -2.354 -1.950 41 41 
CX) 
0 
Cameroon -1.148 35 -1.247 -1.148 35 36 Mali 
~ 
Q 
Canada 1.445 2 1.445 1.550 2 2 Morocco -0.761 31 -0. 782 -0.761 31 31 
l7j 
Chile 0.278 20 0.278 0.349 20 20 Nether lands 
t:j 
Colombia 0.093 22 0.093 0.156 22 22 Nigeria 
p, 
c-t-p, 
Costa Rica 0.245 21 0.245 0.310 21 21 Norway 1.090 9 1.090 1.187 9 9 
Ivory coast -0.895 33 -0.939 -0.895 33 33 Pakistan 
Denmark 1.275 3 1.275 1.377 3 3 Panama -0.076 24 -0.076 -0.030 24 24 
Dominican Rep. Paraguay 
Ecuador -0.196 26 -0.196 -0.154 26 26 Peru -0.084 25 -0.084 -0.033 25 25 
El Salvador -0.452 28 -0.456 -0.438 28 28 Philippines 
Ethiopia -2.046 42 -2.598 -2.046 42 42 Poland 
Finland 0.933 12 0.933 1.024 12 12 Portugal 0.465 17 0.465 0.543 17 17 
France 1.221 7 1.221 1.322 7 7 Senegal -1.160 36 -1.254 -1.160 35 36 
Germany FR 1.273 4 1.273 1.375 4 4 Spain 
Greece 0.574 13 0.574 0.658 13 13 Sri Lanka -0.653 30 -0.666 -0.653 30 30 
Guatemala -0.054 23 -0.054 0.000 23 23 U .R. Tanzania 
Honduras Tunisia 
Hong Kong 1.000 10 1.000 1.103 10 10 U.K. 
Hungary 0.490 16 0.490 0.568 16 16 U.S. 1.456 1 1.456 1.561 1 1 
India -1.646 39 -1.904 -1.646 39 39 Uruguay 0.540 14 0.540 0.625 14 14 
Indonesia -0.990 34 -1.050 -0.990 34 34 Venezuela 0.527 15 0.527 0.608 15 15 
Ireland Yugoslavia 
Israel Zambia -1.810 40 -2.137 -1.810 40 40 
Italy Zimbabwe 
Note: The minimum and maximum rankings based on a:n are not derived from the minimum and maximum of a:n (see text). I~ 
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Table 5_.4: 1 and c for 42 countries satisfying HARP, 1980 
mean q min. q max. q min., max., min. c max. c 
1.1.1 Food 685.3 75.8 1322.1 0.0 75.5 0.92 1.01 
1.1.2 Beverages 105.8 0.4 295.9 0.0 0.4 1.00 1.04 
1.1.3 Tobacco 48.3 1.7 184.0 0.0 1.7 0.98 1.03 
1.2.1 Clothing 183.8 10.8 855.0 0.0 10.8 0.96 1.04 
1.2.2 Footwear 37.4 0.0 116.4 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.04 
1.3.1 Gross rent 284.8 7.4 1072.1 0.0 7.4 0.99 1.03 
1.3.2 Fuel 106.8 2.7 588.2 0.0 2.7 0.99 1.03 
1.4.1 Furnishing etc. 132.1 1.4 591.3 0.0 1.4 1.00 1.04 
1.4.2 HH goods etc. 97.0 7.6 245.0 0.0 7.6 0.94 1.03 
1.5.1 Pvte. medical 200.1 3.1 758.8 0.0 3.1 0.99 1.04 
1.6.1 Transport equip. 84.2 0.1 490.5 0.0 0.1 1.00 1.04 
1.6.2 Trans. equip. (op.) 155.7 2.4 773.9 0.0 2.4 0.99 1.04 
1.6.3 Purchased transport 53.9 0.7 260.3 0.0 0.7 1.00 1.04 
1.6.4 Communication 35.8 0.1 181.9 0.0 0.1 1.00 1.04 
1. 7 .1 Recreation 169.0 0.9 675.3 0.0 0.9 1.00 1.04 
1. 7 .2 Education 191.7 14.1 503.9 0.0 14.0 0.95 1.03 
1.8.1 Personal care 103.3 1.2 722.3 0.0 1.2 0.99 1.03 
1.8.2 Other 224.4 0.0 923.5 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.04 
Note: Note that the columns labeled min. 1 and max. 1 show the range over which, varies -
these columns themselves are not necessarily minimum subsistence bundles. 
5.5, the Ideal Afriat Index and bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes are plotted 
for the 42 countries. Using Definition 5.6, 13 countries (or 31 percent of the sample) 
are classified as poor, 2 countries (El Salvador and Bolivia) cannot be classified, and the 
remaining are classified as rich. 
5.5.1 Approximate multilateral true comparisons 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the tests of HARP (and AHARP) are non-stochastic in that 
the data either pass the tests exactly, or else they don't and the hypothesis of utility 
maximisation is rejected. The Afriat efficiency index approach outlined in Section 4.3 
can be used to conduct approximate multilateral true welfare comparisons. As shown 
in Section 4.4, 59 of the 60 countries in the 1980 ICP data set can be included in such 
a comparison; the Approximate Ideal Afriat Index ( calculated for e* = 0.96) and the 
implied rankings for these countries are shown in Table 5.5 ( these numbers are replicated 
from Table 4.3). 
For the 59 countries that satisfy HARP(0.96), we know Q(0.96) (where the notation 
signifies that this set contains quantity vectors which are consistent with AHARP(0.96)) 
contains at least one vector, namely 1 = 0. Once again, the iterative process was 
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rt) 
<l) 
Table 5.5: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index and Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Index Bounds, 1980 >< <l) 
""d a:n (0.96) a:n (0.96) rank a:n (0.96) a:n (0.96) rank A H 
..-4 a* (0.96) rank min. max. min. max. a* (0.96) rank min. max. min. max . co A Argentina 0.427 26 0.427 0.453 25 26 Japan 0.989 14 0.989 1.018 14 14 .~ bO Austria 1.205 9 1.205 1.239 9 9 Kenya -1.477 53 -1.536 -1.477 53 53 ~ ~ Belgium 1.306 6 1.306 1.338 5 6 Korea -0.200 37 -0.200 -0.183 37 37 
<l) Bolivia -0.479 41 -0.480 -0.461 41 41 Luxembourg 1.306 5 1.306 1.338 5 6 ~ 
~ Botswana -0.847 45 -0.868 -0.847 45 46 Madagascar -1.366 52 -1.416 -1.366 52 52 
..-4 Brazil 0.443 25 0.443 0.472 25 26 Malawi -1.971 57 -2.086 -1.971 57 57 co 1-1 Cameroon -1.139 49 -1.167 -1.139 49 49 Mali 
-1.951 56 -2.065 -1.951 56 56 <l) ~ Canada 1.486 2 1.486 1.518 2 2 Morocco -0.725 44 -0.741 -0.725 44 44 co ..-4 
·~ Chile 0.305 28 0.305 0.332 28 28 Netherlands 1.239 8 1.239 1.270 8 8 
~ 
..-4 
~ Colombia 0.117 30 0.117 0.136 30 30 Nigeria -1.279 51 -1.316 -1.279 51 51 ~ 
. Costa Rica 0.288 29 0.288 0.308 29 29 Norway 1.138 11 1.138 1.169 11 12 lI:) 
Ivory coast -0.856 46 -0.867 -0.856 45 46 Pakistan -0.699 43 -0.712 -0.699 43 43 
Denmark 1.318 4 1.318 1.351 4 4 Panama -0.057 32 -0.057 -0.046 32 32 
Dominican Rep. -0.136 35 -0.136 -0.122 35 35 Paraguay -0.115 34 -0.115 -0.100 34 34 
Ecuador -0.168 36 -0.170 -0.160 36 36 Peru 
-0.076 33 -0.076 -0.065 33 33 El Salvador -0.452 40 -0.461 -0.450 40 40 Philippines -0.314 39 -o·.314 -0.305 39 39 Ethiopia -2.053 59 -2.187 -2.053 59 59 Poland 0.468 24 0.468 0.498 24 24 
Finland 0.967 15 0.967 0.995 15 15 Portugal 0.519 23 0.519 0.549 23 23 France 1.281 7 1.281 1.313 7 7 Senegal -1.165 50 -1.208 -1.165 50 50 Germany FR 1.335 3 1.335 1.367 3 3 Spain 0.904 16 0.904 0.933 16 16 Greece 0.603 19 0.603 0.634 19 19 Sri Lanka -0.613 42 -0.616 -0.610 42 42 Guatemala -0.046 31 -0.046 -0.031 31 31 U .R. Tanzania -2.012 58 -2.139 -2.012 58 58 Honduras Tunisia -0.264 38 -0.268 -0.258 38 38 Hong Kong 1.020 13 1.020 1.052 13 13 U.K. 1.148 10 1.148 1.182 10 10 
Hungary 0.530 22 0.530 0.561 21 22 U.S. 1.507 1 1.507 1.539 1 1 India 
-1.612 54 -1.680 -1.612 54 54 Uruguay 0.575 20 0.575 0.601 20 20 Indonesia 
-0.936 47 -0.952 -0.936 47 47 Venezuela 0.539 21 0.539 0.564 21 22 Ireland 0.721 17 0.721 0.748 17 17 Yugoslavia 0.395 27 0.395 0.423 27 27 Israel 0.693 18 0.693 0.726 18 18 Zambia -1.768 55 -1.850 -1.768 55 55 
~, Italy 1.138 12 1.138 1.171 11 12 Zimbabwe -1.136 48 -1.163 -1.136 48 48 Note: See note to Table 5.3. .--i 
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Table 5.6: , and c for 59 countries satisfying HARP(0.96), 1980 
mean q min. q max. q min. 1 max. 1 min. c max. c 
1.1.1 Food 686.7 75.8 1505.0 0.0 19.6 0.98 1.00 
1.1.2 Beverages 98.6 0.4 307.3 0.0 0.4 1.00 1.01 
1.1.3 Tobacco 47.0 1.2 184.0 0.0 1.2 0.98 1.01 
1. 2 .1 Clothing 180.4 10.8 855.0 0.0 7.1 0.97 1.01 
1.2.2 Footwear 37.3 0.0 116.4 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.01 
1.3.1 Gross rent 282.5 1.7 1072.1 0.0 1.7 1.00 1.01 
1.3.2 Fuel 97.7 2.7 588.2 0.0 2.7 0.98 1.01 
1.4.1 Furnishing etc. 126.1 1.4 591.3 0.0 1.4 0.99 1.01 
1.4.2 HH goods etc. 88.0 4.4 245.0 0.0 4.4 0.96 1.01 
1.5.1 Pvte. medical 192.0 3.1 758.8 0.0 3.1 0.99 1.01 
1.6.1 Transport equip. 76.0 0.1 490.5 0.0 0.1 1.00 1.01 
1.6.2 Trans. equip. (op.) 134.8 0.9 773.9 0.0 0.9 1.00 1.01 
1.6.3 Purchased transport 50.6 0.7 260.3 0.0 0.7 0.99 1.01 
1.6.4 Communication 30.2 0.1 181.9 0.0 0.1 1.00 1.01 
1.7.1 Recreation 159.9 0.9 675.3 0.0 0.9 1.00 1.01 
1.7.2 Education 182.5 14.1 503.9 0.0 10.0 0.95 1.01 
1.8.1 Personal care 91.9 0.5 722.3 0.0 0.5 1.00 1.01 
1.8.2 Other 217.7 0.0 923.5 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.01 
Note: See note to Table 5.4. 
used to collect an "adequate sample" of the vectors in g - 194 ,s were collected, taking 
10,000 iterations. The descriptive statistics of the 194 minimum subsistence consumption 
bundles in Q(0.96) and the bounds to the income elasticities of demand are presented in 
Table 5.6. 
From Table 5.6, it is apparent that for the 59 countries satisfying HARP(0.96), the mini-
mum subsistence bundles in Q(0.96) are very small (and, relatedly, the income elasticities 
of demand are close to one). Unlike in Table 5.4, where for every good l the largest ,z in 
g was equal to ( or very close to) the upper bound of minf 1 qf, in Table 5.6 these upper 
bounds are not tight for 3 goods (food, clothing and education - which are the three 
most important elements of the minimum consumption bundle). A conclusion to draw 
from this is that (approximate) homotheticity is a very reasonable assumption for these 
59 countries. Another way of stating this is that by including an extra 17 countries in 
the comparison, the range of indeterminateness associated with the minimum subsistence 
consumption bundle (that is, the volume of Q), has been reduced significantly. 
Despite this, a comparison of the rankings from a* (0.96) with the bounds to the rankings 
from a:n (0.96) (Table 5.5) reveal several inconsistencies. This is most easily seen in 
Figure 5.6 where countries are arranged along the horizontal axis according to a* (0.96) 
and the bounds to the rankings from a:n (0.96) are plotted. It is apparent that for five 
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pairs of countries, the pairwise ranking is dependent on what , in 9(0.96) is chosen for 
constructing the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index, and hence these countries should perhaps 
be ranked as equivalent. 
In Figure 5.7, a*(0.96) and the bounds to a:n(0.96) are plotted. Consistent with the 
above finding that g (0.96) is relatively small, the bounds to a.:n (0.96) are very tight. In 
the figure, the classification of countries according to Definition 5.6 is also shown. Of the 
59 countries, 17 ( or 28.8 percent) are poor, 5 are neither rich nor poor, and the rest are 
rich. 
30 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 71'< 
2 5 I- ,'~ 
20 I- ,,;K 
15 I- X 
bO 
0 
~ 
0 
ro 
1--f 
10 
5 
---~- --
0 
\) ~- b,~ ~~ ~ ~~- ~~ ~v~ ~bi'+>~~"'{)~-~~~"&~ ~~ ~~ ~bi ~"'~ ~bi ~& ~v~ ~~~ &~ ,§~ ~& ~bi 1'~ . ~~ ~"'~ ~~~ ·"'v~ ~"'~ G~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~&~ ~~~ e}\.~ ~~<+> ~o~ ~ "'~o \~1-"'~~ S~\~&~ \'+>~ v~~~~~ ~~~~~~ o~"~~&~ ~~~ ~~""'o~~ d ~ -<f, ~.P~ 
U"~ \J~.i,<S>" V -./;-# ~o"'" ~ ""l""' V ~ ~\.i,~ cl e,o 
Figure 5.6: True welfare rankings implied by a* (0.96) and a:ri (0.96), 1980 
I 
-f 
-f 
-t 
I ?1 c.n 
. 
> ~ 
~ 
...... 
..... 
C") 
,~ 
..... 
0 
~ 
c-t-
0 
,-. 
~ 
,~ 
1----1 
Q 
~ 
t:, 
~ 
c-t-
I{:).) 
,-. 
~ 
~ 
~, 
>< Q) 
'"d 
~ 
1---t 
-ro ~ 
.b.(), 
~ 
ro 
~ 
Q) 
;:j 
~, 
-ro 
~ Q) 
~ 
-
• ..-4 
+;> 
-;:j 
~ 
. 
ti) 
0 
0 
N 
60 
55 
50 
45 
bO 
~ 
..... 
~ § 
1-4 
40 
35 
---~---30 
~~~~:~~;~~~~~~;~~t 0~~~t~~t>;~,~~~~1~~~;<>~v0:~~~~::~t:"~~~:~vt~"')~"t:i~~~ :~~:~::to~'~ o~~ " ~~"'~"'v~ V ~~"'~ ~ S""' ~ ~,. ~()\~()'\ \~ <\>"' Cl ~~b,~ ~-<\-~ y (),& \). \) 
Figure 5.6: True welfare rankings implied by a*(0.96) and a:n(0.96), 1980 (cont.) 
X 
<l) 
"'d 
0 
-~ 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
,-.. 1 
'"@ 
0 
.bO 
~ 
s 
'-'0.8 
<l) 
;:j 
H 
4-,J 
bO 
..8 0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
' ~ .. ·*· .. * . -~ .. ~-
Rich 
*·. ~-. -
' 
' 
a*(~.96 ---~---
- min. 
- max. 
*·--* 
-·-*-. ·*-. ·* 
0 .__....____,____.____._....._-1----L..---L-L--...L..-.....l.----1..____J_.L,_-l,_----1...----1-L-...L.........L.--1.-l,_..L_.....L.._l_-l_L_...1.,___J____l.__J 
\) C;,·~b,~ ~~ ~'f. t5\ ... ~~ ~v~ ~bi~~<"; t· ~~\,~1 cf'~~~~ ~~bi ~"'~ ~~bi f.~& ~v~ ~~~ &~ ~~ ~~ ~~bi ~~~ -...,~~ ~"'G~~;....,v~ ~"'~ 
cl~ ~~~~~~ ~~;&~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~cf- ~ ~ ~~~"'~ s~\"~ \~ v"<f~~ ~~~~~~~ o.?v~~~ ~f ~<& 0~~ ~~ cl~ 
U",f' \) \>❖,s; ~gs' ~o"' ~., v ~ 'lt\❖<'S c:l G 
Figure 5.7: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index and Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Index bounds, 1980 
C)l 
. 
C)l 
> 
"a 
"a 
....... 
I-'• 
n 
~ 
I-'• 
0 
~ 
C'-t-
0 
...... 
~ 
00 
0 
H 
0 
~ 
tj 
~ 
~ 
tv 
0 
...... 
U) 
(l) 
~ 
'"d 
~ 
r--i 
cd 
~ 
...... 
b.O 
~ 
~ 
(l) 
;:j 
~ 
......-4 
co 
H (l) 
4-,:) 
co 
......-4 
...... 
1 
~ 
. 
li.) 
N 
0 
N 
>< 
<l) 
--0 
~ 
...... 
~ 
~ 
-a 
~ 
s 
'--" 
<l) 
;:j 
~ 
..µ 
0 
-0.5 
-1 
bO -1 5 0 • 
..--4 
-2 
-2.5 
Undetermined 
Rich 
Poor 
' 
' 
' 
' 
a*(9.96 ···-?IE··· 
- min. 
- max. 
', 
~~~~~~;~~~~~'.Zit0~~~!~~~>;\~~t~1~~~;0::~~v0~~~~:~t;$~~;~{~"~~"~~j~~~;~~::~:~o~~~ G~~ ~~"'~"'v~ V ~~"'~ s s<-i ~ ~,, -~.l\~o" \~ <\>"' 6~ ~~~~ -~~ ~ 
\) ~ ~~ 
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5.6 Application to 1993 ICP Data 
In this section, the above analysis is repeated for the 1993 I CP data on 24 0 ECD coun-
tries. In Section 3.5 it was found that 19 of the 24 countries satisfied HARP; the Ideal 
Afriat Index and implied welfare rankings for these countries are shown in Table 5.7 
(these numbers are replicated from Table 3.3). 
Table 5.7: Ideal Afriat Index and Ideal Afriat Marginal Index Bounds, 1993 
a* m a:n rank 
a* rank min. max. min. max. 
Australia 0.013 11 0.013 0.036 11 11 
Austria 0.058 7 0.058 0.099 7 7 
Belgium 0.028 10 0.028 0.060 10 10 
Canada 0.105 3 0.105 0.168 3 3 
Denmark 0.094 4 0.094 0.151 4 4 
Finland -0.160 16 -0.236 -0.160 16 16 
France 0.073 5 0.073 0.121 5 5 
Germany 0.043 9 0.043 0.077 9 9 
Greece -0.362 19 -0.596 -0.362 19 19 
Iceland 0.067 6 0.067 0.113 6 6 
Ireland -0.300 18 -0.473 -0.300 18 18 
Italy 0.003 13 0.003 0.017 13 13 
Japan 0.052 8 0.052 0.083 8 8 
Luxembourg 0.400 1 0.400 0.566 1 1 
Netherlands 
New Zealand -0.133 15 -0.191 -0.133 15 15 
Norway -0.084 14 -0.118 -0.084 14 14 
Portugal 
Spain -0.267 17 -0.416 -0.267 17 17 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
U.K. 0.010 12 0.010 0.030 12 12 
U.S. 0.359 2 0.359 0.513 2 2 
Note: See note to Table 5.3. 
A total of 7 42 iterations were required to find 500 vectors in g - the descriptive statistics 
of these vectors are shown in Table 5.8. Compared with what was found with the 1980 
data, g for the 1993 data contains vectors of significant size. However, it is apparent from 
Table 5. 7 that the country rankings implied by a* are consistent with the bounds to the 
rankings associated with a:n. Further, it should be noted that the bounds to the income 
elasticities of demand reported in Table 5.8 are too wide to be of any use empirically. 
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Table_5_.?_:_, and c for 19 countries satisfying HARP, 1993 
mean q IDlil. q max. q mm., max., mm. c max. c 
1.1.1 Food 1774.4 1278.2 2747.8 0.0 1274.1 0.35 1.25 
1.1.2 Beverages 318.2 189.1 460.5 0.0 188.8 0.49 1.42 
1.1.3 Tobacco 256.7 146.2 1213.5 0.0 145.4 0.53 1.38 
1.2.1 Clothing 608.0 330.7 1082.6 0.0 330.4 0.55 1.36 
1.2.2 Footwear 125.8 53.3 260.9 0.0 52.8 0.67 1.35 
1.3.1 Gross rent 1966.4 1112.7 2710.7 0.0 1101.2 0.60 1.29 
1.3.2 Fuel 539.3 165.0 1422.7 0.0 164.5 0.82 1.36 
1.4.1 Furnishing etc. 470.5 193.4 996.1 0.0 193.3 0.72 1.37 
1.4.2 HH goods etc. 386.4 223.2 692.8 0.0 223.0 0.50 1.33 
1.5.1 Pvte. medical 1114.3 228.6 2534.4 0.0 228.4 0.89 1.43 
1.5.2 Public medical 678.0 0.0 1669.5 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.47 
1.6.1 Transport equip. 476.6 146.9 1912.1 0.0 146.4 0.81 1.39 
1.6.2 Trans. equip. (op.) 687.5 252.8 1428.0 0.0 252.3 0.76 1.37 
1.6.3 Purchased transport 314.4 113.9 791.5 0.0 113.9 0.78 1.40 
1.6.4 Communication 187.4 65.9 403.1 0.0 65.9 0.75 1.42 
1. 7 .1 Recreation 908.1 314.8 1804.6 0.0 314.5 0.74 1.34 
1. 7.2 Education 1282.5 546.9 1932.9 0.0 545.5 0.69 1.39 
1.8.1 Personal care 387.3 224.6 908.7 0.0 224.6 0.52 1.39 
1.8.2 Other 1868.8 677.9 3191.9 0.0 677.8 0.77 1.33 
Note: See note to Table 5.4. 
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Figure 5.8: Ideal Afriat Index and Ideal Afriat Marginal Index bounds, 1993 
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Table 5.9: Approximate Ideal Afriat Index and Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Index 
Bounds, 1993 
a~(0.98) a~ (0.98) rank 
a* (0.98) rank min. max. min. max. 
Australia 0.067 13 0.067 0.108 12 14 
Austria 0.115 8 0.115 0.170 8 8 
Belgium 0.084 11 0.084 0.135 11 11 
Canada 0.158 4 0.158 0.222 4 4 
Denmark 0.135 5 0.135 0.194 5 5 
Finland -0.105 19 -0.118 -0.105 19 19 
France 0.130 6 0.130 0.188 6 6 
Germany 0.097 10 0.097 0.144 10 10 
Greece -0.308 23 -0.386 -0.308 23 23 
Iceland 0.126 7 0.126 0.183 7 7 
Ireland -0.235 21 -0.282 -0.235 21 22 
Italy 0.067 12 0.067 0.109 12 13 
Japan 0.101 9 0.101 0.151 9 9 
Luxembourg 0.440 1 0.440 0.557 1 1 
Nether lands 0.029 15 0.029 0.060 15 15 
New Zealand -0.080 18 -0.085 -0.076 18 18 
Norway -0.013 17 -0.013 0.008 17 17 
Portugal -0.238 22 -0.289 -0.238 21 22 
Spain -0.211 20 -0.251 -0.211 20 20 
Sweden 0.015 16 0.015 0.045 16 16 
Switzerland 0.244 3 0.244 0.327 3 3 
Turkey -1.093 24 -1.829 -1.093 24 24 
U.K. 0.066 14 0.066 0.109 12 14 
U.S. 0.411 2 0.411 0.523 2 2 
Note: See note to Table 5.3. 
5.6.1 Approximate multilateral true comparisons 
In Section 4.5 it was shown that approximate multilateral true comparisons could be 
made for all 24 countries in the 1993 ICP data set. The Approximate Ideal Afriat Index 
(calculated for e* = 0.98) and the implied rankings are shown in Table 5.9 (these are 
taken from Table 4.4). It took 1741 iterations to collect 500 vectors which are elements 
of 9(0.98); the descriptive statistics for these vectors are in Table 5.10. While the bounds 
to the elasticities of demand have been tightened compared with the bounds in Table 
5.8, there are still generally quite wide (however, it appears that, as expected, food is a 
necessity). 
As shown in Figure 5.9 the rankings from a* (0.98) are not consistent with the bounds 
to the rankings from ~(0.98) (Table 5.9). In particular, while the Ideal Afriat Index 
ranks Ireland at 21st and Portugal at 22nd, there exist ,s in 9(0.98) for which these 
rankings are reversed. The rankings between Australia, Italy and the U .K. are similarly 
206 5. Multilateral True Marginal Indexes 
Table 5.10: , and c for 24 countries satisfying HARP(0.98), 1993 
mean q min. q max. q mm., max., min. c max. c 
1.1.1 Food 1737.0 1081.8 2747.8 0.0 1080.9 0.44 1.13 
1.1.2 Beverages 309.2 13.4 480.6 0.0 13.4 1.00 1.24 
1.1.3 Tobacco 233.9 84.4 1213.5 0.0 83.7 0.71 1.22 
1.2.1 Clothing 596.3 271.8 1082.6 0.0 271.7 0.61 1.19 
1.2.2 Footwear 127.5 53.3 260.9 0.0 53.2 0.64 1.21 
·1.3.1 Gross rent 1922.3 876.4 2710.7 0.0 632.5 0.84 1.20 
1.3.2 Fuel 511.6 165.0 1422.7 0.0 164.9 0.75 1.20 
1.4.1 Furnishing etc. 458.5 193.4 996.1 0.0 192.6 0.64 1.21 
1.4.2 HH goods etc. 371.1 162.7 692.8 0.0 162.4 0.63 1.23 
1.5.1 Pvte. medical 1087.0 165.4 2534.4 0.0 164.7 0.92 1.21 
1.5.2 Public medical 620.3 0.0 1669.5 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.25 
1.6.1 Transport equip. 436.2 49.5 1912.1 0.0 49.5 0.96 1.20 
1.6.2 Trans. equip. (op.) 641.9 51.8 1428.0 0.0 51.7 1.00 1.25 
1.6.3 Purchased transport 310.7 113.9 791.5 0.0 113.3 0.71 1.20 
1.6.4 Communication 181.8 26.4 403.1 0.0 26.3 0.93 1.23 
1.7.1 Recreation 865.8 79.9 1804.6 0.0 79.4 1.00 1.22 
1.7.2 Education 1254.9 439.4 1932.9 0.0 433.6 0.74 1.22 
1.8.1 Personal care 368.6 122.8 908.7 0.0 122.4 0.75 1.20 
1.8.2 Other 1784.9 441.1 3191.9 0.0 439.7 0.85 1.18 
Note: See note to Table 5.4. 
indeterminate. 
Finally, in Figure 5.10, a*(0.98) and the bounds to a:n(0.98) are shown. Using Definition 
5.6, 5 countries (or 20.8 percent of the sample) are classified as poor, and one country 
(New Zealand) cannot be classified as either poor or rich. Remember that this is a 
relative definition of poverty, that is, the five countries are only poor relative to the other 
OECD countries. 
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5. 7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a method for constructing multilateral true marginal welfare indexes 
was proposed and implemented using 1980 and 1993 ICP data. It was shown that a 
unique marginal welfare index exists when preferences are affine homothetic, that is, the 
expansion paths are linear and originate from a single point , the minimum subsistence 
consumption bundle. A method for testing a finite set of data for consistency with 
affine homothetic preferences was suggested - this involves testing for the existence of 
minimum subsistence consumption bundles. For a given data set that is consistent with 
affine homothetic preferences we can construct multilateral true marginal welfare indexes. 
A particular multilateral true marginal welfare index, the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index 
was proposed, and it was shown that the Ideal Afriat Index is a special case of the Ideal 
Afriat Marginal Index. 
Using results on approximate welfare comparisons developed in Chapter 4, a set of Ap-
proximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes ( each consistent with a particular minimum 
subsistence consumption bundle) were constructed for the 1980 ICP data. It was found 
that five of the pairwise country rankings implied by the Approximate Ideal Afriat Index 
are contradicted by the bounds to the Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes. Thus, 
while the homothetic welfare comparison implied a particular ranking of countries, there 
exists at least one, =/- 0 which results in alternative true marginal welfare rankings. It 
was argued that since there is no empirical reason to select a particular , from the set 
g of all minimum consumption bundles for these data, the 5 pairs of countries should 
perhaps be considered equivalent. 
A method for ascertaining the poverty status of countries involving a comparison of the 
Ideal Afriat Index with the bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index was proposed. It 
was found that of the 59 countries for which (approximate) welfare comparisons can be 
made, 17 ( or 28.8 percent) were poor. 
With the 1993 ICP data for 24 OECD countries, several inconsistencies in the country 
rankings implied by the Ideal Afriat Index were also identified. It was further found that 
5 countries (or 20.8 percent of the sample) were poor, although it should be emphasised 
that these countries are considered poor relative to the other OECD countries. 
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The methods presented in this chapter are applied in Chapter 6 to the construction of 
leisure-inclusive multilateral true welfare indexes. 
Chapter 6 
Leisure-Inclusive Welfare 
Comparisons 
6.1 Introduction 
The city businessman was at the pier of a small coastal village when a smq,ll boat 
with just one fisherman docked. Inside the small boat were several large yellowfin 
tuna. The businessman complimented the fisherman on the quality of his fish and 
asked how long it took to catch them. The fisherman replied only a little while. 
The businessman then asked why didn't he stay out longer and catch more fish? 
The fisherman said he had enough to support his family's immediate needs. The 
businessman then asked, but what do you do with the rest of your time? The 
fisherman said, "I sleep late, fish a little, play with my children, take a siesta with 
my wife, stroll into the village each evening where I sip wine and play guitar with 
my friends. I have a full and busy life, you see." 
The businessman scoffed, "I have an MBA and could help you. You should spend 
more time fishing and with the proceeds buy a bigger boat, with the proceeds from 
the bigger boat you could buy several boats, eventually you would have a fleet of 
fishing boats. Instead of selling your catch to a middleman you would sell directly 
to the processor, eventually opening your own cannery. You would control the 
product, processing and distribution. You would need to leave this small coastal 
fishing village and move to the city where you will run your expanding empire." 
The fisherman asked, "But how long will this all take?" 
To which the businessman replied, "15-20 years." 
"But what then", asked the fisherman? 
The businessman laughed and said that's the best part. ((When the time is right 
you would announce an IPO and sell your company stock to the public and become 
very rich, you would make millions." 
((Millions? Then what?" asked the fisherman. 
The businessman said, ((Then you would retire. Move to a small coastal fishing 
village where you would sleep late, fish a little, play with your kids, take a siesta 
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with your wife, stroll to the village in the evenings where you could sip wine and 
play your guitar with your friends. " 
Author unknown, via the internet. 
Cross-country measures of economic welfare are generally based on per capita expen-
ditures on goods and services. Such measures ignore an important commodity, leisure, 
which a consumer purchases implicitly by not working. In this chapter, the labour supply-
goods demand framework used by Pencavel (1977), Cleeton (1982) and Riddell (1983), 
among others, in the construction of leisure-inclusive welfare measures is extended to a 
multilateral context, using the methods discussed in the last three chapters. In partic-
ular, a multilateral version of the index of real full income, the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal 
Afriat Marginal Index, is proposed and constructed using the 1993 ICP data on 24 OECD 
countries. 
One of the drawbacks of estimating an index such as the index of real full income is that it 
requires an essentially arbitrary assumption about the amount of subsistence leisure time 
( that is, time spent on sleeping, eating and other necessary biological functions). How-
ever, the approach proposed in Chapter 5 for finding the bounds to the set of minimum 
subsistence bundles can be applied in the leisure-goods framework to nonparametrically 
estimate subsistence leisure time. The proposed method for estimating subsistence leisure 
is applied to the 1993 ICP data on 24 OECD countries and an upper-bound estimate of 
subsistence leisure is 7. 7 hours/ day. 
This estimate of subsistence leisure is used in the construction of the Leisure-Inclusive 
Ideal Afriat Marginal Index, and the implied welfare rankings are markedly different to 
those found with the leisure-exclusive Ideal Afriat Index. For example, Japan has average 
hours of work per capita of almost twice the OECD average; this results in it falling from 
9th in the leisure-exclusive welfare ranking to 19th when leisure time is included in the 
metric. While Luxembourg is ranked first using the Ideal Afriat Index, the fact that the 
average resident of the U.S. consumes more leisure time means that the U.S. is ranked 
first using the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 
Some caveats need to be made about the methods and data used in these leisure-inclusive 
welfare comparisons. In particular, an indirect measure of leisure time consumed ( calcu-
lated as the time available for market activities less hours of work) is used, and there are 
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three reasons why we may not be accurately measuring the average amount of leisure time 
enjoyed in each country. First, there may be differences across countries in the amount 
of non-market work undertaken by the average resident. Second, since per capita hours 
of work are calculated as the product of average hours per worker and the employment-
to-population ratio, differences in demographic composition across countries may affect 
the analysis ( a country with a younger population will have higher recorded leisure, all 
other things equal). Finally, cross-country differences in labour market conditions will 
also affect average leisure time consumed, since unemployment is in effect measured as 
leisure time. 
While these caveats are equally applicable to other research on measuring welfare in the 
leisure-goods framework (for example intertemporal studies within a particular country), 
it is to be expected that they might be particular important in a cross-country context. 
For this reason, the analysis was restricted to the 1993 OECD data; the OECD countries 
are by definition more homogenous, and therefore cross-country differences in non-market 
work and demographic composition are expected to be minimised. However, there are 
large differences in unemployment rates across the OECD countries, and a method is 
therefore proposed for "purging" the leisure variable for the effect of differences in labour 
market conditions. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2, results on welfare measurement 
in the joint commodity demand-labour supply framework are presented, a multilateral 
version of the Allen real full income index, the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Index, is proposed. Previous empirical work on leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons is re-
viewed in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons are conducted 
using the 1993 ICP data. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 Welfare Measurement in the Joint Commodity Demand-
Labour Model 
In this section, welfare measurement in the joint commodity demand-labour supply model 
is reviewed, and a multilateral true leisure-inclusive welfare index is proposed. 
6.2.1 The joint commodity demand-labour supply model 
In the leisure-augmented utility maximisation framework, the household is generally 
taken to be the decision unit. However, as with most studies in this area, the empirical 
analysis here is based on per capita aggregate data and it is therefore necessary to convert 
the household's decision problem into an equivalent problem that can be analysed with 
per capita data. As Barnett (1981, p.17) has noted, there are two problems associated 
with making this transition. 
First, there is a problem associated with aggregating over household members; while all 
household members consume goods, not all members are in the labour force, and further, 
not all of those in the labour force need be employed. Barnett (1981) has explored the 
assumptions regarding preferences which are sufficient for the leisure-augmented utility 
maximisation framework to be expressed in terms of per capita demand functions which 
depend solely upon prices and per capita explanatory variables. For the same reasons as 
those outlined in Section 1.2.3, it is assumed here that such conditions are automatically 
met, and thus the model below is described in terms of a consumer-worker. 
The second problem relates to the fact that in this study, leisure is constructed as the 
hours available for market activities, less the time spent working. 1 Since labour mar-
kets do not necessarily clear, there may exist a corner solution and per capita leisure 
consumption will not be on the per capita leisure demand function. The implication of 
this for leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons is that a country with high unemployment 
will record high per capita leisure ( and thus be attributed a higher level of welfare) even 
1 Leisure is defined similarly in other studies of the joint commodity demand-labour supply framework 
(see, for example, Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976), Barnett (1981) and Coles and Harte-Chen (1985)). The 
reason for using an indirect measure of leisure is that comparable time-use survey data (which can provide 
a direct measure of leisure time) are not widely available; this is especially the case in a cross-country 
context. 
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though much of the measured leisure may be involuntary ( that is, resulting from un-
employment). Barnett (1981) suggests an approach for removing such problems which 
involves constructing a shadow price of leisure - this issue is discussed further below. 
In the joint commodity demand-labour supply framework, the consumer-worker is as-
sumed to maximise a well-behaved utility function u( q, l) with respect to a budget con-
straint p.q = wh + m, where q is a vector of K goods consumed at prices p, l is the 
amount of leisure enjoyed, his the hours worked at wage rate w, and m is exogenous non-
labour income. 2 In the present study, all of the above variables are measured on a per 
annum basis. The individual's total endowment of time per year available for work (T) 
is calculated as the total number of hours in a year H (52 x 7 x 24 = 8736 hours) less an 
amount of time per year spent sleeping, eating and performing other biological functions 
(which can be thought of as "subsistence" leisure time). Available time is split between 
labour (h) and above-subsistence (or supernumerary) leisure (l), that is T = h+l. The 
two constraints are usually transformed into one: p.q + wl = wT + m = y, where y 
is called "full income" and is exogenous to the individual. In the standard model, the 
individual is assumed to be a price (wage) taker and to face no quantity constraints 
( although the latter assumption is discussed further below). 
6.2.2 The bilateral true leisure-inclusive marginal welfare index 
In this section, results on the construction of marginal indexes presented in Chapter 5 
are use to define a leisure-inclusive marginal welfare index. 
The Allen real full income index 
There· are three bilateral leisure-inclusive welfare index numbers which have been pro-
posed in the literature; only one of these index numbers , the Allen index of real full 
income, is considered in this chapter. 3 
Define the full income expenditure function as: 
J(p, w, U*) = min{p.q + wl: u(q, l) > U*}. 
( q,l ) 
2Taxation is ignored in the present study; see Baye and Black (1992) for an analysis of cost-of-living 
indexes in the presence of taxation and the goods-leisure decision. 
3The other two index numbers (Allen real wage and Allen real non-labour income) are described in 
Riddell (1983). 
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With p and w fixed, this expenditure function is a monotonic increasing function of U 
and thus can be used in money metric welfare comparisons. The Allen real full income 
index comparing utility levels Ui and Uj at reference prices pr and reference wages wr 
1s: 
y1,r = f (pr, Wr, u( qi, [i)) 
iJ f(pr,wr,u(qj,Zi)) · 
The Allen real full income index thus gives the fraction of the cost of attaining country j's 
utility level required to attain country i's utility level at reference prices and wages. The 
natural candidates for pr and wr are pi, wj and pi, wi giving base-weighted and current-
weighted true welfare indexes, which are known as the Laspeyres-Allen and Paasche-Allen 
full income indexes, respectively: 
y_.I;,A = f(p-7,wj,u(qi,zi)) 
iJ f (~, wj, u(qj, li)) 
(6.1) y/'A = f(pi,wi,u(qi,li)) 
iJ f(pi,wi,u(qj,li)) 
f(p-7' wj' u(qi, zi)) 
yJ 
y'l, 
f (pi, wi, u ( qj , Zi)) · 
The Allen full income indexes ½JA and ½} A are not directly observable, however in-
formation on the bounds to the true indexes is provided by the Laspeyres and Paasche 
fixed-weight approximations: 
-v-_.I;, _ p-1qi + wizi 
.l.iJ - . yJ 
~f = - . ---=. y=-i piqJ + wi[i. 
Analogous to Result 1.2 in Section 1.4.3, we can construct the following bounds: 
-v-P -v-P A -v-LA -v-L 
.I. ij < .I. ij .I. ij < .I. ij . 
The Allen marginal real full income index 
In Section 5.3.2, it was shown that if preferences are quasi homothetic, then there exist 
Allen marginal welfare indexes. It can similarly be shown that in the leisure-augmented 
utility maximisation framework, quasi-homothetic preferences leads to the existence of 
Allen marginal real full income indexes. 
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First, define the leisure-augmented price and quantity vectors for country i , as, respec-
tively: 
-i { i i i} P = P1, · · · ,PK,w 
qi = {qi, ... ,qk,(H-hi)}. 
With quasi homotheticity, there exists minimum subsistence consumption bundles and 
hence the leisure-augmented quantity vector contains total consumption, that is, mini-
mum subsistence consumption plus supernumerary consumption. Total consumption of 
leisure for country i is H - hi , and this is split between subsistence leisure and supernu-
merary leisure l . 
Following Section 5.3.1, with quasi homotheticity we have the Gorman Polar Form of the 
full income expenditure function: 
j(U, p) = a(f>) + b(f>)U, 
where a(p) and b(p) are positive and homogeneous of degree 1 functions of prices and U 
is leisure-inclusive utility above the subsistence level (normalised to be zero). The Allen 
marginal real full income index at references prices pr is: 
y1-M,r = f (U~, Pr) - a(f>r). 
iJ f (UJ, ft) - a(f>r) 
The Laspeyres-Allen and Paasche-Allen marginal real full income indexes are, respec-
tively: 
y/,AM = f ( Ui, f>j_) - a (f>j_) 
iJ f ( U j, f>1 ) - a (pJ ) 
y .J:=> AM = f (Ui' f>i_) - a(f>i_) . 
iJ f(UJ , pi) - a(pi ) 
The indexes YJAM and ½} AM are not directly observable. However, bounds to these 
indexes are provided by the Laspeyres and Paasche leisure-augmented marginal quantity 
indexes, defined respectively: 
Q~-M = j:>J.(qi - ')'j) 
'LJ pJ. ( qj - ij) 
QfM - pi.(qi - i i) 
'LJ --p- i-:--.• (-q-j ___:_i_:_i )' 
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where .:yr is the leisure-inclusive minimum subsistence consumption bundle. Following 
the argument in Section 5.3.2, we can construct the following bounds: 
Q~ f.M < y/'AM y~AM < Q~ ~-M 1,J - 1,J 1,J - 1,J • 
6.2.3 The Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index 
Analogous to Proposition 5.1, we can state that with affine homotheticity .:yi = i 1 
i and there exists a unique leisure-inclusive marginal index comparing the welfare of 
country i and j: 
yJ;,AM = yJ:AM = Ui/Uj 1,J 1,J • 
Following Proposition 5.2, a test for the consistency of a given data set with affine 
homotheticity is that there exists a leisure-augmented quantity vector which can be 
defined as a leisure-augmented minimum subsistence consumption bundle i . This test 
is carried out by selecting a particular leisure-augmented quantity vector ( constrained 
so that none of the elements of the vector are negative and supernumerary consumption 
for all countries is non-negative) and constructing the appropriate matrix of logarithms 
of Laspeyres leisure-augmented marginal quantity indexes, { i/[J} = log i:JtM. Warshall's 
-m algorithm is then used to construct the minimum path matrix M , and if all of the 
diagonal elements of this matrix are non-negative, then the selected leisure-augmented 
quantity vector qualifies as a particular i. 
For a given i, we can conduct leisure-inclusive marginal welfare comparisons using the 
leisure-inclusive version of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 
Definition 6.1. THE LEISURE-INCLUSIVE IDEAL AFRIAT MARGINAL INDEX: For a 
given leisure-inclusive minimum subsistence consumption bundle i , let~ = ( c1 , c2 , ... , cN) 
and a;;;, = ( -r1 , -r2 , ... , -rN) represent the vector of column means and the vector 
of negative row means, respectively, of the minimum path matrix defined over leisure-
-m inclusive marginal quantities, M . Define the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Index as a~= (a;;;+ ~)/2, the vector of overall means. 
The properties and interpretation of the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index 
are analogous to that of the Ideal Afriat Index (see Proposition 3.4). 
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Analogous to Definition 5.5, we can define the set of leisure-inclusive minimum subsistence 
-
-
bundles Q. For a data set which is consistent with affine homotheticity, g will contain 
an infinite number of -ys, contained within a particular range. For a data set that is 
consistent with HARP, one of the vectors in g will be i = 0. As discussed in Section 
5.3.5, there is no empirical reason to base our leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons on 
a particular i in Q. However, in the empirical section below, an argument for using a 
particular i in Q for constructing a:n, is presented. 
6.2.4 Non-market work, corner solutions and demographic composition 
There are three caveats that need to be made about the above approach for conducting 
leisure-inclusive international comparisons of welfare. These caveats all relate to the 
degree to which the leisure variable employed in this study actually measures the leisure 
time enjoyed by the average consumer-worker in each country. 
Non-market work 
The definition of (supernumerary) leisure used in this study is such that it will include 
non-market work (for example, time spent cooking or looking after children). Thus, if 
there are large differences across countries in the time spent on such activities (which 
is to be expected, especially if countries from the entire development spectrum are in-
cluded in the data set) , this will not be reflected in the leisure-inclusive welfare measure. 
However , the potential bias arising from including non-market work time in leisure is 
minimised in this study by only constructing the leisure-inclusive welfare measures for 
the 24 OECD countries in the 1993 ICP data set. Since, by definition, these countries 
are more homogeneous, it is to be expected that cross-country differences in the average 
amount of time spent in non-market work will be minimised. 
Corner solutions 
It was mentioned above that a potential problem with using the leisure-augmented util-
ity maximisation framework for conducting leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons arises if 
labour markets do not clear. For a country with a high unemployment rate, leisure time 
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(as defined in this study) will include a component of "involuntary" leisure, i.e. unem-
ployment . This is particularly a problem in the present context, where unemployment 
rates vary significantly across countries (for example, the unemployment rate for Japan 
in 1993 was 2.5 percent, compared with 22.7 percent in Spain). 
Corner solutions can be removed if one uses a shadow price for leisure, as suggested 
by Barnett (1981). The shadow price for leisure will be equal to the wage rate if the 
labour market clears, and lower than the wage rate otherwise. However, the method 
for constructing a shadow wage rate suggested by Barnett (1981) involves estimating a 
parametric demand system, and this is at odds with the nonparametric methods which 
are the feature of the present study. In this study, therefore, the potential impact of corner 
solutions on the welfare measurement is minimised by adjusting the leisure variable to 
remove cross-country differences in unemployment rates. 4 
Demographic composition 
The goods-leisure model used in this study is based on the existence of a consumer-
worker, and consequently all variables are measured in per capita terms. However, the 
underlying theory involves the household as the relevant decision making unit, and one of 
the assumptions that is required to move to a consumer-worker model is that demographic 
variables do n~t influence consumption decisions. While this may be plausible for the 
consumption of goods ( especially at the relatively broad aggregation used in this study), 
it is likely that the age-sex composition of a household will influence its consumption 
of leisure. Thus, by using per capita leisure in a cross-country leisure-inclusive welfare 
comparison, a country with a higher than average percentage of the population younger 
( or older) than the working age will be ranked higher simply because of demographic 
composition. 
One could argue that consumption of leisure should be measured on a per adult equivalent 
basis rather than per capita basis.5 However, previous work on leisure-inclusive welfare 
comparisons has tended to ignore the influence of age-sex composition on the consumption 
of leisure. One reason for this is because the use of an equivalence scale would introduce 
4 Future work will focus on whether it is possible to adapt the nonparametric test for rationing of 
Varian (1983, p.108) (and implemented by Swofford and Whitney (1994)) to the construction of true 
indexes in the presence of corner solutions. 
5See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for details on the construction of equivalency scales. 
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arbitrariness into the analysis in terms of what weights are attached to the different age-
sex categories. In this study, leisure is measured in per capita terms. However to minimise 
the possible bias arising from cross-country differences in demographic composition, the 
analysis will be restricted to the 1993 ICP data set on 24 OECD countries. It is to 
be expected that the differences in demographic composition across these countries is 
smaller than the differences across the 60 countries in the 1980 ICP data set. 
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6.3 Previous Work on Leisure-Inclusive Welfare Compar-
• 1sons 
Before applying the methods for leisure-inclusive welfare measurement to the ICP data, 
it is useful to briefly review previous research on leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons 
6.3.1 Within-country welfare measurement 
The majority of research on leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons has been concerned 
with temporal comparisons within a particular country. Pencavel (1977, 1979) proposed 
a constant-utility real wage rate which is the wage rate such that, given the prices and 
non-labour income for year t, the utility of the wage earner would be equal to that of a 
chosen base year. 6 Using parameters for the Stone-Geary utility function ( estimated via 
the Linear Expenditure System (LES)), Pencavel found a 150 percent increase in the real 
wage between 1939 and 1967 in the U.S. This was more than double than that recorded by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) real spendable weekly earnings series and Pencavel 
concluded that the understatement of the BLS real spendable earnings series relative to 
his true real wage index arose because the BLS figures neglected the utility increasing 
effects both of shorter working hours and rising non-labour income. 
A disadvantage of the functional approach is that the results of welfare measurement 
are dependent on the form of the utility function used. However, Coles and Harte-
Chen ( 1985), using data identical to those used by Pencavel, compared constant-utility 
index numbers calculated from the LES and the Indirect Addilog System (IAS), and 
found that the constant-utility real wage rate was reasonably robust across the different 
specifications. 
Empirical work on constructing real wage index numbers under the axiomatic approach 
has mainly focused on the Allen real wage index. Coles and Harte-Chen (1985) calculated 
the fixed-weight bounds to this index found that the functional real wage indexes based 
on the IAS and LES demand system frequently violated these bounds between 1939 and 
1967 (however the majority of those violations occur during the Depression and war 
years). Kokoski (1987) constructed fixed-weight real wage indexes for different types of 
6 See, however, Lloyd (1979) for a criticism of this approach. 
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households using household-level data for the U.S. and found that some of the conclusions 
of Pencavel (1977) based on aggregate time series data may be misleading. In particular, 
Kokoski found that while there have been decreases in the national average of hours 
worked per week, increases in the labor force participation of women have led to a decline 
in leisure-consumption at the household-level. As result, it was concluded that leisure-
inclusive welfare indexes, indicated smaller welfare increases ( or larger decreases) over 
time than those indicated by a leisure-exclusive welfare index. 
Swofford and Whitney (1987) and Patterson (1991) used nonparametric (revealed prefer-
ence) methods to test the utility maximisation model when the utility function includes 
liquid assets, durables and leisure, in addition to consumption goods. The main ob-
jective of these articles was to test the assumption frequently used in applied demand 
research that the utility function exhibits weak separability between consumption goods 
and these "other" goods. Weak separability is very useful in consumer demand research 
since it implies a two-stage model for consumer behaviour; the demand for consumption 
goods can validly be modeled separately to the demand for other goods , thus allowing 
degrees of freedom in econometric estimation to be conserved. Applying tests developed 
by Varian (1983) to U.S. quarterly per capita data, Swofford and Whitney (1987) found 
that consumption goods and leisure meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for weak 
separability. In contrast, Patterson (1991) did not find any evidence of weak separability 
in U .K per capita data. 
6.3.2 Cross-country welfare measurement 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1993, 1994) developed a revealed preference approach to cross-
country comparisons of welfare that explicitly includes leisure with consumption and 
investment. This method tests whether the representative consumer in country A could 
afford to buy the goods and services enjoyed by the average person in country B if 
consumer A worked B's hours, while receiving A's rate of pay for those labour hours. 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) found that in 1990, the average Japanese worked 23.7 hours 
per week, compared with the average Australian only working 16 hours per week. The 
authors therefore asked whether the consumption/investment bundle enjoyed by the av-
erage Australian is affordable to the representative Japanese if they were to reduce hours 
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of work from 24 to 16 per week and it was found that adjusting for differences in leisure 
consumed using this approach markedly improved Australia's measured standard of liv-
ing. 
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6.4 Application to 1993 ICP data 
For the reasons discussed in Section 6.2 .4, the method for constructing leisure-inclusive 
welfare comparisons was only applied to 1993 ICP data on 24 OECD countries (see 
Appendix A for details of the construction of the wage and leisure data). 
In Figure 6.1, hourly wages (measured in ICP units of food) are plotted against average 
hours of work per week for the 24 OECD countries (both wages and hours of work are 
per capita estimates, not per worker estimates) . There is a large amount of dispersion 
in average hours worked; the average cit izens of Iceland and Japan both work over 20 
hours per week (the average J apanese works 24.6 hours per week), while residents of 
Canada, Ireland and Spain work less t han 12 hours per week on average. 6 One would 
expect leisure-inclusive welfare rankings to significantly differ from rankings which do 
not take into account differences in the consumption of leisure. In particular, countries 
such as Iceland and Japan should slip down the welfare rankings and Canada, Ireland 
and Spain should move up the country "league tables" . Note, however , that the cross-
country differences in hours worked largely reflect the fact that in 1993, unemployment 
rates varied markedly across the OECD countries; below a method for removing the effect 
of cross-country differences in unemployment rates from the leisure variable is proposed. 
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Figure 6.1: Hourly wages and hours of work, 1993 
6 Figure 6.1 indicates that average hours worked in the U.S. is low relatively to other OECD countries. 
This is partly explained by the fact that, as noted in Appendix A , hours of work data were only available 
for U.S. wage earners , not employees as a whole. 
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Table 6.1: Leisure-exclusive and leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons, 1993 
unadjusted data adjusted data 
a* (0.98) rank a:n (0.99) rank a:n (0.99) rank 
Australia 0.067 13 0.018 11 0.013 13 
Austria 0.115 8 0.015 13 0.033 6 
Belgium 0.084 11 0.040 4 0.043 5 
Canada 0.158 4 0.058 2 0.054 3 
Denmark 0.135 5 0.021 9 0.018 10 
Finland -0.105 19 -0.015 19 -0.042 20 
France 0.130 6 0.023 7 0.016 12 
Germany 0.097 10 0.019 10 0.024 9 
Greece -0.308 23 -0.046 21 -0.053 23 
Iceland 0.126 7 -0.020 20 -0.005 16 
Ireland -0.235 21 -0.008 17 -0.031 18 
Italy 0.067 12 0.029 5 0.027 7 
Japan 0.101 9 -0.056 23 -0.036 19 
Luxembourg 0.440 1 0.055 3 0.080 2 
Netherlands 0.029 15 0.015 12 0.025 8 
New Zealand -0.080 18 0.001 14 -0.001 14 
Norway -0.013 17 -0.012 18 -0.003 15 
Portugal -0.238 22 -0.052 22 -0.045 21 
Spain -0.211 20 -0.001 15 -0.048 22 
Sweden 0.015 16 -0.006 16 -0.007 17 
Switzerland 0.244 3 0.027 6 0.046 4 
Turkey -1.093 24 -0.204 24 -0.215 24 
U.K. 0.066 14 0.021 8 0.017 11 
U.S. 0.411 2 0.077 1 0.089 1 
Note: a:n (0.99) is calculated with rK+l = 2394 hours/year using the unadjusted leisure data 
and rK+l = 2795 using the adjusted leisure data. 
In Section 4.5 it was shown that if we assume 2 percent consumer optimisation error then 
all 24 countries in the 1993 ICP data set are found to share common homothetic pref-
erences. The Approximate Ideal Afriat Index constructed for e* = 0.98 and the implied 
rankings are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6.1 (these are replicated from Table 4.4). 
Using a *(0.98), Luxembourg is ranked first with a true welfare level approximately 1.6 
times the OECD average. The poorest OECD country is Turkey for which true welfare 
in 1993 was approximately a third of the OECD average. 
We now want to compare the leisure-exclusive welfare index a* (0.98) with an approximate 
version of the Lei~ure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index (it is necessary to calculate an 
approximate version of this index so as to include all 24 countries in the comparison). As 
discussed above, the general approach involves finding an "adequate sample" of bundles 
in Q and calculating the bounds to a:n, however it was decided to constrain Q so that 
,z = 0 for all goods except leisure. Thus the minimum subsistence bundle only contains 
leisure; equivalently, preferences are assumed to be homothetic in all goods except leisure 
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( and affine homothetic in leisure). 
There were two reasons for constraining gin this manner. First , it is in keeping with other 
empirical studies in the goods-leisure framework which use supernumerary leisure in the 
analysis, but do not allow for the existence of other goods in the minimum subsistence 
consumption bundle. Second, by employing homotheticity for all goods except leisure it 
is easier to compare the welfare results from a* and a_;'71 i.e. it is only the inclusion of 
leisure which will be having an impact on welfare rankings. 
The method for finding bundles in Q used here is slightly different to that proposed in 
Chapter 5. In Table 5.10, descriptive statistics for 500 consumption bundles in 9 (0.98) 
were shown ( these bundles qualify as minimum subsistence consumption bundles, as de-
fined in Proposition 5.2 , when e* = 0.98). This approach was used in Chapter 5 because 
it enabled a comparison between the bounds to the Approximate Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Index constructed using these 500 vectors and a*(0.98) (shown in Table 5.9). However, 
in this chapter we are more interested in finding an accurate estimate of minimum sub-
sistence leisure and it doesn't necessarily make sense to be adding an error component to 
the data (which is what is happening when we use e* =/ l ) prior to making this estima-
tion. Further, using the Afriat efficiency index approach in the estimation of minimum 
subsistence leisure could lead to certain countries (whose consumption bundles may con-
tain error due to measurement or consumer optimisation error) unduly influencing the 
estimate of tK+l (subsistence leisure). 
The bounds to Q were therefore estimated in the following way. First , an arbitrary subset 
of countries for which at least one minimum subsistence bundle exists was selected (these 
countries were Australia, Austria, Canada and the U.S. ). Then the remaining countries 
were iterated over and if a minimum subsistence bundle existed with a particular country 
included in the subset , then that country was added to t he subset ( this is called the 
AHARP subset) .7 In Figure 6.2, the minimum and maximum of , K+l measured in 
hours / year are plotted against the 20 countries that were iterated over (the minimum 
and maximum of t K+ l for the initial 4 countries is plotted on the vertical axis). These 
bounds were calculated over 500 ,s in the g for each AHARP set of countries. If the 
inclusion of a particular country into the subset resulted in a. minimum subsistence bundle 
7 A major difference with this process compared to the method used in Chapter 5 is t hat it is possible 
for 9 to not contain i = 0. 
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not existing, then there is no marker for that country (such countries included Belgium, 
Iceland and Ireland) . 
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Figure 6.2: Estimated bounds to subsistence leisure, 1993 
The definition of the minimum subsistence bundle in Proposition 5.2 implies that as more 
countries are added to the AHARP subset the bounds to g cannot be getting wider. 8 
From Figure 6.2, it is apparent that the estimated upper bound to ,K+l was tightened 
as Japan and Sweden were added to the AHARP set. The upper bound was reduced by 
around 50 percent (from 5295 to 2915 hours/year) when Japan was added, and thus it is 
possible to identify Japan as an "outlier" country. However, in the absence of a formal 
empirical method for identifying outlier countries, Japan was kept in the final AHARP 
subset of 16 countries.9 For this subset of countries, minimum subsistence leisure was 0 
hours/year, maximum rK+l was 2394 hours/year and mean ,K+l was 1235 hours/year). 
The maximum estimate of subsistence leisure is therefore approximately 6. 7 hours per 
day. While there is no empirical reason to base the leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons 
8Note, however, that since we are only taking a sample of the vectors in 9 it is possible that the 
estimated bounds to this set could increase as more countries are added to the AHARP set. 
9It took 1527 iterations to collect 500 vectors in 9 for these 16 countries. 
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on a particular I in Q, commonsense tells us that the maximum estimate of 6. 7 hours per 
day is a reasonable choice. However, this nonparametric estimate of minimum subsistence 
leisure is around half the estimate of 4680 hours/year (12.9 hours/day) which was used 
by Kuznets (1952) in the construction of a leisure-inclusive GDP series for the U.S.) .
10 
The Approximate Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index was calculated using 
rK+1 = 2394 hours/year (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 6.1). It was necessary to assume 
consumer optimisation error of approximately 1 percent ( e* = 0.99) in order to include 
all 24 countries in the welfare comparison. It is apparent that the large differences in 
average hours worked (and hence leisure time consumed) identified in Figure 6.1 lead 
to radically different conclusions about the relative welfare levels of OECD countries. 
The fact that the average citizen of the U.S. consumes more leisure than the average 
resident of Luxembourg results in the U.S. being ranked first in the leisure-inclusive 
welfare comparison (compared with being ranked second according to a*(0.98)). Some 
of the other changes in rankings are even more marked. The average Japanese works 
almost twice as hard as the average resident of OECD countries and this results in Japan 
being ranked second last on the basis of a~i (0.99) compared with being ranked ninth 
using a*(0.98) (and Iceland slips from 7th to 20th). The differences in rankings produced 
by a* (0.98) and a~1 (0.99) is evident in a Pearson's correlation coefficient of 0. 724. 
Since all countries consume leisure ( and leisure is a relatively large component of full 
income), the inclusion of leisure into the welfare metric results in welfare being more 
equitably distributed across the countries. For example, the true leisure-inclusive welfare 
level of the U.S. is only approximately 8 percent above the OECD average, while that of 
Turkey is approximately 82 percent of the mean. 
6.4.1 Leisure data adjusted for differences in unemployment rates 
The fact that per capita hours worked is indirectly measured raises questions about the 
validity of leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons in Table 6.1. In particular, one has to 
question whether the average Japanese really works almost 10 hours per week more than 
the average resident of OECD countries, and consequently the accuracy of the finding in 
1
°Kuznets (1952, p.64) estimated that the total number of hours per week available for work is 78 
hours - and thus T = 78 x 52 = 4056 hours/year. Hence Kuznets ' implied estimate of subsistence le
isure 
is ,x+1 = H - T = 8736 - 4056 = 4680 hours/year. Kuznets ' estimate of T has been us
ed by authors 
such as Barnett (1981). 
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Table 6.1 that Japan falls from ninth on a leisure-exclusive welfare ranking to 19th when 
leisure is included in the metric. 
As argued above, the OECD countries have relatively similar demographic structures, 
and thus cross-country differences in the employment-to-population ratio are less likely to 
be due to demographic factors. Evidence for this is shown in Figure 6.3, where there does 
not appear to be a relationship between the percentage of the population of working age 
and the employment-to-population ratio (e/p) . When the percentage of the population 
of working age was regressed against e/p also, the estimated slope coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero, thus giving further support to this observation.11 
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Figure 6.3: Employed-to-population ratio, percentage of population aged 15-64 years, 
1993 
It is to be expected, however, that labour market conditions in each country will be in-
fluencing both the employment-to-population ratio (which can be expected to rise during 
periods of labour market growth) and average hours worked by workers ( which will sim-
ilarly be positively influenced by a strong labour market). The labour market conditions 
in each country can be proxied by the unemployment rate, and from Figure 6.4 there 
indeed appears to be a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and average 
hours of work per week per capita. 
11 In contrast, when this exercise was performed for the 60 countries in the 1980 ICP data set, there 
was evidence to suggest that cross-country differences in demographic composition were influencing the 
employment-to-population ratio. 
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Figure 6.4: Unemployment rate, average hours of work/week/capita, 1993 
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The apparent negative correlation between the unemployment rate and average hours of 
work per capita is confirmed in the following regression results:
12 
(6.2) 
hi = 18.864 
(1.038) 
R2 = 0.651 ; 
0.4l6U~ 
(0.103) 
N=24 
' 
where U ~ is the unemployment rate in country i. The regression indicates that average 
hours of work per capita are indeed higher in countries with lower rates of unemployment . 
The regression coefficients can be used to correct hours of work per capita ( and hence 
the measure of leisure time used in the welfare comparisons) for cross-country differences 
in the unemployment rate. In particular, the estimated parameters in (6.2) were used to 
find hours of work per capita h for each country; the residual for country i, h1;, = hi - hi, 
is then used to construct an adjusted hours of work variable, hf which is free of the 
influence of the business cycle: hf = h + h1;, , where h is the mean hours of work per 
capita. 
To illustrate this adjustment for the business cycle, consider the example of J apan which 
in 1993 had average hours of work per capita of 24.6 hours/week ( compared with the 
12 From Figure 6.4, a non-linear functional form should perhaps be used in this regression. 
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OECD average of 15.1 hours/week) and an unemployment rate of 2.5 percent ( compared 
with an average of 9 percent). On the basis of (6 .2) , the predicted h for Japan is 17.8 and 
the adjusted his therefore hJAP = 15.1 + (24.6-17.8) = 21.9 hours/week. A comparison 
of Figure 6.5, which plots adjusted hours of work per capita against wages, with Figure 
6.1 indicates that adjusting hours of work for cross-country differences in the business 
cycle reduces the dispersion of average hours of work. The adjustment has a marked 
impact on average hours of work for some countries; using adjusted hours of work, the 
average Spaniard works around 17 hours per week, compared with less than 12 hours per 
week using the unadjusted data. 
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Figure 6.5: Hourly wages , adjusted hours of work, 1993 
The bounds to subsistence leisure for the adjusted data were estimated using the same 
method described above. -As shown in Figure 6.6, the estimated upper bound to 'YK+l 
was lowered when Belgium and France were added the AHARP set, while the lower 
bound was tightened significantly from O hours/year to 1936 hours/year when Spain 
was included. The final set of countries satisfying AHARP contained 18 countries; the 
maximum estimate of subsistence leisure calculated for this set was 2795 hours/year ( or 
7.7 hours/day). 13 This estimate of 'YK+l was used in the construction of the Approximate 
Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Index presented in the final two columns of Table 6.1. 
13The minimum and me_an estimates were 1937 and 2372 hours/year, respectively. It took 4170 itera-
tions to collect 500 i's in (J for these 18 countries. 
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Figure 6.6: Estimated bounds to subsistence leisure - adjusted data, 1993 
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Leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons constructed using the adjusted leisure data are 
shown in the final two columns of Table 6.1. It is expected that a.7n(0.99) calculated using 
the adjusted leisure data provides a more accurate leisure-inclusive welfare comparison 
across the OECD countries since the influence of differences in labour market conditions 
has been minimised. The rankings implied by a~1 (0.99) calculated using the adjusted 
leisure data are closer to those based on a* (0.98) (the Pearson's correlation coefficient 
of 0.823) , but it is apparent that the inclusion of leisure still has a marked impact on 
how countries are ranked. Comparing the rankings implied by a* (0 .98) with those for 
a:n (0.99) calculated with the adjusted data, Japan slips from 9th to 19th and Iceland 
from 7th to 16th while Belgium moves up the rankings from 11th to 5th, and Italy moves 
up from 12th to 7th. 
The reason that the inclusion of leisure has such a marked impact on cross-country welfare 
comparisons is that leisure accounts for a large share of full income. For the 24 OECD 
countries in 1993, the average share of supernumerary leisure in full income ( calculated 
using the adjusted leisure data) was 82.7 percent (with a minimum of 71.7 percent and 
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a maximum of 87.8 percent). Thus, it is no surprise that the leisure-inclusive welfare 
rankings are very different to the rankings calculated using the standard Ideal Afriat 
Index. Barnett (1981, p.27) investigates theoretically appropriate methods for scaling 
down the quantity of leisure (he justified such - , scaling so as to prevent the domination 
of the price of leisure in an aggregate price index). Such methods may equivalently be 
applied in the present context to prevent the domination of leisure in the leisure-inclusive 
welfare index, and this will be investigated in future work. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, an approach for conducting leisure-inclusive cross-country welfare com-
parisons has been proposed and implemented using the 1993 ICP data. It was shown 
that a multilateral version of the Allen real full income index is the Leisure-Inclusive 
Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. Drawing on results presented in Chapter 5, a method for 
nonparametrically estimating the bounds to minimum subsistence leisure was applied, 
and an upper bound of 7.7 hours/day was estimated using the leisure data which had 
been adjusted for cross-country differences in unemployment rates. 
This upper estimate of subsistence leisure was used to calculated an approximate version 
of the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index ( using the Afriat efficiency index 
of Chapter 4) and this was compared with the Approximate Ideal Afriat Index. It was 
found that including leisure into the welfare comparison had a marked impact on the 
welfare rankings of countries. 
There are three issues that need to be addressed in future research. First, because an 
indirect measure of leisure consumption is employed, differences in labour market condi-
tions across countries are reflected in the leisure variable used in the analysis ( countries 
with higher unemployment rates will record higher consumption of leisure). While an 
adjustment was made in attempt to purg~ the leisure data of the effects of cross-country 
differences in unemployment rates, this was essentially an ad hoc procedure. It would be 
preferable to instead use a shadow price of leisure ( as used by Barnett ( 1981), although it 
may not be possible to construct such a price in a nonparametric setting. Alternatively, 
it may be possible to adapt the nonparametric test for rationing of Varian (1983 , p.108) 
(and implemented by Swofford and Whitney (1994)) to the construction of true indexes 
in the presence of corner solutions. Second, it was apparent that particular countries can 
have a large impact on the estimate of subsistence leisure. An approach to methodically 
identify such outlier countries should be developed. Finally, because leisure accounts for 
a large share of full income, the leisure-inclusive welfare measures tend to be dominated 
by cross-country differences in leisure time consumed. An adaptation of the method for 
scaling down the quantity of leisure suggested by Barnett (1981) should be investigated. 
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Conclusions 
There were two main aims of this thesis. The first was to present a thorough review of 
the methods for conducting cross-country comparisons of welfare, with particular focus 
on the construction of multilateral true indexes. The second aim was to make three 
extensions to the use of multilateral true indexes in cross-country welfare comparisons. 
These extensions are now briefly s11mmarised, and further research areas are identified. 
Approximate multilateral true welfare comparisons 
The test of HARP does not allow for the existence of measurement or consumer optimi-
sation which may lead to a data set failing the test of common homothetic preferences. 
In Chapter 4, the work of Afriat(1972, 1987) and Varian (1993) was extended to the 
construction of Ideal Afriat Indexes which incorporate specific levels of consumer opti-
misation error. 
A grid search method was used for finding the Afriat efficiency index e* (which measures 
the degree of consumer optimisation error) necessary to include all countries in the welfare 
comparison. For the 1980 ICP data, consumer optimisation error of less than 5 percent 
allowed (approximate) welfare comparisons for 59 of the 60 countries, while for the 1993 
ICP data 2 percent consumer optimisation error enabled all 24 countries to be included in 
the comparison. The use of approximate welfare comparisons allowed the identification 
of several pairwise rankings which reverse under differing levels of consumer optimisation 
error , in such cases it was suggested that the countries concerned should perhaps be 
ranked as equivalent. 
The grid search method used for finding e* is not particularly accurate, and future work 
will involve employing the iterative approach suggested by Houtman and Maks (1987) 
for estimating this parameter. 
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Multilateral true marginal welfare indexes 
The Ideal Afriat Index exists when preferences are homothetic. However, homotheticity 
is a restrictive assumption and may not be appropriate in a cross-country context (where 
incomes typically vary greatly). In Chapter 5, it was shown that the Ideal Afriat Index is 
a special case of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index, which exists when preferences are affine 
homothetic. The construction of the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index requires know ledge 
of the minimum subsistence consumption bundle; an iterative method for finding the 
bounds the set of possible subsistence bundles g was proposed. There is no empirical 
reason for basing welfare comparisons on a particular bundle in Q. Consequently, for a 
data set that satisfies HARP, there is no reason to use the Ideal Afriat Index for welfare 
comparisons rather than any other Ideal Afriat Marginal Index which can be constructed 
from another bundle in Q. 
The overall bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes were constructed for the 1980 
and 1993 data, and several inconsistencies between these bounds and the Ideal Afriat 
Index were identified. It was also shown that a comparison of the Ideal Afriat Index with 
the bounds to the Ideal Afriat Marginal Indexes can be used to classify countries as poor 
and rich. 
The method used for finding bundles in Q involves randomly selecting bundles from 
the uniform distribution (the bounds to which are appropriately set). However, a more 
satisfactory method would involve a grid search procedure and this will be investigated 
in future work. 
Leisure-inclusive welfare comparisons 
The aim of Chapter 6 was to propose a utility-consistent method for incorporating leisure 
into cross country comparisons of welfare. Results from Chapter 5 were used to show that 
a multilateral version of the Allen real full income index is in fact the Leisure-Inclusive 
Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. The iterative procedure suggested in Chapter 5 for finding 
the bounds to Q was used to nonparametrically estimate minimum subsistence leisure 
( time spent eating, sleeping and performing other necessary biological functions). For the 
1993 ICP data, the upper bound estimate of subsistence leisure ( constructed using leisure 
data adjusted for cross-country differences in unemployment rates) was 7.7 hours/day. 
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This estimate was used in the construction of the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Index and 
it was found that the welfare rankings implied by this index were significantly different 
to those found with the leisure-exclusive Ideal Afriat Index. 
One of the problems with the approach to leisure-inclusive measures of welfare used in 
Chapter 6 is that cross-country differences in labour market conditions will affect the 
welfare comparison. In particular, a country with high unemployment will record a high 
average consumption of leisure, all other things equal, even though a lot of this wil
l 
be involuntary leisure. An adjustment to the leisure variable to "purge" the effect of 
cross-country differences in unemployment rates was used, however it would be more 
theoretically acceptable to use a shadow price of leisure. The approach for calculating
 
the shadow price of leisure suggested by Barnett (1981) may not be appropriate here as it 
involves a parametric specification, however it may be possible to adapt the nonparamet-
ric test for rationing suggested by Varian (1983) to the construction of true indexes in the 
presence of corner solutions. Another area for further research relates to the dominance
 
of leisure in the Leisure-Inclusive Ideal Afriat Marginal Index; the method for scaling
 
down the quantity of leisure suggested by Barnett (1981) should be investigated in the 
context of leisure-inclusive welfare measures. 

Appendix A 
Data Definitions and Sources 
A.1 Prices and Quantities for Goods and Services 
In this section, information on the source of the price and quantity data used in the thesi
s 
is provided. 
A.I.I The International Comparison Programme - background 
The International Comparison Programme (ICP) is the source of the price and quantity 
data for goods and services. 1 The ICP provides detailed information on prices and good
s 
which are comparable across countries. The first project director of the ICP was Professor 
Irving B. Kravis of the University of Pennsylvania and the first three phases (1970, 1973 
and 1975) were coordinated from that university (see Table A.1).
2 After phase III the 
role of the University of Pennsylvania was gradually changed from main organiser o
f 
the ICP into that of adviser on methodological issues and developers of the Penn Worl
d 
Tables. 
The first three phases were designed for global comparisons in that while some resul
ts 
were presented by region, the valuation of each country's quantities was carried ou
t 
at "average" prices ( to be defined below) of all participating countries. From 1980, 
however , the data has been organised by regional coordinators , and the regional resul
ts 
are linked together at a later stage for use in global comparisons. The global results fo
r 
1 See World Bank (1993) and UN (1992) for a summary of the history and methods of t he ICP; the 
following summary is based on these publications. Note that the letter "P " in the acrony
m ICP originally 
stood for Project , but this was changed at the twenty-fifth session of the Statistical Commission in 1989. 
2 The ICP is also associated with the Penn World Tables of Professors Alan Heston 
and Robert 
Summers. 
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Table A.l: Phases of the ICP and participation of countries 
Phases (I-VII) Developing countries Industrialised countries Total 
1970 4 6 10 
1973 8 8 16 
1975 21 13 34 
1980 42 18 60 
1985 42 22 64 
1990 6 24 30 
1993 0 24 24 
Note: Data for all countries participating in the 1993 phase of the ICP had not been released at 
the time of the completion of this thesis. Therefore these numbers are preliminary. 
1980 were processed by UNSTAT and for 1985 by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities (EURO STAT), which has had an increasing role in the ICP. 
A.1.2 A guide to using the ICP data 
It is now described how the ICP data are constructed and how they may be used in 
cross-country comparative research. 
The ICP implementation of the Geary method of aggregation 
Different aggregation methods are used at different stages in the construction of the 
ICP data. However, the method used by the ICP to compute purchasing-power-parity-
corrected exchange rates and real income measures is the Geary method, described in 
Chapter 1. The Geary method of aggregation was first suggested by Geary (1958), and is 
constructed under the assumed existence of "world prices" 1r = ( 1r1 , ... , 1r K) and "true" 
exchange rates € = ( E1 , ... , EN). 3 
The true exchange rates are Laspeyres price indexes, which compare the world prices 
with the prices of each country in turn:4 
Ei = I:z 1rzqf 
~ ii' 
L..tl plql 
i EN, l EK. 
It is therefore apparent that each country's real income is the same whether valued at 
world prices I:z 1rzqf or valued at domestic prices, converted at the true exchange rates 
3 The presentation here follows Neary (2000). The properties of the Geary index were investigated by 
Khamis (1972) and the Geary index is also known as the Geary-Khamis index. 
4 Following the U.S. convention, the ICP defines the true exchange rates or "purchasing power of 
currency" as the inverse of the definition presented above; the presentation in Neary (2000) follows the 
U.K. convention since it facilitates the matrix algebra. 
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(ci Llpfqf). The world prices are defined by the requirement that total world spending 
on commodity l is the same whether valued at its world price ( 1rl Li qt) or at domestic 
prices converted at the true exchange rates (Li Eipf qf): 
i i i 
Li E Pl_ql' 
'lrl = Li ql i EN, l EK. 
Solving simultaneously for€ and 7r , one can then calculate the real income of each country 
at world prices:5 
1, 1, 1, 1, - -- L -
Xe = E X = 'lrlql, i EN, l EK. 
l 
The ICP data are constructed from highly disaggregated data provided by the statistical 
agencies of the countries covered in each survey. These data are aggregated ( using either 
the EKS method or the Cross Product Dummy (CPD) method) to basic heading level 
data. The requirements for basic heading level data are (a) expenditure in national cur-
rencies can be estimated for each basic heading ( and are not available for the component 
items of the basic heading); and (b) the basic headings be as homogenous as possible in 
terms of dispersion of price ratios across countries. 6 The number of basic heading items 
across countries ranges between 150 and 258, depending on the amount of expenditure 
detail that is available for a particular country. 
The basic heading level data (and aggregates constructed from these) are what are re-
leased to researchers and are what are used in the Geary aggregation equations above. 
In Table A.2 the expenditure aggregates constructed from the basic heading level data 
are presented; depending on the country, the basic heading levels lie either 1 or 2 levels 
below the lowest level of aggregation shown in Table A.2. 
The Geary method was originally implemented by Geary using actual quantities of agri-
cultural output and prices associated with these quantities. Thus, the basic heading 
level data for rice for India, for example, would be quantities measured in tons and prices 
measured in rupees per ton. The international prices computed by the method would 
be expressed in the numeraire currency (such as the U.S. dollar) and thus would be 
expressed as the number of dollars per unit quantity, for example, ton of rice. 
5 The solution can either be found via iteration or matrix algebra. 
6 For example, the dispersion of prices (relative to the U.S., for example) across countries for recreation 
equipment and services (category 1.7.l in Table A.2) would be higher than the dispersion of prices of 
televisions, and thus televisions may be chosen as a basic heading level item. 
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A. Data Definitions and Sources 
Table A.2: ICP breakdown of GDP into expenditure aggregates 
Final household consumption 1. 7 Recreation, entertainment, education, etc. 
Food, beverages f3 tobacco 1. 7 .1 Equipment and services 
Food 1. 7.2 Total education expenditures 
Beverages 1.8 Miscellaneous goods f3 services 
Tobacco l.8.1 Personal care 
Clothing and footwear 1.8.2 Other 
Clothing 1.9 Net expenditures of residents abroad 
Footwear 2 Capital formation 
Gross rent, fuel f3 power 2.1 Domestic capital formation 
Gross rent 2.1.1 Gross fixed capital formation 
Fuel and power 2.1.2 Changes in stocks 
House furnishings, operations 2.2 Net foreign balance 
Furniture & appliances 3 Government consumption, total 
Household goods and services 3.1 Compensation of employees 
Total medical care f3 services 3.2 Commodities, goods f3 services 
Private medical care & services 4 Gross domestic product 
Public medical care 
Transport and communication 
Personal transportation equip. 
Purchased transport 
Communication 
However, in the ICP implementation of the Geary method, actual prices and quantities 
are not used in the above formulae. Rather, the basic heading level data of the ICP 
consist of expenditures xl and basic heading parities, PPl that have been computed either 
by the EKS or CPD methods. The basic heading parities are constructed as: 
i . PPz = pz/PUSA l ' 
where the U.S. has been chosen as the base or numeraire country. This is the first of two 
normalisations made in the construction of the ICP data and the basic heading parities 
thus have the interpretation of units of currency of country i to the U.S. dollar. 7 It 
follows that the ICP quantities at the basic-heading level are not measured in physical 
units, but are termed notional quantities and are computed from the expenditures and 
basic heading parities as: 
. . . 
7, i; 7, qz = Xz PPz· 
Each country's expenditure at the basic heading level is therefore converted into the 
currency of the numeraire country, and is thus termed a notional quantity. 
7Note that this normalisation is only mentioned here for completeness since it doesn't affect the use 
of the ICP data. Some ICP publications (for example, World Bank (1993)), do not even mention that 
this normalisation has been made. 
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In the light of this normalisation, the ICP implementation of the Geary system can be 
re-written as (where qf now refers to the notional quantity, not actual quantity): 
Ei 
(A.l) 1rz 
Lz 1rzqf 
""' ii' LJl pplql 
Li €.ippfqf 
Liqf i EN, l EK. 
Solving the Geary system 
The Geary system can be solved either by use of matrix algebra or by iteration; the 
following is a description of the matrix algebra approach. 
The system ( A. l) consists of N + K equations and N + K unknown variables. The second 
normalisation in the Geary approach is to set the E for the base country equal to one, 
and thus the exchange rate equation for the base country is dropped from the system. 
Assuming that the numeraire country is country N, the system (A.l) can be re-written 
as the following matrix system: 
[X-N -Q~Nl [€-Nl = [ 0 Nl X_N -q 7r -x 
where x denotes an N x 1 vector of total expenditures by country, with typical element 
xi = Lz ppf qf; X denotes the K x N matrix of expenditures by commodity and country, 
with typical element Xzi = xf = ppfqf; xN is the K x 1 vector of expenditures by 
commodity for country N (i.e., the final column of X); Q denotes the K x N matrix 
of notional quantities by commodity and country, with typical element Qzi = qf; and q 
denotes the K x 1 vector of world consumption levels of each commodity, with typical 
element qz = Li qf. Finally, a prime (') denotes the transpose; a circumflex O over 
a vector denotes a diagonal matrix formed by placing on the principal diagonal the 
corresponding elements of the vector; and the subscript (-N) denotes a vector or matrix 
from which the entries corresponding to the numeraire country ( country N) have been 
deleted. 
Noting that W = zz-1 is the matrix of world budget shares (in domestic prices), with 
typical element Wzi = wf = xf /xi, then the above system can be solved for 1r using the 
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formula for inverting a partitioned matrix:8 
[,.. W Q' ]-1 N 7r = q - -N -N X · 
Interpreting the output of the Geary method 
The normalisation Eu s = 1 leads a particular interpretation of the international prices 1r. 
An implication of this normalisation is that xus = I:z 1rzqf s. Therefore xus international 
dollars can purchase U.S. GDP and hence 1 international dollar can purchase a quantity 
of goods and services equal to what 1 USD can purchase of U.S. GDP. Therefore, the 
international prices 1r are measured in international dollars (I$) which have the same 
purchasing power as the U.S. dollar. However, note that while the international prices 
are denominated in U.S. dollars, by construction they reflect an "average international" 
price structure rather than U.S. price relativities. 
The normalisation Eu s = 1 also leads to a particular interpretation of the true exchange 
rates e. The true exchange rate Ei is defined as the number of units of country i's 
currency required to purchase the same amount of goods and services as 1 USD would 
buy in the U.S. This can be seen from the following example. Suppose EAUS = 1.5 and 
Lz 1rzqfUS=15 1$. Then from EAUSxAUS = Lz 1rzqfus, it is apparent that 10 Australian 
dollars will purchase the same amount of goods and services as 15 I$ and 1.5 Australian 
dollars will purchase the same amount of goods and services as 1 I$. But because the I$ 
has been normalised so 1 I$ can purchase the same quantity of goods and services that 
1 USD can purchase of U.S. GDP, then EAUS = 1.5 is the number of Australian dollars 
required to purchase the same amount of goods and services as 1 USD would purchase 
in the U.S. 
The Geary method of aggregation - an example 
The following simple example is used to illustrate the Geary method and the use in the 
ICP of notional quantities and basic heading parities. Assume the ICP has collected 
basic heading data on four commodities (bread, cheese, footwear and jumpers) for three 
countries (Australia, India and the U.S.). The basic heading raw data consists of ex-
penditures in local currencies on the different commodities (the sum of which comprise 
8 See, for exam.ple,Greene (1993, p.27). 
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Table A.3: Example - basic heading level expenditure, local prices and budget shares 
xi l 
wi l 
AUS IND USA AUS 
Pr 
IND USA AUS IND USA 
Food 7000 36000 6400 
Bread 3500 24000 1600 1.50 20.00 2.00 0.25 0.40 0.10 
Cheese 3500 12000 4800 2.00 60.00 1.00 0.25 0.20 0.30 
Clothing 7000 24000 9600 
Footwear 4200 21000 3200 8.00 100.00 6.00 0.30 0.35 0.20 
Jumpers 2800 3000 6400 12.00 150.00 10.00 0.20 0.05 0.40 
GDP 14000 60000 16000 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table A.4: Example - basic heading parities and notional quantities 
PPr q{ 
AUS IND USA AUS IND USA 
Food 
Bread 0.75 10.00 1.00 4667 2400 1600 
Cheese 2.00 60.00 1.00 1750 200 4800 
Clothing 
Footwear 1.33 16.67 1.00 3150 1260 3200 
Jumpers 1.20 15.00 1.00 2333 200 6400 
GDP 11900 4060 16000 
GDP) and the local prices per unit (Table A.3) .. 
The basic heading data used in the Geary aggregation are the parities (where the U.S. 
is chosen as the numeraire country) and notional quantities, defined above ( and shown 
in Table A.4). A question one may ask is why can't we just use the sum of the notional 
quantities as the real income measure for each country? While this would express GDP 
in a common currency, the problem is that real GDP would be being measured at U.S. 
prices and it is preferable that real income does not depend on the prices of any one 
country. 
The prices and quantities in the above table are used as input into the Geary method, 
and the following international prices and true exchange rates are calculated: 
1r = [0.629 , 1.188, 0.973 , 0.965], c = [0.738, 0.053, 1.000]. 
The Geary estimate of real income for country i can then be calculated as Eixi or 
~z 1rzq{ (Table A.5). Table A.5 also presents the ppf /1rz, which are called the pur-
chasing power parities for each commodity. One of the main advantages of the Geary 
method is that it exhibits matrix consistency in that the real income measure can be 
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Table A.5: Real income using the Geary method 
PPz/1rz 'I, 1rzqz 
AUS IND USA AUS IND USA 
Food 1.396 20.612 0.954 5013 1747 6706 
Bread 1.193 15.904 1.590 2934 1509 1006 
Cheese 1.684 50.523 0.842 2078 238 5700 
Clothing 1.316 16.908 1.033 5319 1419 9294 
Footwear 1.370 17.123 1.027 3066 1226 3115 
Jumpers 1.243 15.537 1.036 2253 193 6179 
GDP 0.738 0.053 1.000 10331 3166 16000 
consistently disaggregated by commodity. For example, in Table A.5, the real value of 
food consumption in Australia is calculated as the sum of the real value of consump-
tion of bread and cheese. Thus, while the Geary method does not derive an inter-
national price of food (since food is not a basic heading item), the fact the method 
exhibits matrix consistency enables one to implicitly calculate q10~f 1r food· Similarly, 
the purchasing power parity of food for Australia, ppJ"J!o~ / 1r food can be calculated as 
PPJ"J!o~ /1r food = xJ"J!o~ / qf:/of 1r food= 7000/5013 = 1.396. The fact that the Geary method 
is matrix consistent therefore allows one to derive consistent prices and quantities for 
aggregation levels higher than the basic heading level. 
Note that the true exchange rates or purchasing power of currencies € are also shown in 
Table A.5 (last row, columns 3-4). This reflects the fact that they can be calculated as 
(the inverse of) a weighted average of the purchasing power parities, using the budget 
shares as weights: 
( i)-1 _ ~ 1rz i E - ~-iwz. 
z PPz 
The data provided by the ICP (i.e. in hardcopy and in the *STARS* software) are the real 
expenditures qfwz, purchasing power parities ppf /1rz and purchasing power of currencies 
Ei shown in Table A.5, as well as the nominal expenditures shown in Table A.3. The 
real expenditures and purchasing power parities are often referred to as ICP quantities 
and prices, and are used in international comparison work. For example, Dowrick and 
Quiggin (1997) use the basic heading level ICP quantities and prices in their work on 
constructing multilateral true indexes. 
Note, however, that Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) could equivalently have used the basic 
heading parities ppf and notional quantities qf rather than the ICP prices and quantities. 
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Following Neary (2000), these can be recovered from the example ICP data above in the 
following way. At the basic heading level, dividing each purchasing power parity ppf / 7rz 
by the corresponding entry for the U.S. ppf s /1rz gives ppf /ppf s = ppi, since by definition 
ppf s = 1. The notional quantity is then recovered as qf = xf / ppf. 
Using this method, it is possible to compute parities and notional quantities for more ag-
gregated expenditure levels. In the above example, the parities and notional quantities 
were provided only at the basic heading level. However, the parity for food in A us-
tralia can be calculated as (pp1-:/oi/1rfood)/(ppf0:J/1rfood) = 1.396/0.954 = 1.463. Simi-
larly, the notional quantity of food in Australia is calculated as q10~J = x1-:/ol /PP1-:/ol = 
7000/1.463 = 4785. 
The multilateral methods of Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) can be equivalently applied to 
the ICP prices and quantities or the parities and notional quantities. The reason for this 
is that the log Laspeyres matrix will be identical regardless of which set of data is used.
9 
A.1.3 1980 data 
Following from the above discussion, it is now possible to describe the 1980 ICP data 
used in this thesis. The 1980 data on prices and quantities of goods and services are 
from Phase IV of the ICP, and are available in hard copy in World Bank (1993) and 
electronically via the World Bank's *STARS* software. The 1980 ICP data cover 60 
countries and are available at a very disaggregated level. 
Table 6 of World Bank (1993) gives data for 1980 on per capita expenditure on different 
types of goods and services measured in national currencies , xf = ppf qf , where ppf = 
pf /pf SA is the parity of good l in country i (with the U.S. as the base country) and 
qf = xf / ppf is the per capita notional quantity of good l consumed in country i. Table 4 
of World Bank (1993) gives expenditures measured in international or world prices, 1rzqf, 
where 1rz is the international price of good l ( these prices are outputs of the Geary method 
of aggregation). The quantities in Table 4 are therefore measured in "international 
dollars". 
Table 5 of World Bank (1993) gives purchasing power parities, which are the nominal 
9 further, this property will hold regardless of whether basic heading level data or more aggregate data 
is being used. 
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expenditures in Table 6 divided by the real expenditures in Table 4, (pp}qt) / ( 1rzqt) 
ppf /1rz. Thus, Table 4 gives the ICP quantities (1rzqf) and Table 5 gives the ICP prices 
(ppf /1rz) which can be used to construct real income measures (these basic he~ding level 
data were used by Dowrick and Quiggin (1997), for example). 
The analysis in the thesis is conducted at a fairly aggregated level (the level of aggre-
gation covers 18 types of goods and services), and for reasons discussed in Chapter 1, 
only includes components of household expenditure.10 It should be noted that because 
aggregated, rather than basic heading level data are used in this thesis, the data used 
are therefore an output of the Geary method of aggregation ( and are derived using the 
method explained above). Thus, it is somewhat contradictory that while the methods 
of aggregation studied in this thesis are "competitors" to the Geary method, the lat-
ter method has been used in the preparation of the data which is used in the empirical 
implementation. However, aggregated data were only used for computational and presen-
tational e3:se ( and to avoid further issues with missing prices); all the methods discussed 
in this thesis could equally be applied to the basic heading level data. Further, while the 
Geary method is used to derive the consumption aggregates, they are still relatively dis-
aggregated and thus it can be argued that the use of the Geary method is not significantly 
"tainting" the results. 
Even at this relatively high level of aggregation, two countries (Bolivia and Sri Lanka) 
have missing price and quantity information. Bolivia is missing these data for the "other" 
category of expenditure and Sri Lanka is missing the data for the footwear category. So as 
to be able to keep these countries in the data set, it was decided to make an imputation for 
the missing data. It is possible that a country recorded zero expenditure on a particular 
good or service, and hence no imputation was made for the missing quantities. Two 
methods were used to impute for the missing prices. The missing price of footwear for 
Sri Lanka was imputed as the following: 
75 
~80 P footwear 80 
Pfootwear = 75 X Pclothing&footwear· 
P clothing&footwear 
Thus, the imputed price of footwear for 1980 reflects the same relativity between the price 
of footwear and the price at the next higher level of aggregation ( footwear and clothing) 
10Note that at this level of aggregation, the 1980 ICP data include quantities and prices for public 
medical expenditure, but since these data were missing for several countries it has not been included in 
the present study. 
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which was observed in 1975. Using this method, the imputed 1980 price of footwear for 
Sri Lanka is fJ}~otwear = 2.732/3.248 X 5.069 = 4.264. 
Bolivia was not in the 1975 data set, and hence the same method could not be used to 
impute for the price of "other" goods. Consequently, the imputed price of "other" goods 
was set equal to the price at the next higher level of aggregation, which is miscellaneous 
goods and services. 
Table A.6 presents the descriptive statistics of the ICP price and quantity data for the 
60 countries. 
A.1.4 1993 data 
The 1993 data are from phase VII of the I CP and cover 24 0 ECD countries ( at present 
the 1993 data can only be used for regional, rather than global comparisons). At the 
19-good level of disaggregation, three countries (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) 
had missing prices for public medical care; these missing prices were imputed for using 
the approach outlined above. Table A. 7 presents the descriptive statistics of the price 
and quantity data for the 24 OECD countries. 
A.2 Leisure Time, Wages and Demographic Data 
In Chapter 6, data on leisure time and wages are merged with the 1993 ICP data to 
compute leisure-inclusive welfare indexes (see Table A.8 for the descriptive statistics of 
these data). 
The data for leisure and wages were constructed using the methods outlined in Dowrick 
and Quiggin (1994). The number of hours worked per week per capita (hw) is calculated: 
h w = e/p x average hours per worker per week, 
where e/p is the employment-to-population ratio derived from Table 1 of OECD (1997). 
Average hours per worker per week is derived from Table 4A of the 1997 edition of the 
ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics. This variable measures average hours worked in 
all sectors of the economy, as opposed to average hours paid for (which includes annual 
leave and public holidays) .11 
11 Some countries only recorded average hours paid; an imputation was made for these countries. Where 
available , average hours worked by employees was used , but for some countries ( e.g. the U.S .) only average 
hours worked by wage earners was available. 
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Table A.6: 1980 ICP data (N = 60, K = 18) 
Quantities 
mean min. max. s 
1.1.1 Food 679.5 75.8 1505.0 394.6 1.000 
1.1.2 Beverages 97.1 0.4 307.3 101.5 1.500 
1.1. 3 Tobacco 47.1 1.2 184.0 42.6 1.240 
1.2.1 Clothing 178.6 10.8 855.0 170.8 1.068 
1. 2. 2 Footwear 37.1 0.0 116.4 28.1 1.082 
1.3.1 Gross rent 279.7 1.7 1072.1 294.9 1.370 
1.3.2 Fuel & power 96.8 2.7 588.2 118.1 1.256 
1.4.1 Furnishing & appliances 124.6 1.4 591.3 142.1 1.139 
1.4.2 Household goods & services 87.6 4.4 245.0 62.2 0.994 
1.5.1 Private medical care & services 190.2 3.1 758.8 197.0 1.001 
1.6.1 Personal transport equipment 74.9 0.1 490.5 119.9 1.744 
1.6.2 Operation of transport equipment 132.6 0.9 773.9 170.9 1.237 
1.6.3 Purchased transport 50.0 0.7 260.3 54.9 1.422 
1.6.4 Communication 29.8 0.1 181.9 36.9 1.461 
1.7.1 Recreation equipment & services 157.4 0.9 675.3 169.1 1.120 
1. 7.2 Education expenditure 180.5 14.1 503.9 131.7 0.910 
1.8.1 Personal care 90.6 0.5 722.3 111.9 1.096 
1.8.2 Other miscellaneous goods 214.3 0.0 923.5 266.6 1.052 
Note: In this table , prices are expressed in ICP units of food. 
Prices 
1.000 1.000 0.000 
0.353 4.563 0.828 
0.329 2.446 0.543 
0.440 2.374 0.375 
0.418 1.940 0.364 
0.309 4.248 0.812 
0.260 2.839 0.577 
0.466 2.453 0.375 
0.153 2.090 0.443 
0.234 2.250 0.414 
0.391 6.723 1.133 
0.302 2.248 0.380 
0.279 2.897 0.685 
0.251 4.482 0.881 
0.478 3.634 0.444 
0.207 2.246 0.604 
0.565 2.054 0.337 
0.201 2.571 0.463 
Table A. 7: 1993 ICP data (N = 24, K = 19) 
Quantities 
mean min. max. s 
1.1.1 Food 1737.0 1081.8 2747.8 354.4 1.000 
1.1.2 Beverages 309.2 13.4 480.6 100.2 1.102 
1.1.3 Tobacco 233.9 84.4 1213.5 215.4 1.187 
1.2.1 Clothing 596.3 271.8 1082.6 185.2 1.129 
1.2.2 Footwear 127.5 53.3 260.9 53.2 1.126 
1.3.1 Gross rent 1922.3 876.4 2710.7 556.6 0.971 
1.3.2 Fuel & power 511.6 165.0 1422.7 306.2 0.989 
1.4.1 Furnishing & appliances 458.5 193.4 996.1 186.0 1.114 
1.4.2 Household goods & services 371.1 162.7 692.8 134.9 1.033 
1.5.1 Private medical care & services 1087.0 165.4 2534.4 825.5 0.852 
1.5.1 Public medical care & services 620.3 0.0 1669.5 488.9 0.973 
1.6.1 Personal transport equipment 436.2 49.5 1912.1 378.6 1.321 
1.6.2 Operation of transport equipment 641.9 51.8 1428.0 284.2 1.203 
1.6.3 Purchased transport 310.7 113.9 791.5 151.8 0.964 
1.6.4 Communication 181.8 26.4 403.1 93.5 1.238 
1. 7 .1 Recreation equipment & services 865.8 79.9 1804.6 375.5 1.214 
1. 7.2 Education expenditure 1254.9 439.4 1932.9 347.6 0.842 
1.8.1 Personal care 368.6 122.8 908.7 167.0 1.091 
1.8.2 Other miscellaneous goods 1784.9 441.1 3191.9 652.5 1.017 
Note: In this table, prices are expressed in ICP units of food. 
Prices 
1.000 1.000 0.000 
0.784 1.587 0.267 
0.457 2.009 0.366 
0.841 1.594 0.204 
0.774 2.163 0.284 
0.362 1.598 0.266 
0.353 1.429 0.284 
0.768 1.576 0.189 
0.762 1.533 0.176 
0.466 1.605 0.220 
0.550 1.926 0.260 
0.579 2.592 0.445 
0.877 1.500 0.144 
0.442 1.360 0.251 
0.328 2.846 0.512 
0.838 1.667 0.197 
0.432 1.407 0.236 
0.830 1.652 0.182 
0.755 1.300 0.136 
> . 
t-...:> 
. 
rt 
(t) 
..... 
CJ) 
~ (t) 
r-3 
..... 
s (t) 
... 
t 
oq 
(t) 
00 
~ 
::::s 
0.. 
t:J 
(t) 
s 
0 
~ 
~ 
~ 
p-' 
..... 
(j 
t:J p, 
c:-t-
~ 
t-...:> 
C,}1 
v-' 
254 A. Data Definitions and Sources 
Table A.8: Data for analysis in Chapter 6, 1993 
mean min. max. s 
e/p 0.43 0.31 0.55 0.06 
Hours/worker /week 35.1 24.8 47.5 4.9 hw 15.1 11.2 24.9 3.0 
Wage share 0.521 0.312 0.642 0.068 
GDP (in ICP units of food) 19811.3 5595.0 32876.0 5754.3 
w (in ICP units of food per hour) 13.76 3.57 26.46 5.53 
pl5_64 66.4 62.0 69.8 2.0 
UR 9.0 2.5 22.7 4.6 
Leisure time per year (l) is calculated: 
l = (TX 7 - hw) X 52, 
where Tis the total amount of time that is split between working and leisure. 
The hourly wage rate ( w) per capita is calculated: 
w= 
GDP per capita x wage share 
(hW x 52) 
where GDP per capita is 1993 per capita nominal GDP from the ICP and the wage share 
is derived from OECD (1996) as the ratio of compensation of employees paid by resident 
producers to GDP (in current prices). 
The standardised unemployment rate (UR) is from Annex Table 22 of OECD (2000) .12 
The percentage of the population aged 15-64 years (p15-64 ) is from Table 1 of OECD 
(1997) . 
A.3 Data Sources 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997) , Labour Force Statis-
tics, 1976-96, Paris. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1996), National Accounts, 
1960-94, Main Aggregates ( Vol. I) , Paris. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2000), OECD Economic Out-
look, Paris. 
United Nations (1986 ,7), World Comparisons of Purchasing Power and Real Product for 
12Standardised unemployment rates were not available for three countries - the unemployment rate 
constructed using the count ry specific methodology (Annex Table 21 ) was used for these countries. 
A.3. Data Sources 
1980, Vols I and II, United Nations and Commission of the European Communities. 
United Nations (1992), Handbook of the International Comparison Programme, 
ST /ESA/STAT /SER.F /62, New York. 
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The World Bank (1993), Purchasing Power of Currencies: Comparing National Incomes 
Using ICP Data, Washington, D.C. 
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Appendix B 
Summary of Mathematical 
Results and Geometric Concepts 
This Appendix contains a summary of mathematical results and geometric concepts 
referred to in the text. 
B.1 Mathematical Results 
The Kuhn-Tucker Theorem 
Consider the problem: 1 
maxF(x) subject to G(x) < c, x > 0 
X 
Form the Lagrangian: 
L(x, A) = F(x) + A[c - G(x)] 
Suppose x* maximises F(x) subject to G(x) < c and x > 0, and the constraint qualifi-
cation holds. Then there is a value of A such that: 
Lx(x*, A) < 0, x > 0, with complementary slackness 
L>..(x*, A) > 0, A> 0, with complementary slackness 
If x is constrained to be positive, then the Khun-Tucker conditions become: 
Lx ( x*, A) = 0, x > 0 
L>.. (x*, A) > 0, A > 0, with complementary slackness 
1 This presentation is from Dixit (1990). 
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If the G(x) constraints are assumed to hold with equality, then the Khun-Tucker condi-
tions become: 
Lx(x*, A) < 0, x > 0, with complementary slackness 
L >. ( x* , A) = 0, A > 0 
If x is constrained to be positive and the G(x) constraints hold with equality, then the 
Khun-Tucker conditions become: 
The Envelope Theorem 
Consider the problem:2 
Lx ( x*, A) = 0, x > 0 
L>. (x*, A) = 0, A > 0 
maxF(x, a) subject to G(x, a) < c, x > 0, 
X 
where x is a vector of choice variables and a is a vector of parameters which may enter 
the objective function, the constraint, or both. The solution will clearly depend upon a; 
denote this solution x(a). 
Define a new function M(a), which is the value achieved by the objective function when x 
is chosen to maximise F subject to the constraints. M(a) is the maximum value function 
and is defined: 
M(a) _ maxF(x , a) subject to G(x, a ) < c , x > 0 
X 
The maximum value function can equivalently be defined as: 
M(a) - F(x(a) , a) , 
where x(a) is the optimal solution to the problem. The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
L(x, a , A) = F (x , a) + A[c - G(x, a)] 
Let (x(a) , A(a) ) solve the Khun-Tucker conditions. The Envelope Theorem states: 
BM(a ) = BL I = BF(x , a) I _ A(a) BG(x, a) I 
Bai Bai x (a),>.(a) Bai x (a) Bai x (a),>-(a) 
2This presentation is from Jehle (1991) . 
B .1. Mathematical Results 
Roy's Identity 
Let 'ljJ ( x, p) be an indirect utility function. Then: 
. ( ) _ o'l/J ( x, P) opi 
qi x, p - - o'ljJ(x, p )ox 
Shephard's Lemma 
Let e ( U, p) be a differentiable expenditure function. Then: 
oe(U, p) _ 
= hi ( u, p) = qi ( X' p) 
'Pi 
Homogeneous Functions 
A real valued function f (x) is called homogeneous of degree k iff for all 0 > 0: 
f (0x) gk f (x). 
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It is worth noting two special cases. The function f (x) is homogeneous of degree 1 or 
linearly homogeneous iff for all 0 > 0: 
f (0x) = 0 f (x). 
The function /(x) is homogeneous of degree zero iff for all 0 > 0: 
f (0x) - f (x). 
It can be shown (see, for example, Jehle (1991, p.71)) that if f(x) is homogeneous of 
degree k, then its partial derivatives are homogeneous of degree k - 1: 
8f(0x) = gk-i of(x) 
OX[ OX[ • 
An important implication of this is that the slopes of the level surfaces of a homogeneous 
function are constant along rays through the origin: 
8f(0x) BJ(x) 
8x1 _ Bxz 
a f(0x) - 7ff[x) ' 
Bxm Bxm 
for all 0 > 0. Note, however, that certain non-homogeneous functions will have this same 
property. For example, affine transformations of homogeneous functions are themselves 
not homogenous, yet the slopes of the level surfaces are constant along rays through the 
ong1n. 
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B.2 Geometric Concepts 
Convex hulls 
The set of all the limit points of a set S is called the derived set of S. The union of S 
and its derived set is called the closure of S. 
For a given set S a convex hull is the smallest convex set containing S. 
For a given finite set S, a polytope is the smallest set containing S. A polytope is convex 
if and only if any line containing an edge of the polytope does not contain any interior 
points (a convex polytope is also known as a convex polyhedron). A concave polytope is 
any polytope that is not convex (see Figures (B.l) and (B.2)). 
Figure B.2: A concave polytope 
Figure B.l: A convex polytope 
Cones 
K is a cone if a > 0 and q E K implies aq E K. Thus in ffi.2 , an example of K is 
a half line or ray starting from the origin. K is a convex cone if it is a cone with the 
additional property that x , y E K implies x + y E K. Thus the set of two different half 
lines starting from the origin is a cone, but not a convex cone ( the set X U Y in Figure 
B.3 is an example of a cone, but not a convex cone). If the set includes the area inside 
two half lines with an acute angle, then it is a convex cone (Figure B.4). 
For a given finite set S , a polyhedral is the smallest cone containing S while a convex 
polyhedral is the smallest convex cone containing S. Thus, in ffi.2 a polyhedral consists of 
the smallest number of half lines starting from the origin which include all the points in S 
(in Figure B.5 , the set XUYUZ is a polyhedral). A convex polyhedral includes the area 
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X 
y y 
Figure B.3: A cone Figure B.4: A convex cone 
inside the two half lines with the smallest acute angle which results in S being a subset 
of the convex polyhedral (Figure B.6). Finally, a concave polyhedral is any polyhedral 
which is not convex. 
X 
z 
y y 
Figure B.5: A polyhedral Figure B.6: A convex polyhedral 
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Appendix C 
Programs and Data Files 
The empirical analysis in this thesis was conducted using programs written in Visual 
Basic (VB), C and Gauss. These programs, and the associated data files are described 
in this Appendix and are available on request from the author. Note that while the 
programs were written as carefully and clearly as possible, they are not completely "user 
friendly" and therefore they are released to researchers "as is". In particular, to use these 
programs one will need to edit the code to suit the task at hand. 
C.1 Visual Basic Programs and Data Files 
Visual Basic (in Microsoft Excel) was used for the majority of the analytical work. The 
following is a description of the directory \ excel_-wrk. 
There are two types of spreadsheets - spreadsheets containing VB code and those contain-
ing data. The data spreadsheets are titled dat1980.xls (1980 ICP data), dat1993.xls 
(1993 ICP data) and examdat.xls (example data). The ICP data were obtained from 
the World Bank's *STARS* software, and it should be noted that they only cover house-
hold consumption expenditure (not including net expenditure of residents abroad). For 
further details of the ICP data, see Appendix A. 
\harpgarp - subdirectory containing general programs 
Harpgarp.xls contains the VB code for data set manipulation, testing of G ARP, HARP 
and AHARP. The procedures within this spreadsheet are designed to work on data 
contained in the data spreadsheets. 
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The procedure Data_mod.Data creates a subset of price and quantity data and then 
calculates certain matrices ( such as the matrix of log Laspeyres indexes) which are used 
as input into-the revealed preference (RP) tests. These matrices are printed in worksheets 
in the data spreadsheets. The worksheet info_t in the data spreadsheets is used to select 
the sample of countries for the analysis ( column C) and the number of goods and services 
(column G) . 
The procedure Data_mod.Data_affine performs the same calculations as Data_mod.Data, 
except it works on marginal consumption data - quantities in excess of the minimum sub-
sistence bundle which is contained in the worksheets gamma in the data spreadsheets (in 
sub-directories \affine and \leisure). 
The procedure GARP _mod.GARP uses Warshall's algorithm to test for GARP (as 
per Varian (1982)). Results of the test are printed in the worksheet GARPlog in the 
data spreadsheets. 
The procedure HARP _mod.HARP uses Warshall's algorithm to test for HARP ( as 
per Varian (1983)). Results of the test are printed in the worksheet HARPlog in the data 
spreadsheets , and the minimum path matrix (and Ideal Afriat Index) are printed in the 
worksheet M. If the procedure Data_affine is run before running HARP _mod.HARP, 
then the test will be of AHARP and the worksheet M will contain the minimum path 
matrix defined over marginal quantities and the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index. 
The procedure HARP __searcher _mod.HARP __searcher is used to iterate through the 
countries and select the largest set of countries sharing common homothetic preferences. 
This routine takes a long time in VB , so it has also been implemented in C (see below). 
The procedure Bounds_as_add_mod.Bounds_as_add prints in the worksheet bounds_add_log 
t he t rue bounds ( derived from M) as countries are iteratively added to the set satisfying 
HARP. This was used in Chapter 3. 
The procedure IAMI_bounds_mod.IAMI_bounds calculates the Ideal Afriat Marginal 
Index for different ,s (found using a C program to be described below) and calculates 
overall bounds to the this index and the implied rankings. The results are printed in the 
worksheet IAMJ_bounds. This was used in Chapter 5. 
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\Bbc - subdirectory for improved G ARP analysis in Chapter 2 
The spreadsheet rp_bbc.xls contains two modules for conducting improved GARP tests 
of the representative consumer hypothesis and constructing improved GARP bounds to 
the bilateral true welfare indexes. The modules were used in the analysis in Chapter 
2 and are based on results in Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (1998). The module 
cb_H_mod uses homothetic expansion paths (this replicates the minimum path matrix, 
and is used only as a test of the BBC algorithms). The module cb_QHexact_mod uses 
quasi-homothetic preferences. 
\ ChavCox - subdirectory for Afriat envelope analysis in Chapter 2 
The spreadsheet chav _env4.xls contains three modules for constructing Afriat envelope 
functions and the implied bounds to the bilateral true welfare indexes. The modules were 
used in the analysis in Chapter 2 and are based on results in Chavas and Cox (1997). 
The module Afr _Uncond_mod constructs unconditional Afriat inner and outer bound 
envelope functions when preferences are general. The unconditional Afriat numbers are 
used as input into the module Afr _Cond_mod which constructs inner-bound and outer-
bound representations of the expenditure function , and the bounds to the bilateral true 
indexes implied by these representations. The module Afr _U ncond_mod_h constructs 
the unconditional Afriat numbers under the assumption of homotheticity. This module 
replicates the minimum path matrix. 
\Die-wPark - subdirectory for mathematical programs used in Chapter 2 
The spreadsheet Diew85_lp.xls contains two modules which conduct mathematical pro-
gram tests of common preferences using results from Diewert and Parkan (1985). The 
module G ARP _LP _mod conducts the mathematical program test of common general 
preferences. The module HARP _LP _mod conducts the mathematical program test of 
common homothetic preferences. 
\ Var82 - subdirectory for GARP analysis in Chapter 2 
There are two spreadsheets containing VB code in this subdirectory. 
The spreadsheet Var82_Afr .xls contains two modules. The module Afrcomb_mod 
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computes conditional Afriat numbers using the combinatorial algorithm (Algorithm 3) 
in Varian (1982). The module Afrcomb_h_mod computes conditional homothetic Afriat 
numbers using a modified version of the combinatorial algorithm in Varian (1982). 
The spreadsheet Var82_bounds.xls contains one module. The module GARP _bounds_mod 
calculates the classical and fixed-weight bounds to the bilateral true welfare index and 
the GARP bounds suggested by Varian (1982). 
\e_effic - subdirectory for analysis in Chapter 4 
There are two spreadsheets containing VB code in this subdirectory. 
The spreadsheet e_effic.xls contains two modules. The module e_effic_mod is used to 
test HARP with different levels of consumer optimisation error and constructs the min-
imum path matrix. Note: the procedure Data_mod.Data must be run before running 
e_effic_mod. The module e_effic_searcher _mod is used to iterate over non-homothetic 
countries and finds the level of the Afriat efficiency parameter ( e*) necessary so that each 
country is found to share homothetic preferences. Note: the procedure Data_mod.Data 
must be run before running e_effic_searcher _mod. 
The spreadsheet envel.xls contains two modules. The module envel_mod_h is used 
to construct inner and outer Afriat envelope functions (as per Chavas and Cox (1997)), 
conditional on the Afriat numbers contained in the minimum path matrix ( thus it in 
fact constructs unconditional inner and outer envelope functions). Note: the procedures 
Data_mod.Data and HARP _mod.HARP must be run before running envel_mod.Ji. 
The module impute_mod_h is used to impute utility bounds ( using the Afriat envelope 
functions) for those countries which do not share common homothetic preferences. Note: 
the procedures Data_mod.Data and HARP _mod.HARP must be run before running 
impute_mod.Ji. 
\affine - subdirectory for analysis in Chapter 5 
This subdirectory contains only data spreadsheets. The code for finding the set of ,s 
consistent with AHARP (and the mean ,) was written in C (see below). Once the 
mean , has been estimated in C, it is then placed in the worksheet gamma in the 
data spreadsheets and the Ideal Afriat Marginal Index is calculated using the procedures 
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Data_mod.Data_affine and HARP _mod.HARP described above. 
\leisure - subdirectory for analysis in Chapter 6 
This subdirectory contains only data spreadsheets. The spreadsheet w _h_dat93.xls 
contains the raw data for hours of work and wages, pop93.xls contains the calculations 
for adjusting the 1980 hours of work data for cross-country differences in demographic 
composition and Leidat93.xls contains the worksheets for the calculation of the leisure-
inclusive welfare indexes described in Chapter 6. 
C.2 C Programs and Data Files 
The C programming language was used to conduct some of the iterative routines which 
took too long to run in VB. The programming was performed using the Linux oper-
ating system with the GCC compiler. The following is a discussion of the files in the 
directory \ C_wrk. The analysis of the 1980 and 1993 ICP data is separated into the two 
subdirectories \80_wrk and \93_wrk. 
The program icp_prog.c contains the source code ( this program is called icp_prog_93.c 
in \93_-wrk). This program contains several procedures - to run a particular procedure 
it is necessary to edit the source to make the procedure active (inactive procedures 
are commented out) and then re-compile the code to create an executable file. All 
procedures require three input files: p_kl 8. dat (ICP price data on 18 goods), p_kl 8. dat 
(ICP quantity data on 18 goods) and subset. dat ( the data file which is used to select 
which countries are in the analysis). Thus, to select a particular subset of countries for 
analysis, subset.dat must be edited accordingly, and then icp_prog.c compiled (with the 
appropriate procedure activated). It should also be noted that the user has to manually 
set the variables k and Kin icp_prog.c. Also note that the Afriat efficiency parameter e* 
(labeled e in the program) must be set at a particular value. Note that p_k19.dat contains 
ICP price data on 18 goods, plus wages and q_k19_l0.dat contains ICP quantity data on 
18 goods, plus leisure (where T = 24) and q_k19_l0_adj.dat contains ICP quantity data 
on 18 goods, plus leisure (where T = 24 and data have been adjusted for cross-country 
differences in demographic composition) .1 
1 Note that the 1993 data includes one extra good (public medical care). 
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The main procedures in icp_prog.c are now described. 
HARP _searcher Starting with an initial (arbitrarily selected) subset of four countries, 
this procedure iterates over the remaining countries and find the maximum number of 
countries satisfying HARP. The set of countries shown to share common homothetic 
preferences is printed in the output file HARP sub. dat. 
AHARP _searcher Starting with an initial (arbitrarily selected) subset of four coun-
tries, this procedure iterates over the remaining countries and find the maximum number 
of countries satisfying AHARP. A particular country is added to the set of countries 
satisfying AHARP if AHARP is satisfied for at least 10 ,s out of a possible 1000 draws 
from the uniform distribution of potential subsistence bundles. The set of countries sat-
isfying AHARP is printed in the output file A HARP sub. dat. Details of the number of 
random draws of 1 performed for each country, and the values of 1 which satisfy AHARP 
are printed in the file AHA RP searcher. out. The number of successful draws out of 1000 
required for a country to be added to the AHARP set of countries can be changed by 
altering the parameter gam_n_t__search (initially set to 10). 
AHARP _test For the countries selected using the procedure AHARP _searcher, 
there exist an infinite number of subsistence bundles which result in these countries 
sharing common affine homothetic preferences. The procedure AHARP _test is used 
to collect an "adequate sample" of these consistent ,s and then calculate the mean of 
this set ( which is then used in the construction of the Ideal Afriat Marginal welfare in-
dex using the VB procedures Data_affine and HARP _mod.HARP). The number of 
consistent ,s required for an "adequate sample" is arbitrary - it is set to 500 at present, 
but can be changed by changing the parameter gam_n_t_test. The file AHARPtest.out 
contains the printout the results of AHARP _test, including the number of random 
draws required to collect the sample of consistent 1 s, the values of the consistent ,s, and 
relevant descriptive statistics such as minimum, maximum, mean. 
CalcElasticities The procedure CalcElasticities is used to calculate estimated in-
come elasticities of demand. The file gamma. dat contains the vector of mean ,s ( obtained 
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from the procedure AHARP _test) which is used as input into CalcElasticities, and 
the file elast. out contains the printout of the estimated elasticities. 
C.3 Gauss Programs 
Gauss was used for calculating the Geary index using the matrix algebra approach sug-
gested by Neary (2000). The file Geary.prg in the subdirectory \gauss_Yrk contains the 
Gauss code and the example data from Appendix A. 
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List of Notation 
Concepts which are used frequently throughout this thesis have a common notation; 
hence, in this list, the notation is given only for the first chapter in which it occurs. 
Chapter 1 
N 
K 
pi 
qi 
p.q 
Qij 
X 
Xz 
q(x,p) 
u(q) 
u 
h(U, p) 
'lf;(x, p) 
e(U, p) 
d(Ur, q) 
Wz 
ec(Ui, pJ) 
7r 
€ 
II 
number of countries in the data set 
number of commodities 
price vector for country i, with typical element Pi, l = l, ... , K 
quantity vector for country i, with typical element qf, l = l, ... , K 
the inner product of p and q 
index expressing welfare of country i relative to that of country j 
outlay, budget or total expenditure ( = p.q) 
expenditure on good l ( = pzqz) 
Marshallian demand function 
(unobservable) utility function 
(unobservable) utility level ( = u( q)) 
Hicksian demand function 
indirect utility function 
expenditure function 
distance function ( = max8{ 5 : u( q/ 5) > ur}) 
budget share for commodity l (= pzqz/x) 
classical approximation to expenditure function 
( = minq pJ .q subject to pi .q = xi) 
Geary "world prices" · 
Geary "true" exchange rates 
GAIA "world prices" 
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272 List of Notation 
E G AIA "true" exchange rates 
qzi G AIA imputed quantity 
Chapter 2 
RD directly revealed preferred relation: qiRDq if pi.qi> pi.q 
pD strictly directly revealed preferred relation: qi pD q if pi .qi > pi .q 
R revealed preferred relation: the transitive closure of RD 
P strictly revealed preferred relation: qi Pq if :3 qJ, ql such that 
qiRqJ, qJ pDql, qlRq 
w ( q) utility function that rationalises the demand data 
RW ( q0 ) set of observations revealed worse to q0 , { q : q0 Pq} 
RP( q') set of observations revealed preferred to q', { q: qPq'} 
NRW(q0 ) set of observations not revealed worse than q0 , 
{ q : pi .q > pi .qi for all qi such that q0 Rqi} 
W utility level(= w(q)) , or Afriat number 
,\ marginal utility of income, or Afriat number 
x E X x belongs to X ( x is a member of X) 
x i X x does not belong to X ( x is not a member of X) 
X\Y {x:xEX,xiY} 
XUY {x:x EX,x EY} 
X C Y X is contained in Y ( X is a subset of Y) 
X ::J Y X contains in Y ( X is a supset of Y) 
C X is contained in Y or is equivalent to Y 
G matrix summarising relation RD: Gij = 1 if qi RD qJ, 0 otherwise 
H matrix summarising relation R : H ij = l if qi RqJ , 0 otherwise 
P matrix summarising relation pD: Pij = l if qi pD qJ , 0 otherwise 
v 2 normalised prices (=pi /pi .qi) 
emax(Ui, pJ) improved (via RP) upper bound to expenditure function 
emin(Ui, pJ) improved (via RP) lower bound to expenditure function 
p ( q O) { q : u ( q ) > u ( q O)} 
m( q0 , p) money metric utility function proposed by Varian (1982) 
(= inf p.q subject to q in P (q 0 ) ) 
List of Notation 
m+(qo,p) 
m-(qo, p) 
am+(q0 , p) 
m-(qo,p) 
mI+(qo,p) 
mI-(qo,p) 
CM(q0 ) 
CM(q0 ) 
EP(pi) 
w1(q, W) 
wo(q, W, .-\) 
wu1(q) 
wuo(q) 
e1(WS,p) 
eo(WS,p) 
Chapter 3 
A 
a(q) 
A 
a 
Chapter 4 
1{ 
R 
upper bound on money metric function, 
( = inf p .q subject to q in RP( q0 )) 
lower bound on money metric function, 
(= infp.q subject to q in NRW(q0 )) 
approximation to m+(q0 ,p) , (= minp.qi such that qiRq0 ) 
approximation to m- ( q0 , p), ( = min p.qj such that 
pi .qj > pi .qi for all qi such that q0 Rqi) 
upper bound on money metric function, calculated using 
expansion path information 
lower bound on money metric function, calculated using 
expansion path information 
interior of convex hull of { q: q >qi, qi Rq0 } 
closure of CM(q0 ) 
expansion path for country i 
conditional inner envelope function 
conditional outer envelope function 
unconditional inner envelope function 
unconditional outer envelope function 
unconditional inner-bound representation of expenditure function 
unconditional outer-bound representation of expenditure function 
unobservable marginal utility of income 
homothetic utility function that rationalises the demand data 
homothetic utility level ( = a( q)), or Afriat number 
= log A 
set of countries which share common homothetic preferences 
set of countries which do not share common homothetic preferences 
with countries in H 
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a1( q, A) 
ao(q, A) 
au1( q) 
auo(q) 
e* 
RD(e*) 
R(e*) 
Chapter 5 
conditional inner homothetic envelope function 
conditional outer homothetic envelope function 
unconditional inner homothetic envelope function 
unconditional outer homothetic envelope function 
Afriat efficiency index 
directly revealed preferred relation ( efficiency level e*): 
qiRD(e*)q if e*pi.qi > pi.q 
transitive closure of RD ( e*) 
1 minimum subsistence consumption bundle 
g set of minimum subsistence consumption bundles 
G number of bundles sampled from g 
Chapter 6 
List of Notation 
l (supernumerary) leisure time consumed per capita per year 
')'K+l minimum subsistence leisure per capita per year 
u( q , l) leisure-augmented utility function 
h hours of work per capita per year 
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